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For my parents, whom I believed to be omniscient in my childhood 
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Abstract 
The aim of this work is to shed light on the concept of omniscience and 
demonstrate that it plays crucial roles in a number of important 
philosophical topics, particularly in the philosophy of religion and the 
philosophy of mind. In Part I, I try to provide a proper formulation of 
omniscience and show that the issue of omniscience emerges 1n many 
distinct areas of philosophy, such as the philosophy of religion, 
epistemology, aesthetics, the philosophy of language, logic and the 
philosophy of mind. In Part II, I focus on the philosophy of religion and 
analyse two arguments that are held to refute the existence of an 
omniscient God: the argument from knowledge de se and the argument 
from concept possession. I evaluate the existing objections to these 
arguments and demonstrate that none of them is successful. I then provide 
my own objections to the arguments by utilising the concept of 
omniscience. To evaluate these anti-theist arguments is an important task 
in itself. However, in Part ill, I argue that my analyses of the arguments 
are applicable to quite different arguments in the philosophy of mind: 
Thomas Nagel' s bat argument and Frank Jackson's know ledge argument, 
both of which purport to undermine the dominant physicalist position on 
Abstract 
the mind-body problem. I construe the arguments in terms of omniscience 
and, on that basis, I maintain that the argument from knowledge de se is 
parallel to the bat argument, and that the argument from concept 
possession is parallel to the knowledge argument. By comparing the 
knowledge argument and the bat argument with their counterparts I 
construct new objections to the arguments. 
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Preface 
When I first became interested in philosophy I was fascinated by two 
philosophical topics in particular. The first was the existence of God in the 
philosophy of religion. How could we prove the existence or non-existence 
of the greatest possible being that is worthy of religious worship? I was 
impressed by philosophers' great efforts to prove the existence and non-
existence of God. The second was the mystery of phenomenal 
consciousness in the philosophy of mind. How could the phenomenal 
aspect of perceptual experience be realised in the brain, which is nothing 
but an aggregation of billions of individually non-sentient neurons? I was 
impressed by philosophers ' elaborate attempts to formulate and solve this 
deep metaphysical mystery. 
The goal of the present work is to bridge these two distinct topics in 
two different areas of philosophy by appealing to the concept 
'omniscience'. 
This work is divided into three parts. In Part I, I try to demonstrate 
that the issue of omniscience emerges, not only in the philosophy of 
religion and the philosophy of mind, but also in other areas of philosophy, 
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such as epistemology, aesthetics, the philosophy of language and logic. I 
claim that the concept plays crucial roles in each area. 
In Part II, I focus on the philosophy of religion and analyse two 
arguments that allegedly refute the existence of an omniscient God: the 
argument from know ledge de se and the argument from concept 
possession. I maintain that the existing objections to these arguments are 
unsuccessful and construct new objections to the arguments. 
To evaluate these anti-theist arguments is an important task in itself. 
However, in Part III I argue that my analyses of the arguments are 
applicable to quite different arguments in the philosophy of mind: Thomas 
Na gel's bat argument and Frank Jackson's know ledge argument. I 
demonstrate that the argument from know ledge de se is parallel to the bat 
argument, and that the argument from concept possession is parallel to the 
know ledge argument. I argue that the bat argument and the know ledge 
argument fail to undermine the physicalist position on the mind-body 
problem by utilising my analyses of the anti-theist arguments. 
This work draws upon material that has been published as papers in 
various journals. Chapter 2 draws heavily on my papers 'Divine 
Omniscience and Knowledge De Se', 2003, International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion, Volume 53, Issue 2, pp. 73-82 and 'God's Point of 
View: A Reply to Mander', 2003, Heythrop Journal: A Quarterly Review 
of Philosophy and Theology, Volume 44, Issue 1, pp. 60-63. The second 
last section of Chapter 3 consists almost entirely of my paper 'Divine 
Omniscience and Experience: A Reply to Alter', 2003, Ars Disputandi, 
Volume 3. Chapter 5 comes from my paper 'Thomas vs. Thomas: A New 
Approach to Nagel's Bat Argument', 2003, Inquiry, Volume 46, Number 3, 
pp. 377-394. Finally, Chapter 6 comes from 'The Knowledge Argument 
Against Dualism', 2002, Theoria, Volume LXVIII, Part 3, pp. 205-223. I 
would like to thank Kluwer Publishing Company, Blackwell Publishing, 
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the Utrecht University, Taylor and Francis, and Theoria for letting me use 
the material again here. 
Part of Chapter 2 was read at the Pacific Regional Meeting of the 
Society of Christian Philosophers in Spokane, Washington in 2002 and the 
Eastern Di vision Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in 
Philadelphia in 2002. Part of Chapter 5 was given at the ANU Philosophy 
Society in Canberra in 2002. Part of Chapter 6 was read at the ANU 
Philosophy Society in Canberra in 2001 and at the Toward a Science of 
Consciousness conference in Tucson, Arizona in 2002. I would like to 
thank the American Philosophical Association and the Philosophy 
Program at the Australian National University for their financial support 
for my attendance at the conferences. I would also like to thank all in the 
audiences, including Harriet Baber, Stephen Biggs, Campbell Brown, 
David J. Chalmers, Philippe Chuard, Daniel Cohen, Nie Damnjanovic, 
Mitchell Joe, Josh Parsons, Karen Riley, Howard Robinson, Kim Sterelny, 
Charles Taliaferro and Keith Wyma. 
Lisa Bortolotti read an entire draft of this work. I would like to 
acknowledge gratefully her feedback, which led to numerous 
improvements of this work. I am also grateful to the following people for 
their useful comments and constructive suggestions on various parts of this 
work: Ben Blumson, William Hasker, Daniel Hill, Peter Ludlow, Graham 
Oppy, Thomas Sullivan, Chris Wright and anonymous referees for Ars 
Disputandi, Inquiry, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and 
Theoria. Without Torin Alter' s and Patrick Grim' s inspiring works I 
would not have seen the connection between the arguments in the 
philosophy of religion and in the philosophy of mind. I would like to thank 
them warmly. 
I would also like to thank Karen Bennett and Laura Schroeter, who 
were members of my advisory panel while they were at the Australian 
X 
Preface 
National University, for their helpful feedback on my work, and Michael 
Smith, the Head of the Philosophy Program, for his encouragement and 
support. I am deeply indebted to my supervisors, Martin Davies and Frank 
Jackson, whose useful suggestions and insightful advice have made a 
significant effect on the development of my research. I also owe a deep 
debt, of a different sort, to my family and friends for their loving support. 
Finally, my greatest debt is to Daniel Stoljar, my principal supervisor, who 
taught me how to tackle intractable philosophical puzzles through helpful 
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Part I 
Omniscience 
Chapter 1 
Omniscience in P'hilosophy 
1.1 Introduction 
To be omnis ient is to kno\;r, e\ erything; in particular) to be omniscient 
about a subject matter is to knov~ ever:, hing about the subject matter. 
Omni ien e is} of ourse, best knov, n as one of the neces attributes of 
the traditional J udaeo-Christian God or the God in the . Anselmian tradition. 
\-;r,-hat follo\VS I use the \YOrd , 1 Judaeo-Christian God}} · Anselmian 
God, and iGod) inter hangeably. Scripture sa" } for instance) 'God is 
greater than our heans! and he kno\YS eYerything) 1 J obn °: _Q .. But \vhat 
ex tly doe it mean that one kno\YS eYerything or one is omniscient'? 
It h long been re o gnised b~ philosophers of religion that defining 
ornni orence 1 another ne- e~ ary attribute of God, is an enormou l; 
diffi ult t ~ k. \\neneYer a ne\Y ormulation o omnipoten e i introduced! 
0\1.-erful ounter-argumenr- oon follo\1.-. Peter Gea h 197 , for 
example! cL - :ri er the ~imation a- follO\YS: 
La Croi"'\. 19 . Thoma P . 
9 Ho~--~-~ 
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When people have tried to read into 'God can do everything' a 
signification not of Pious Intention but Philosophical Truth, they 
have only landed themselves in intractable problems and hopeless 
confusions; no graspable sense has ever been given to this sentence 
that did not lead to self-contradiction or at least to conclusions 
manifestly untenable from the Christian point of view. (p. 4 ). 
Similarly, Richard La Croix (1978) writes: 
[I]t is impossible to produce a satisfactory definition of 
'omnipotence' which universally generalises over persons because 
any such definition will entail either that a being is omnipotent who 
is clearly not omnipotent or that if God is omnipotent then he is not 
omniscient, not omnipresent, and not all-loving. (p. 219) 
By contrast, it is generally regarded as a much easier task to define 
omniscience. Anthony Kenny (1979), for example, explicitly states, 'The 
doctrine of omniscience is easy to formulate precisely' (p. 10). But is this 
really true? Many philosophers often think that omnipotence is difficult to 
define because such definition requires the prior definition of ability. 
Ability itself is difficult to define because it appears to involve 
counterf actuals, which require careful treatment. 2 On the other hand, 
omniscience does not obviously involve counterfactuals. For while 
omnipotence concerns what one can do omniscience concerns what one 
does know. 3 However, defining omniscience cannot be so easy because 
such definition requires the prior definition of knowledge. Needless to say, 
Morriston (2001b), Bruce R. Reichenbach (1980), Richard Swinburne (1973), Erik J. 
Wielenberg (2000), Edward Wierenga (1983). 
2 One might define, for example, an ability to speak French as follows: One can speak 
French if and only there is a possible world in which one speaks French. However, this 
sort of simple conditional analysis of ability is highly implausible. See Chapter 4 of this 
work. 
3 I discuss this point in detail in Chapter 2. 
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knowledge is widely regarded as one of the most intractable concepts in 
philosophy. 4 Moreover, there are a number of neglected arguments against 
the traditional formulation of omniscience, some of which are very 
powerful. As I explain below, once those arguments are taken seriously it 
is not as easy as it initially appears to provide a proper formulation of 
omn1sc1ence. 
Since omniscience is best-known as one of the divine attributes, the 
concept of omniscience has been discussed mainly in the philosophy of 
religion. I argue in the following, however, that the issue of omniscience 
arises in a number of other areas of philosophy. 
This chapter has the following structure. In Section 1.2 I introduce 
what I think is a correct formulation of omniscience. From Sections 1.3 to 
1.8, I demonstrate that the concept of omniscience appears, and plays 
important roles, in many areas of philosophy. I argue that a number of 
distinct ideas in philosophy should be construed either as challenges to the 
possibility of one's being omniscient or arguments that lead to challenges 
to the possibility of one's being omniscient. In particular, I discuss the 
concept of omniscience in the philosophy of religion in Section 1.3, 
epistemology in 1.4, aesthetics in 1.5, the philosophy of language in 1.6, 
logic in 1.7 and the philosophy of mind in 1.8. Finally, in Section 1.9, I 
argue that the arguments that I discuss in this chapter are divided into two 
categories. 
4 As we will see, I make some minimal , uncontroversial assumptions about knowledge in 
this work. For example, I assume that if one knows that p then it is true that p. However, I 
make no attempt to define knowledge. I try to minimise the dependence on a specific 
definition of knowledge in my discussions. 
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1.2 Definitions of Omniscience 
As I mentioned earlier, Scripture states that 'God knows everything' (1 
John 3: 20). If we construe this statement literally as a correct description 
of God's omniscience we can formulate omniscience in general as follows: 
(1) For any x, xis omniscient if and only if x knows everything. 
This formulation of omniscience is analogous to the following formulation 
of omnipotence: 
(2) For any x, xis omnipotent if and only if x can do anything. 
To the extent that (2) does not set any restrictions on x' s ability or power 
(1) does not set any restrictions on x' s knowledge. 
(1) is, however, clearly unsatisfactory because it does not exclude the 
absurdity that an omniscient being knows meaningless non-propositions. 
(Similarly, (2) is unsatisfactory because it does not exclude the absurdity 
that an omnipotent being can perform meaningless non-tasks.) In order to 
solve this problem we can revise (1) as follows: 
(3) For any x and any proposition p, xis omniscient if and only if x 
knows that p. 
(3) is analogous to the following formulation of omnipotence: 
( 4) For any x and any task k, xis omnipotent if and only if x can do 
k. 
(3) is, however, also unsatisfactory. Consider the following 
proposition: 
(5) A square is seven-sided. 
Although (5) is a meaningful proposition nobody, not even an omniscient 
being, knows (5) because (5) is false. In general, if a proposition p is false 
then one cannot know that p, because the truth condition of knowledge is 
not satisfied. (Similarly, ( 4) is often regarded as being unsatisfactory as a 
formulation of omnipotence. For, if ( 4) is true, an omnipotent being can 
create, for instance, a seven-sided square, which seems absurd. Drawing a 
5 
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seven-sided square is not a proper task but a 'pseudo task' .5) Put this point 
in a different way. If (3) is a correct formulation of omniscience then we 
can easily show that there is no omniscient being by constructing the 
following absurd argument: Consider a proposition P. If (3) is true then an 
omniscient being must know that P, because according to (3) an 
omniscient being knows all propositions. Suppose, however, that P is false. 
If P is false then it is impossible for any being to know that P because, in 
general, one can know that p only if it is true that p. Therefore, for any x 
and for the proposition P, the right hand of side of the biconditional in (3) 
is false and consequently the left hand is false too. And, hence there is no 
omniscient being. 
Proponents of (3) might respond as follows. If we accept ( 4 ), which is 
in fact accepted by a number of philosophers6, then an omnipotent being 
like God must be able to perform literally any task, including tasks that it 
is logically impossible to perform. Then surely God can make (5) true. 
That is, if He7 changes the truth-value of (5) from false to truth then the 
truth condition is indeed satisfied and hence God can know (5). 
There are at least two responses to this objection. First, this objection 
only shows that God can know (5), not God does knows (5). Since, again, 
the doctrine of omniscience is a doctrine about what one does know, rather 
than what one can know, even if we can show that God can know (5) by 
using His power to change the truth-value of (5) that does not entail that 
God actually knows (5). It seems clear that God does not know (5), at least 
5 See Chapter 5 of this work for the issue of omnipotence and pseudo tasks. 
6 Philosophers who endorse the doctrine of omnipotence similar to (4) include Earl Conee 
(1991), Rene Descartes (1970), D. Goldstick (1990), J. L. Mackie (1955), John Ellis 
McTaggart (1906), Leon Shestov (1992). See also Conee (1991), Antoine Cote (1998) , 
Goldstick (1990), Louis Groarke (2001), Nick Trakakis (1997). 
7 In this work, following a tradition, I use the word 'He' when I refer to God. However, 
this does not imply that I think that God has a gender. 
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at present, because (5) is false before God brings it about that a square is 
seven-sided, whatever that means. Second, even if God does have a power 
to change a falsity into a truth it still does not make sense to say that He 
knows all propositions. Consider the following proposition: 
(6) A square is not seven-sided. 
If He knows all propositions then He knows (5) and (6). However, 
knowing (5) and (6) entails that God has 'inconsistent knowledge', the 
notion of which itself is logically incoherent. 
Therefore, (3) is not a compelling formulation of omniscience. In 
order to eliminate the difficulties of (3) we can introduce the following 
formulation: 
(7) For any x, and for any proposition p, xis omniscient if and only 
if, if it is true that p then x knows that p. 
As I noted earlier, Kenny (1979) contends that omniscience is 'easy to 
formulate precisely' (p. 10). In fact (7) is almost identical to Kenny's 
formulation8 and it also represents the most popular notion of omniscience. 
The following is a list of philosophers who subscribe to this formulation, 
or one very similar to it: Peter Geach (1977, pp. 40 and 43), Anthony 
Kenny (1979, p. 10), William E. Mann (1975, pp. 153-154), Alvin 
Plantinga (1980, p. 91), A. N. Prior (1962, p. 114), James F. Ross (1969, p. 
214), Richard Swinburne (1977, p. 162), James E. Tomberlin and Frank 
McGuinness (1977, p. 472).9 
8 Kenny's formulation (1979) is the following: 
For all p, if p, then God knows that p. (p. 10) 
If we generalise the above and change it to a biconditional properly then we can obtain (7) 
because presumably Kenny denotes proposition by 'p'. 
9 See Grim (1983), p. 265, p. 275, fn 5. Although Plantinga uses a formulation of 
omniscience like (7) which allows an omniscient being to have false beliefs in the work 
cited above, in a later exchange with Grim he adopts a different formulation of 
7 
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(7) seems consistent with the commonsense idea that omniscience is 
'all-knowing'. Assuming that P 1 is a true proposition we can imagine that 
X knows that P 1. Again, assuming that P2 is a true proposition we can 
imagine that X knows that P 1 and P2. Again, assuming that P 3 is a true 
proposition, we can imagine that X knows that P 1, P2 and P3. The more 
we reiterate this procedure, the closer X would be to being omniscient. (7) 
also seems consistent with the idea of being knowledgeable. Suppose that 
X knows two true propositions P 1 and P2. And suppose also that Y knows 
three true propositions P 1, P2 and P3. In this case . X is more 
knowledgeable than Y, or closer to omniscient than Y, because X knows 
. . h y IO more true propositions t an . 
One might claim that (7) is untenable because it fails to exclude the 
possibility that an omniscient being has false beliefs or inconsistent 
beliefs. 11 For instance, one might think, even if (7) excludes the possibility 
omniscience that excludes the possibility that God has false beliefs. See Plantinga and 
Grim (1993). 
10 An interesting question here is which would be closer to being omniscient if 
propositions that they know are not neatly overlapping. Suppose, for example, that John 
knows that 1+2 is 3, that 1+2 is close to 2.999, and that 1+2 is not 289. And suppose also 
that Kate knows 1 +2 is 3 and that some spiders are poisonous. One might claim that 
although John knows numerically more propositions than Kate, he is less close to being 
omniscient than Kate. For, one might say, Kate's knowledge is more comprehensive, 
more useful or more informative. 
11 See Grim (1983), p. 265. Grim contends that the following simple definition of 
omniscience is unsatisfactory because it allows God to have 'any number of fals e beliefs ' : 
x is omniscient = df for all p, p is true IFF x knows that p. (p. 265) 
Similarly, Richard Gale (1991) defines an omniscient being as one 'who knows all and 
believes only true propositions ' (p. 57, my emphasis). See also Michael Martin (1990), p. 
243 and Martin (2000), p. 18. For objections to a formulation of omniscience similar to 
(7) see Grim (1983), pp. 265-267, John Lachs (1963) Martin (1990), Martin (2000), 
Charles Taliaferro (1985). 
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that an omniscient being knows (5)-viz., that a square is seven-sided-
that does not exclude the possibility that it believes (5). However, if the 
omniscient being believes (5) then it believes both that a square is four-
sided and that a square is seven-sided. In other words, it believes both that 
a square 1s four-sided and not four-sided. This seems deeply counter-
. · · 12 1ntu1t1 ve. 
In what follows, unless I explicitly state otherwise, I denote (7) by the 
term 'omniscience' because it is simple yet captures correctly the 
commonsense notion of omniscience. However, if we are to exclude false 
beliefs from omniscience we can always hold the following formulation: 13 
(8) For any x and for any proposition p , x is omniscient if and only 
if, x does not have false beliefs and if it is true that p then x knows 
that p. 14 
12 Proponents of (7) might argue as follows. Given that omniscience is the possession of 
knowledge, which is a form of true belief, a proper formulation of omniscience does not 
need to be concerned with whether or not an omniscient being has false beliefs. What the 
above objection to (7) shows is that there is a possible irrational omniscient being that 
has false beliefs or inconsistent beliefs in addition to true beliefs, which is unproblematic . 
Just as it is possible for an irrational omnipotent or omnibenevolent being to exist, it is 
perfectly possible for an irrational omniscient being to exist. For being omniscient is one 
thing and being rational is quite another. 
13 If we are only concerned with God 's omniscience then (7) does exclude the possibility 
that He has a false belief. If God is omniscient, then presumably He will know that He 
has this belief, know that it is false, know how to revise it, and know that He ought to 
revise it (because He will also know what the canons of rational belief are). So, unless 
there are any impediments to His eradicating the belief He will eradicate it. Now, given 
that God is omnipotent, there are no impediments. Hence, God has no false beliefs. I owe 
this point to Daniel Stoljar. 
14 Grim (1983) provides the following complicated formulation of omniscience: 
x is omniscient = df for all p, p is true if and only if x believes that p, and x 
believes that p if and only if x knows that p. (p. 266) 
This is essentially equivalent to (8), which I believe is more straightforward. 
9 
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Important provisos are, however, in order: First, (7) is not concerned 
with, and does not state, whether or not omniscience includes 
foreknowledge. Some philosophers think that God knows, for instance, 
what I will eat for dinner tonight or what the name of the first baby in 3004 
will be (if the human race survives that long), because He is omniscient. 
However, some other philosophers think that even an omniscient God does 
not know exactly what will happen in the future, in particular what kind of 
actions human beings (possessed, as they are, of free will) will perform. I 
have formulated (7) so that it is neutral with respect to this point because (i) 
the issue of foreknowledge and free will is enormously controversial and 
(ii) arguments about omniscience that I discuss in this work are irrelevant 
to foreknowledge. 15 What is clear, however, is the following. If the truth-
values of propositions about the future are fixed then an omniscient being 
knows them. If they are not fixed, on the other hand, then, at least on the 
face of it, the fact that one cannot know them does not undermine one's 
omn1sc1ence. 
Second, (7) does not cover 'non-propositional knowledge'. One might 
think that in order for one to be omniscient one has to possess non-
propositional knowledge, such as, 'knowledge by acquaintance' or 
'knowledge-how' in addition to propositional knowledge. 16 Apart from a 
few b1ief comments in Section 1.5 and Chapter 7 I set aside the 
controversial issues of whether or not knowledge by acquaintance and 
knowledge-how are really non-propositional knowledge and whether or 
15 See John Martin Fischer (1989), for instance, for the issue of foreknowledge. 
16 See, for example, Martin (1974), p. 232, Martin (1990), pp. 243-244, Martin (2000), p . 
19. 
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not there really is such a thing as non-propositional knowledge in the first 
place. 17 
In the following I demonstrate that the concept of omniscience, as 
formulated above, emerges as a topic of discussion in many different areas 
of philosophy. I maintain that a number of ideas in these areas of 
philosophy may be profitably construed either as challenges to the 
possibility of one's being omniscient or arguments that lead to challenges 
to the possibility of one's being omniscient. It should be emphasised, 
however, that, except for a few cases, I do not aim to evaluate these 
challenges in this chapter. My main goal is simply to show the significant 
roles that the concept of omniscience plays in philosophy. At the end of 
this chapter I contend that the arguments about omniscience introduced 
here may be classified into two categories, according to their structure. 
1.3 Omniscience in the Philosophy of Religion 
Probably the concept of omniscience has most thoroughly been considered 
in the philosophy of religion because, as I noted earlier, omniscience is 
best known as one of the necessary attributes of the traditional Judaeo-
Christian God. Since I spend the entirety of Part II of this work discussing 
arguments about God's omniscience, here I briefly review only two 
arguments in the philosophy of religion. The aim of both arguments is to 
show that God does not exist because omniscience is inconsistent with 
other divine attributes. 
17 For the issue of knowledge by acquaintance see John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter 
(1996), Conee (1994), Richard Fumerton (2004). For the issue of knowledge-how see 
Torin Alter (2001), Fred Dretske (1988), William G. Lycan (1966), John Perry (2001), 
Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001), Alan R. White (1982). 
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The Argument from Concept Possession 
What I call the 'argument from concept possession' concerns a putative 
inconsistency between omniscience and omnipotence. The most basic 
version of this argument is based on the following thesis about concept 
possession: 
(9) In order for one to understand certain concepts fully, one has to 
have relevant experiences. 
So, for example, according to the argument, God cannot be both 
necessarily omnipotent and necessarily omniscient. For if He is necessarily 
omnipotent then He does not fully understand the concepts fear, 
frustration and despair, possession of which require Him to have 
experienced fear, frustration and despair. Therefore, the argument 
concludes, an omniscient and omnipotent God does not exist. Although the 
argument from concept possession has been discussed by a number of 
philosophers in various different forms it has not, I believe, attracted the 
attention it warrants. I discuss this argument in detail in Chapters 3 and 4. 
The Argument from Immutability 
Another argument about omniscience 1n the philosophy of religion 
concerns an alleged inconsistency between omniscience and immutability. 
This argument is most notably endorsed by Norman Kretzmann (1966). 18 
Kretzmann contends that God cannot be omniscient because given that He 
is necessarily immutable, that is, given that necessarily He is not subject to 
change, He does not know temporally indexed propositions like the 
following: 
18 For the argument from immutability see also William Lane Craig (2001), Gregory E. 
Gregory E. Ganssle and David M. Woodruff (2002), Grim (1985), William Raster (1989) , 
Peter Ludlow (1995c), Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (1981), Thomas V. 
Sullivan (1991), Edward Wierenga (1988). 
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(10) It is 10:00 am. 
On the fact of it, this argument is similar to the argument from knowledge 
de se that I discuss in Section 1.6 below. 
It is important to note that the cogency of this argument largely rests 
on how the doctrine of divine immutability is interpreted. Some 
philosophers think that God's immutability should be understood as 
timelessness. That is, according to them, God exists outside time. However, 
other philosophers think that God's immutability should be understood as 
eternity. That is, according to them, God exists inside time, but exists at 
every time. If the latter view is correct, then perhaps God's immutability 
does not immediately undermine His omniscience. For, given that God is, 
just like us, in time it seems easy for Him to know (10). 
It is also important to note that this argument rests on one's 
understanding of time as well. Some philosophers contend that even if God 
does not know a temporally indexed proposition like (10) that does not 
undermine His omniscience because He can have temporal know ledge 
timelessly. However, if one accepts the four-dimensionalist picture of 
time-according to which an object in time has temporal parts in the 
various subregion of time it occupies-then it appears difficult to think 
that anyone can have temporal knowledge timelessly. 19 
1.4 Omniscience in Epistemology 
As I noted earlier, to be omniscient 1s to know everything. Hence, 
epistemology seems to be another place to look for the concept of 
omniscience. In this section I discuss two important topics in epistemology 
that are closely related to the concept. 
19 See Theodore Sider (2003) for a defence of four-dimensionalism. 
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Scepticism 
One of the oldest and most perplexing ideas in epistemology, or even in 
philosophy in general, is scepticism. For almost anything you think you 
know, the sceptic will produce an argument that undermines your 
confidence that you know that thing. Consider the traditional Cartesian 
sceptical scenario. I believe the following proposition: 
(11) I have hands. 
It is plausible to say not just that I believe (11) but also that I know (11) 
because: (i) by looking at my hands I can justify my belief that I have 
hands, (ii) it is indeed true that I have hands and (iii) there is no Gettier-
type perplexity in this situation. However, the sceptical hypothesis says 
that I do not really know that I have hands. For, according to the 
hypothesis, it is perfectly possible that an evil demon is creating an illusion 
of my hands and, therefore, I falsely believe that that I have hands. 
Scepticism may be taken as a challenge to the possibility of one's 
being omniscient. For while one has to know all true propositions in order 
to be omniscient, scepticism says that there are at least some propositions, 
such as (11), that are not knowable even in principle. 
As Peter Klein (2003) says, it is important to distinguish scepticism 
from ordinary incredulity. Suppose John claims that he knows that the bird 
that he sees is a robin. He might begin to doubt his claim if someone 
introduces the following hypothesis: 
(12) The flight pattern of this bird is not typical of robins. 
There are two possible ways to deprive this hypothesis of its force. The 
first is to falsify it. Perhaps John can show, by referring to an encyclopedia, 
that in fact there are certain kinds of robin that fly in the manner of the bird 
under observation. The other is to neutralise (12). Perhaps although it is 
true that the bird in question is flying in an unusual way, it is discovered 
that it cannot fly properly because, for instance, one of its wings is 
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damaged. Consider, on the other hand, the following sceptical hypothesis, 
which might also make John doubt his belief that the bird that he sees is a 
robin: 
(13) John has an illusion of a robin, which illusion has been created 
by an evil demon. 
(13) is much more persistent than (12) because, unlike (12), it is 
impossible in principle to falsify or neutralise (13). Thus, while ordinary 
incredulous hypotheses do not undermine the possibility of one's being 
omniscient, sceptical hypotheses do. Incredulous hypotheses show, if they 
show anything, only the practical impossibility of one's being omniscient. 
One might think it mistaken to construe scepticism as an argument 
against the possibility of one's being omniscient in general. For, one might 
say, scepticism shows, if it shows anything, only that we, human beings, 
cannot be omniscient. However, this is not correct. If scepticism is cogent, 
then it appears difficult even for God to refute sceptical hypotheses, e.g. 
He is not in fact God. 20 
Scepticism is usually taken as an argument for one's ignorance. We 
have seen, however, that they may also be taken as an argument against 
one's omniscience. This makes sense, given that omniscience is the exact 
opposite of total ignorance. 
The Paradox of Knowability 
Frederic Fitch (1963) introduces the so-called 'paradox of knowability' as 
follows: 21 
20 I owe this point to Ben Blumson. 
21 According to Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno (2002) this argument was originally 
introduced by Fitch and then rediscovered by W. D. Hart (1979) and Hart and Colin 
Mc Ginn ( 197 6). For an argument against God's omniscience in a similar vein see Roland 
Puccetti (1963). Puccetti argues as follows: An omniscient being must know the fact that 
it itself is omniscient. To know this fact, however, it must know the proposition expressed 
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(14) If there is an unknown true proposition then the true 
proposition that it is an unknown proposition is itself unknowable. 
(15) There are unknown true propositions. 
Therefore, 
(16) There is an unknowable true proposition. 22 
(14) is an axiom that Fitch introduces. (15) is easily motivated by simple 
examples. For instance, no one knows, I presume, true propositions of the 
following forms, simply because no one bothers to investigate them: 
( 17) The exact number of typos in this chapter is __ 
(18) The name of the person who was the 1352th baby born in the 
year 1828 was __ 
(16) is derived from (14) and (15) by modus ponens. The conclusion (16), 
if it is true, shows that the following principle of knowability is false: 
(19) Necessa1ily, any true proposition is knowable. 
This argument is often construed as a refutation of verificationism. Strong 
verificationism says that necessarily, all true propositions are known and 
weak verificationism says that necessarily, all true propositions are 
knowable. Strong verificationism is false because, as we have seen, as a 
matter of fact, there are many true propositions that are unknown. Thus 
only weak verificationism seems tenable. However, the paradox of 
know ability seems to show that even weak verificationism is false. In 
order to see how weak verificationism is refuted we can formulate the 
as 'there are no facts unknown to me'. Since this proposition is universal and negative, 
the only way that one can know this is to know that its denial is false. However, there is 
no way of knowing this. Therefore, there is no omniscient being. 
22 The argument is often formulated · in terms of truths rather than true propositions. I 
formulate it in terms of true propositions so that we can clearly see the connection 
between the paradox of knowability and the concept of omniscience that I have 
formulated. 
16 
Chapter 1: Omniscience in Philosophy 
paradox in a slightly different way. Letting p be a true proposition and Kp 
mean 'pis known' we can represent weak verificationism as follows: 
(20) v p(p=>•Kp) 
The fact that there are unknown true propositions, i.e., (15), is symbolised 
as: 
(21) 3p(p&~Kp) 
Consider a particular instance of (21), say P&~KP. If we instantiate p with 
P&~KP then with (20) we can derive •K(P&~KP). This is equivalent to 
•(KP&K~KP) and hence •(KP&~KP). This means that (20) and (21) 
jointly reduce to absurdity. Since (21) is an innocuous claim it seems that 
we need to reject (20), which represents weak verificationism. This 
argument is based on two principles. The one is that knowledge distributes 
across conjunctions, that is, K(p&q) f- Kp and K(p&q) f- Kq. The other is 
that knowledge implies truth, that is, Kp f- p.23 
It is mistaken to think that the paradox of know ability proves one's 
non-omniscience, because it presupposes that one is not omniscient in its 
premiss (15), viz., There are unknown true propositions. However, we can 
still derive an interesting thesis about omniscience from the paradox, 
which is that if the paradox is cogent, any being that is not, as a matter of 
fact, omniscient cannot be omniscient. 
If we suppose that weak verificationism is true and that the paradox of 
knowability is cogent then we can derive that (15) is false. One might 
think this shows that there is an omniscient being that knows all true 
propositions. However, this is mistaken. Even if the above suppositions are 
right, it only follows that every true proposition is known 24 , which is 
23 See Michael Hand and Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). 
24 This is another way of presenting the paradox. That is, if Fitch is right, then weak 
verificationism entails strong verificationism, which seems much more implausible than 
weak verificationism. 
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consistent with the non-existence of an omnsicient being. For it could well 
be the case that there is no single omniscient being but, for instance, two 
knowledgeable beings, one of which knows half of all the true propositions 
and the other of which knows the rest of all the true propositions. 25 
1.5 Omniscience in Aesthetics 
The Acquaintance Principle 
Malcolm Budd (2003) formulates the 'acquaintance principle', an 
influential principle in aesthetics as follows: 
(22) Aesthetic knowledge must be acquired through first-hand 
experience of the object of knowledge and cannot be transmitted 
from person to person. (p. 386) 
This principle is, of course, influenced by Bertrand Russell's epistemology. 
Russell (1912) famously distinguishes 'knowledge by acquaintance' from 
'knowledge by description' .26 He defines knowledge by acquaintance as 
knowledge of a thing of which we are 'directly aware' (p. 25). The 
significance of this knowledge is, according to Russell, that, unlike 
knowledge by description, we can acquire it 'without the intermediary of 
process of inference or any knowledge of truths' (p. 25). In order to 
illustrate his point Russell introduces the following example: 
It is sometimes said that 'light is a form of wave-motion', but this 
is misleading, for the light which we immediately see, which we 
know directly by . means of our senses, is not a form of wave 
motion, but something quite different-something we all know if 
25 For general discussions of the paradox of knowability see Berit Brogaard and Joe 
Salerno (2002), Jonathan Kvanvig (2005-forthcoming), Neil Tennant (1997), Timothy 
Williamson (2000). 
26 See Richard Fumerton (2004) for the issue of knowledge by description and knowledge 
by acquaintance. 
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we are not blind, though we cannot describe it so as to convey our 
knowledge to a man who is blind. A wave-motion, on the contrary, 
could quite well be described to a blind man, since he can acquire a 
knowledge of space by the sense of touch; and he can experience a 
wave-motion by a sea voyage almost as well as we can. But this, 
which a blind man can understand, is not what we mean by light: 
we mean by light just that which a blind man can never understand, 
and which we can never describe to him. (pp. 27-8). 
Here Russell regards a certain sort of empiricism to be obvious, namely, 
that experience is necessary for the sort of perceptual know ledge of light 
only available to the sighted. It follows from this that a congenitally blind 
person-someone who by definition has not had the relevant 
experiences-cannot attain that sort of knowledge. 
Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description are often 
regarded as being equivalent to propositional knowledge and non-
propositional knowledge, respectively. However, proponents of the 
acquaintance principle do not necessarily need to accept such idea. One 
can endorse the acquaintance principle by claiming that there are 
propositions about aesthetics, which cannot be known without having 
relevant first-hand experiences. This claim is plausible if we assume that in 
order to understand certain aesthetic propositions one has to comprehend 
fully certain concepts that require one to have relevant first-hand 
experiences. (Notice that this reasoning is very similar to that manifested 
in the argument from concept possession that I explained above.) 
As Budd (2003) explains, there are a number of interpretations of the 
principle: Richard Wollheim (1980) thinks that the principle is concerned 
with knowledge about judgement of aesthetic values; Frank Sibley (1974) 
and Michael Tanner (2003) think that the principle is applied to knowledge 
about judgement of aesthetic properties; Roger Scruton (1974) and Philip 
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Pettit (1983) contend that the principle holds for knowledge about 
aesthetic description. Whichever of the above interpretations may be 
correct, if the acquaintance principle is cogent then in order for one to have 
complete aesthetic knowledge of an object one has to have every possible 
first-hand experience of the object of knowledge. However, it is obviously 
impossible to have every possible first-hand experience of the object of 
knowledge unless, perhaps, we are omnipresent. In other words, if the 
acquaintance principle is cogent then it is impossible for us to be 
aesthetically omniscient, and a forteriori it is impossible for us to be 
omniscient simpliciter. (In this sense, the acquaintance principle leads to, 
just like ordinary incredulous hypotheses, the practical impossibility, 
rather the necessary impossibility, of being omniscient.) 
1.6 Omniscience in the Philosophy of Language 
The Argument from Negative Existentials 
One of the most important papers in the twentieth century philosophy of 
language is undoubtedly Russell's 'On Denoting' (1905). In this paper, he 
tackles the problem of reference to non-existents. Consider the following 
sentence: 
(23) The present King of France is bald. 
It is difficult to provide a satisfactory analysis of (23) because while it 
seems that a meaningful subject-predicate sentence needs to pick out some 
individual entity and ascribe some property to that entity, (23) does not 
pick out or denote anything that exists given that there is no such thing as 
the present King of France. Russell provides the theory of descriptions and 
analyses (23) as a conjunction of three separate claims as follows: 
(24) (i) At least one person is presently King of France, and (ii) at 
most one person is presently King of France, and (iii) whoever is 
presently King of France is bald. 
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And he concludes that (23) is false because the conjunction expressed in 
its analysis, (24), is false because one of the conjuncts, (i), is false. 
Another well-known philosophical puzzle about singular terms is the 
problem of negative existentials. 27 Consider the following: 
(25) The present King of France does not exist. 
It is difficult to provide a satisfactory analysis of (25) because, just like 
(23), whether or not (25) is true, it seems that (25) cannot be about the 
present King of France because there is no such King for it to be about. 
Russell's theory purports to solve this problem by analysing (25) again as 
a conjunction of three separate claims, as follows: 
(26) The following is not the case: (i) At least one person is 
presently King of France, and (ii) at most one person is presently 
King of France, and (iii) whoever is presently King of France exists. 
Russell concludes that (26) is true because one of the conjuncts, (i), is false. 
There are many objections to Russell's theory, but I do not discuss them in 
this section. What is important here is that the problem of singular terms, 
in particular, the problem of negative existentials, is still regarded as an 
intractable puzzle among philosophers of language and that there are a 
number of on-going debates on this topic. 
Christopher Hughes (1998) attempts to utilise the problem of negative 
existentials in order to disprove the existence of an omniscient God. 
Suppose that there are possible worlds in which God exists but Anselm 
does not. In these possible worlds, Hughes says, God cannot even entertain 
the thought expressed as the following negative existential statement: 
(27) Anselm does not exist. 
For, according to Hughes, in such worlds God does not even know that 
Anselm does not exist. Therefore, he concludes, God is not necessarily 
27 Some philosophers deny that 'the present King of France' is a singular term, but I set 
this point aside for the sake of simplicity. 
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omniscient. Hughes' s argument is based on vanous assumptions about 
proper names and existential judgements, which one might try to reject. 
However, it seems that his argument has a more fundamental flaw: On the 
one hand, he assumes that God's capacity is constrained by this world, for 
he seems to think that God can know only what is the case in this world. 
However, on the other hand, he assumes that in order for God to be 
omniscient His capacity needs to extend to all possible worlds. This is 
unfair for God. If one is allowed to make two obviously conflicting 
assumptions about God then it is too easy to prove that He does not exist. 
The Argument from Knowledge De Se 
In order to reveal the intractable character of essential indexicals and 
knowledge de se John Perry (1979) provides the following scenario: 
Imagine that I find a trail of spilled sugar on the floor in a supermarket. I 
wonder which shopper is making this terrible mess all around the aisles 
and I decide to search for the one responsible. Suddenly, however, I realise 
there is a hole in the bag of sugar in my own shopping cart. I am the one 
who is making the mess! 
Here I can express what I come to know as: 
(28) I am making the mess. 
One might think that (1) is the same as the following: 
(29) Yujin Nagasawa is making the mess. 
According to Patrick Grim (1983, 1985, 2000), however, 'what I know in 
knowing (28)', 28 is different from what I know in knowing (29) because I 
can know (28) without knowing (29) (and vice versa). What surprises me 
is not that someone named Yujin Nagasawa is making the mess but that I 
am making the mess. If I believed that I was not Yujin Nagasawa but, say, 
Aristotle, then I would not think that (29) concerns me. But I would be 
28 See Grim (1983), p. 272, Grim (1985), p. 151, Grim (2000), p. 142. 
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surprised at finding out that I am making the mess. Whoever I think I am, I 
am surprised by what I know in knowing (28). Over the last twenty years 
or so it has been one of main goals for philosophers of language to provide 
a satisfactory treatment of essential indexicals like 'I'. Grim utilises 
Perry's example in order to undermine the doctrine of divine omniscience. 
He argues that God cannot be omniscient because He cannot know what I 
know in knowing (28) even though He can know what I know in knowing 
(29). I discuss this argument in detail in Chapter 2 of this work. 
1.7 Omniscience in Logic 
The Liar Paradox 
One of the oldest and most intractable paradoxes in logic is the liar 
paradox. The following is the standard formulation of the liar sentence: 
(30) This sentence is false. 
The paradoxical nature of this self-referential sentence is shown as follows: 
Either (30) is true or it is false. Suppose that (30) is true. Given that what 
(30) says is true (30) is false. Hence, if (30) is true then (30) is false. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that (30) is false. Since (30) says that (30) is 
false-i. e., it is false that (30) is false-if (30) is false then (30) is true. 
Therefore, (30) is true if and only if (30) is false! 29 
Grim (1983) introduces a liar paradox about omniscience-which he 
calls the 'di vine liar': 
(31) God believes that (31) is false. 
Either (31) is true or false. Suppose that (31) is true. Given that what (31) 
says is true, God believes that (31) is false. However, since we suppose 
that (31) is true there is a truth-i.e., (31) is true-that God does not 
29 For issues concerning the liar paradox see Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy (1987), J. 
C. Beall (2003), Robert Martin (1978), Martin (1984), Vann McGee (1991) , Graham 
Priest, Richard Routley and Jean Norman (1989). 
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believe. 30 If there is a truth that God does not believe then He does not 
know it. Hence, if (31) is true, God is not omniscient. Suppose, on the 
other hand, (31) is false. Given that what (31) says is false God does not 
believe that (31) is false. However, since we suppose that (31) is false 
there is a f act-i. e., that (30) is false-that God does not believe. Again, if 
there is a truth that God does not believe then He does not know it. Hence, 
if (31) is false, and God is not omniscient. Therefore, in either case God is 
not omniscient! 
The most common way of responding to the liar paradox is to claim 
that a sentence like (30) is neither true nor false, that is, a self-referential 
sentence like (30) has a 'truth value gap'. Can we respond to the divine liar 
paradox in the same way? Grim contends that we cannot. Suppose that (31) 
is neither true nor false. If God is omniscient then He knows that (31) is 
neither true nor false. This entails that (31) is false because (31) does not 
state that God believes that (31) is neither true nor false but that God 
believes that (31) is false. However, if (31) is false then God does not 
believe that (31) is false, which follows that God does not know the fact 
that (31) is false. Therefore, again, God is not omniscient. 
The following is the so-called 'strengthened liar', which 1s not 
vulnerable to a number of objections to the classic liar: 
(32) This sentence is not true. 
Grim introduces the 'strengthened divine liar', which is analogous to (32): 
(33) God believes that (33) is false. 
Or alternatively: 
(34) God does not believe that (34) is true. 
30 Here Grim assumes that if God believes that p is false then He does not believe that p is 
true. This assumption is not obviously true. 
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John E. Abbruzzese (1997) rejects the strengthened divine liar. He argues 
that that a strengthened di vine liar sentence such as (34) does not 
undermine God's omniscience because, Abbruzzese says, just like the 
divine liar, it 'does not express anything at all' (p. 29). That is, according 
to Abbruzzese, (34) is a mere 'garble of words', which is not an object of 
God's knowledge. Grim claims that this objection is unsuccessful. 
Abbruzzese seems to assume that God believes only truths . If this is right 
then given that (34) is nothing but a garble of words he needs to conclude 
the following: God does not believe that (34) is true. However, this is the 
very strengthened divine liar sentence that Abbruzzese rejects (Grim, 2000, 
p. 145)! 
The Cantorian Argument 
Patrick Grim (1984, 1986, 1991, 2000)3 1 purports to prove that there is no 
set of all truths (or equivalently, there is no true proposition about all true 
propositions) by utilising the Cantorian set theorem. Grim's argument is a 
reductio. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that there is a set of all truths , 
call it T. Let P(T) be the powerset of T. To each element si of P(T) there 
exists a unique truth. For example, to each Si there is a unique truth as 
follows: 
Si E P(T) 
Alternatively, let Q be a truth. Then for every element si of P(T) , either of 
the following is true: 
Q E Si 
Q E Si 
This means, however, that there are at least as many elements of T as there 
are elements of P(T). This contradicts the Cantorian set theorem, according 
to which the powerset has more elements than its original set. Therefore, 
31 See also Plantinga and Grim (1993) . 
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Grim concludes, there is no set of all truths. Grim says that if we assume 
that omniscience subsumes a set of all truths then the Cantorian argument 
undermines the possibility of one's being omniscient.32 
Various objections to Grim' s argument have been raised. First, 
philosophers such as Gary Mar (1993) and Keith Simmons (1993) argue 
that Grim' s argument fails because the Cantorian theorem does not hold in 
some powerful set theories, for instance, the system of NF introduced by 
W. V. 0. Quine (1937). Grim (2000) regards that this objection is 
unsuccessful because if we accept set theories like NF we have to accept 
notions of truth that are too radically counter-intuitive. That is, the price of 
accepting altemati ve set theories is greater than accepting the conclusion 
that there is no set of all truths. 
Second, J. C. Beall (2000) points out that Robert Stalnaker' s theory of 
propositions (1984) entails that the following assumption in Grim's 
argument is false: 
(35) To each element of P(T) there corresponds a unique truth. 
Stalnaker' s theory says that there is precisely one necessary truth, because 
propositions are functions from worlds to truth-values. If this theory is 
right then, while it is true that to each element of P(T) there corresponds a 
truth, it is not true that to each element of P(T) there corresponds a unique 
truth. Therefore, Beall says, '[s]ince there is exactly one necessary truth 
[(35)] is false' (p. 39). This objection to Grim's argument inherits a 
problem similar to that which the previous objection inherits. That is, the 
price of accepting Stalnaker' s theory is greater than accepting the 
conclusion that there is no set of all truths. If the theory is cogent then, for 
example, the necessary truths that 1 + 2 is 3 and that triangles are three-
sided are the same truth, which is highly counter-intuitive. Moreover, as 
Beall himself notes, if we assume that propositions are the sole content of 
32 A prototype of this argument is found in Grim (1983). 
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intentional states then it follows from the theory that we are logically 
omniscient, that is, we know all consequences of what we believe (Beall 
2000, fn. 5). This is also highly counter-intuitive. · 
Third, Plantinga (in Plantinga and G1im ( 1993)) and Abbruzzese 
(1997) argue that Grim' s Cantorian argument is self-defeating. 33 If the 
Cantorian argument against a set of all truths is sound then we can also 
construct a Cantorian argument against a proposition about all propositions. 
However, if there is no proposition about all proposition then the 
conclusion of the argument that there is no proposition about all 
proposition, which itself is a proposition about all proposition, does not 
express anything meaningful. Therefore, Grim' s argument is self-defeating. 
Grim (2000) contends, however, that even if we could not derive a general 
conclusion about all propositions by advancing the Cantorian argument we 
could still defeat every particular claim about omniscience by constructing 
a Cantorian argument for each claim. 34 
1.8 Omniscience in the Philosophy of Mind 
Externalism and Authoritative self-knowledge 
Since Hilary Putnam _ published his influential paper, 'The Meaning of 
"Meaning"' (1975), the doctrine of extemalism has held considerable 
interest for philosophers of mind and language. According to extemalism, 
the content of our mental states conceptually depends on external factors 
about which we do not have authoritative knowledge. 
33 This objection is also anticipated in Grim (1991 ). 
34 For the debate on the Cantorian argument see: Abbruzzese (1997), Bringsjord (1989), 
Richard M. Gale (2004-forthcoming), Grim (1984), Grim (1986), Grim (1990), Grim 
(1991), Grim (2000), Mar (1993), Christopher Menzel (1986), Plantinga and Grim (1993), 
John F. Post (2004-forthcominng), Post (forthcoming), Alexander R. Pruss (2004-
forthcoming), Simmons (1993), Jordan Howard Sobel (2004). 
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In order to illustrate extemalism consider the following Twin Earth 
case introduced by Putnam: The molecular structure of the liquid that 
people call 'water' is, of course, H20 on Earth. Imagine, however, that, the 
molecular structure of the liquid that people call 'water' on Twin Earth-
call it 'twater'-is 'XYZ' on Twin Earth. According to extemalism, when 
you entertain a thought expressed as 'water is wet' the content of the 
thought could be either water is wet or twater is wet depending on whether 
you are on Earth or Twin Earth. This means, according to extemalism, that 
in order for you to know whether you are thinking that water is wet or 
twater is wet you need to find out which natural environment you inhabit. 
Many philosophers think that extemalism is incompatible with the 
doctrine of authoritative self-knowledge, according to which we have a 
privileged access to our own mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and 
sensations. In the following I introduce two of the principal arguments 
against the compatibility of extemalism and authoritative self-knowledge 
and demonstrate that they may be construed as arguments about 
omniscience. 
The most well-known argument against the compatibility has been 
proposed by Michael McKinsey (1991). 35 McKinsey argues as follows: If 
the doctrine of authoritative self-knowledge is true then if I think that 
water is wet then I know a priori that I am thinking that water is wet. On 
the other hand, if extemalism is true then the proposition that I am thinking 
that water is wet conceptually implies the following proposition: 
(36) Some particular extemalist condition for thinking that water is 
wet is met. 
35 McKinsey is concerned with anti-individualism, which he distinguishes from 
externalism. Since the difference between these two doctrines, if there is any, does not 
make any difference in my discussion I use the word 'externalism' for the sake of 
uniformity. 
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However, (36) cannot be known a pnon, but only by empirical 
investigation. Therefore, McKinsey says, externalism is incompatible with 
authoritative self-knowledge.36 
Paul Boghossian (1989) introduces another argument against the 
compatibility of externalism and authoritative self-knowledge, which is 
known as the 'memory argument'. The memory argument utilises slow-
switching, which Tyler Burge (1988) introduces with the intention of 
illustrating the compatibility of externalism and authoritative self-
knowledge. A slow-switching case is one in which an agent is switched 
from one environment to another and, according to externalism, the 
content of one's beliefs shifts as a consequence. Let us consider a social 
externalist type of slow-switching case in which I am switched between 
two linguistic communities. I am transported, without being aware of the 
transport, from Earth to Twin Earth, where people have slightly different 
individuating conditions for the meaning of the word 'chicory' from those 
on Earth. 37 That is, while people on Earth mean chicory by 'chicory', 
people on Twin Earth mean twicory by 'chicory'. Hence, after a certain 
amount of time on Twin Earth, my belief expressed as 'chicory is bitter' 
comes to have the content that twicory is bitter. Likewise, my second-
order belief expressed as 'I think that chicory is bitter' comes to have the 
content that I think that twicory is bitter. Boghossian argues that the slow-
switching case can be used to derive a situation which entails the 
incompatibility of externalism and authoritative self-knowledge of the 
contents of our own beliefs: I believe at time tl that chicory is bitter and 
36 More precisely, McKinsey says that anti-individualism is incompatible with privileged 
access. For McKinsey's argument see Jessica Brown (1995) , Brown (2003), Martin 
Davies (2003), McKinsey (2003), Brian P. McLaughlin (2003) , Crispin Wright (2003). 
37 The case of chicory was originally introduced by Ludlow (1995a) as a 'real life ' 
example of slow-switching. See also Ludlow (1997), Ted Warfield (1992), Warfield 
(1997). 
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authoritatively know what I am believing, then forget nothing, but at time 
t2 do not authoritatively know that I believe at tl that chicory is bitter. 38 
On the face of it, there is no connection between the concept of 
omniscience and the arguments against the compatibility of extemalism 
and authoritative self-knowledge. However, once we recognise that the 
doctrine of authoritative self-knowledge is related to the concept of 
omniscience we can see the connection. 
The doctrine of authoritative self-knowledge has traditionally been 
construed as entailing that, in a relevant sense, we have complete 
knowledge of certain kinds of our own mental states. That is, we know 
exactly what we believe, desire, sense and so on. So, for example, if I 
believe that the capital city of England is London and that my car is blue 
then, the doctrine says, I know that I believe that the ~apital city of 
England is London and that my car is blue. The phrase 'in a relevant 
sense' is added to the above statement because even if we have 
authoritative self-knowledge we do not necessarily have, for example, 
complete knowledge of what neurophysiology and psychiatry tell about 
our mental states. 
Some philosophers relate the doctrine of authoritative self-knowledge 
to omniscience. 39 For example, Brie Gertler (2003) writes: 
The strongest epistemic claims on behalf of self-knowledge are 
infallibility and omniscience. If self-knowledge is infallible, one 
cannot have a false belief to the effect that one is in a certain 
38 For the memory argument see Anthony Brueckner (1997), Burge (1998), Sanford C. 
Goldberg (1997), Jane Heal (1998), Ludlow (1995b), Ludlow (1996), Ludlow (1997), 
Ludlow (1999), Yujin Nagasawa (2000), Nagasawa (2002), Michael Tye (1998). 
39 In addition to Brie Gertler (2003), see Goldberg (2003) for the issue of omniscience and 
authoritative self-knowledge. 
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mental state. One is omniscient about one's own states only if being 
in a mental state suffices for knowing that one is in that state. 40 
The mention of infallibility in the above passage seems redundant. If one 
knows what one believes, for example, then it is impossible for one to be 
mistaken about what one believes. For knowing that p entails that it is true 
that p. It is also unclear what sort of conception of knowledge Gertler 
adopts when she talks about knowledge in the passage. Given that she 
thinks that being in a certain mental state suffices for knowing that one is 
in that state, she does not seem to think that know ledge is a form of belief. 
In any case, if it is really possible to construe self-knowledg as a form 
of omniscience with respect to our mental states, then we can see that 
extemalism is a challenge to the possibility of one's being omniscient.41 
For granting that extemalism is true and that the arguments against the 
compatibility of extemalism and authoritative self-knowledge are cogent, 
we can derive that we are not omniscient with respect to our own mental 
states. Of course, if we know everything about the external world then we 
may still be omniscient with respect to our own mental states. We can 
assume, however, that the argument against our omniscience with respect 
to our own mental states exclude·s the possibility that we know all those 
40 It should be noted that Gertler correctly states that an unqualified form of the 
omniscience thesis about our own mental states is subject to counter-examples . Suppose, 
for instance, that Kate trusts John ' s insight into her own psychology. Thus if John says 
that she wants to live in New York she believes that she does want to live in New York. 
However, suppose further that John is mistaken-Kate really wants to live in Los Angeles, 
though she hasn ' t reflected sufficiently on her desire to realise this . Hence, Kate has a 
false belief about her own desires and she is not omniscient with respect to her own 
mental states. 
4 1 It is important to emphasise that the doctrine of authoritative self-knowledge is not the 
trivial thesis that if I know a proposition about my mental states, then I am omniscient 
with respect to that single proposition. If the doctrine is cogent then we could have an 
astronomically large, if not an infinitely large, body of knowledge about our mental states. 
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things about the external world that are related to our authoritative self-
knowledge. 
The Bat Argument and the Knowledge Argument 
Thomas Nagel (1974) argues that the physicalist approach to phenomenal 
consciousness seems untenable, because no matter how complete our 
knowledge of the physical sciences is we can never know what it is like to 
be a bat, the subjective aspect of a bat's experience. For, in order to know 
what it is like to be a bat we need to have a bat's unique sensory apparatus. 
Frank Jackson (1982, 1986) also tries to undermine physicalism by 
appealing to phenomenal consciousness. His 'knowledge argument' is 
based on the following scenario: 
Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, [and] is educated 
through black-and-white books and through lectures relayed on 
black-and white television. In this way she learns everything there 
is to know about the physical nature of the world. She knows all 
the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of 
'physical' which includes everything in completed physics, 
chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the 
causal and relational facts consequent upon all this, including of 
course functional roles. If physicalism is true, she knows all there 
is to know. For to suppose otherwise is to suppose that there is 
more to know than every physical fact, and that is what 
physi~alism denies .... It seems, however, that Mary does not know 
all there is to know. For when she is let out of the black-and-white 
room or given a color television, she will learn what it is like to see 
something red, say. This is rightly described as learning-she will 
not say "ho, hum." (1986, p. 291) 
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Jackson says that physicalism is false because Mary, who has complete 
physical knowledge, still comes to know something new when she leaves 
her black-and-white room for the first time in her life. 
How are Na gel's and Jackson's arguments related to the concept of 
omniscience? Notice that both of them derive the metaphysical conclusion 
that physicalism is false by refuting the following epistemological thesis, 
which physicalism seems to entail: 
(37) Complete physical knowledge 1s complete knowledge 
simpliciter. (Jackson, 1986, p. 291) 
Nagel tries to show that (37) is false by claiming that even if we have 
complete physical knowledge we do not have complete knowledge 
simpliciter, because we cannot have complete knowledge about a bat's 
phenomenology. Jackson claims that (37) is false because even if Mary has 
complete physical knowledge she does not have complete knowledge 
simpliciter before she leaves her black-and-white room. For, he says, her 
knowledge misses what it is like to experience colours. 
We can clearly see that (37) is relevant to the concept of omniscience 
by rephrasing it as follows: 
(38) Physical omniscience is omniscience simpliciter.42 
Thus, we can construe Nagel's and Jackson's arguments as challenges to 
the physicalist conception of omniscience stated in (38). Although many 
philosophers have described Mary as a 'physically omniscient scientist' 
the connection between their arguments and the concept of omniscience 
has almost never been considered. In Part III of this work I provide 
objections to these antiphysicalist arguments by comparing them with 
arguments about omniscience in the philosophy of religion. 
42 See Chapter 6 for the precise definition of physical omniscience. 
33 
Chapter 1: Omniscience in Philosophy 
1.9 Conclusion 
We have seen that the concept of omniscience 1s closely related to 
important ideas in a number of distinct areas of philosophy. Surprisingly 
enough, many of them represent the most well-known and most discussed 
topics in relevant areas-e.g., the liar paradox in logic, scepticism in 
epistemology, extemalism and the knowledge argument in the philosophy 
of mind, essential indexicals in the philosophy of language, and so on. 
The arguments against the possibility of one's being omniscient that I 
have introduced can be classified into two categories, on the basis of their 
structures. 
The first is to appeal to logical impossibilities. The idea is to show 
that one cannot be omniscient, typically by demonstrating that there is a 
true proposition that no one could ever know. Scepticism, the paradox of 
knowability, the argument from negative existentials, the divine liar 
paradox and the Cantorian argument fall into this category. 
The second is to appeal to some principle that fits the following 
general scheme: In order for one to know a certain proposition pone has to 
do a certain thing q or one has to be a certain (kind of) being r. Given this 
principle and the alleged fact that the being at issue cannot do q or cannot 
be r an argument in this category concludes that it cannot be omniscient. 
The argument from concept possession, the argument from immutability, 
the argument derived from the acquaintance principle, the argument from 
knowledge de se, the arguments against the compatibility of extemalism 
and authoritative self-knowledge, the bat argument and the knowledge 
argument fall into this category. 
In the rest of this work I focus on some of the arguments in the latter 
category. I evaluate the argument from knowledge de se in Chapter 2, the 
argument from concept possession in Chapters 3 and 4, the bat argument 
in Chapter 5, and the know ledge argument in Chapters 6 and 7. The 
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structure of my overall argument goes as follows: (i) I maintain that 
neither the argument from knowledge de senor the argument from concept 
. possession is successful in showing that God is not omniscient, or more 
generally, that theism is false. (ii) I explain that the argument from 
knowledge de se is structurally parallel to the bat argument, and that the 
argument from concept possession is structurally parallel to the knowledge 
argument. (iii) Finally, I argue that the bat argument and the knowledge 
argument are not successful in establishing the falsity of physicalism by 
utilising my analyses of the argument from knowledge de se and the 
argument from concept possession. 
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Part II 
Divine Omniscience: Puzzles in the Philosophy of 
Religion 
Chapter 2 
Divine Omniscience and the Argument from 
Knowledge De Se 
2.1 Introduction 
Patrick Grim (1983, 1985, 2000) challenges the doctrine of divine 
omniscience1 by using John Perry's famous example of knowledge de se. 2 
According to Grim, since no one else-no one other than me-can acquire 
knowledge de se of me, God cannot be omniscient.3 Ever since Aquinas, 
1 Some philosophers might think that divine omniscience is different from omniscience 
simpliciter, as it is defined in Chapter 1 of this work. However, I assume, for the sake of 
simplicity, that divine omniscience is omniscience simpliciter instantiated as one of God's 
necessary properties. See Chapter 7 for a slightly different formulation of divine 
omrusc1ence. 
2 The term 'knowledge de se' was introduced by David Lewis (1979). Perry uses a more 
general term 'essential indexicals' in his original paper (1979). 
3 In Chapter 1 I treated Grim' s argument as an argument in the philosophy of language 
because it involves essential indexicals. However, in this chapter, I regard it as an 
argument in the philosophy of religion because I focus on the fact that it is directed to 
God 's omniscience. Grim also provides an argument against di vine omniscience from 
knowledge de presenti; namely, knowledge of 'now' . According to Grim, since God is 
necessarily timeless He cannot know, for example, what a temporal being knows in 
knowing that it is 10:00 am now. Since this argument involves enormously controversial 
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philosophers have been interested in the relationship between divine 
omnipotence and necessary impossibilities.4 However, in this chapter I am 
concerned with the relationship between divine omniscience and necessary 
impossibilities, which has attracted little attention. I argue that given two 
plausible principles regarding divine attributes, we need not accept Grim' s 
conclusion that God cannot be omniscient. I then claim that my objection 
to Grim' s argument is applicable to another argument against the doctrine 
of divine omniscience discussed by William J. Mander (2002). 
Imagine that, borrowing Perry's example, I find a trail of spilled sugar 
on the floor in a supermarket. I wonder which shopper is making this 
terrible mess all around the aisles and I decide to search for the one 
responsible. Suddenly, however, I realise there is a hole in the bag of sugar 
in my own shopping cart. I am the one who is making the mess! I can 
express what I come to know as: 
(1) I am making the mess. 
One might think that (1) is the same as the following: 
(2) Yujin Nagasawa is making the mess. 
According to Grim, however, 'what I know in knowing (1)' 5 is different 
from what I know in knowing (2) because I can know (1) without knowing 
(2) (and vice versa).6 What surprises me is not that someone named Yujin 
issues concermng divine timelessness and eternity, I focus on his argument from 
knowledge de se in this chapter. 
4 See, for example, Thomas Aquinas (1967), Campbell Brown and Yujin Nagasawa 
(2002), Rene Descartes (1970), Thomas P. Flint and Alfred J. Freddoso (1983) , Harry G. 
Frankfurt (1964), Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosenkrantz (1988) , Hoffman and 
Rosenkrantz (2002), E. J. Khamara (1978), Richard R. La Croix (1977), George I. 
Mavrodes (1963), C. Wade Savage (1967), Richard Swinburne (1973). 
5 See Grim (1983), p. 272, Grim (1985), p. 151, Grim (2000), p. 142. 
6 A precise interpretation of the phrase 'what I know in knowing (l)' raises a further issue 
in the philosophy of language. Grim uses this phrase to denote an object of knowledge. 
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Nagasawa is making the mess but that I am making the mess. If I believed 
that I was not Yujin Nagasawa but, say, Aristotle, then I would not think 
that (2) concerns me. But I would be surprised at finding out that I am 
making the mess. Whoever I think I am, I am surprised by what I know in 
knowing (1). 
If God knows everything knowable, then, according to Grim, He must 
know what I know in knowing (1) as well as what I know in knowing (2). 
However, while anyone can know in principle that Yujin Nagasawa is 
making the mess, which is expressed by (2), no one but I can know what I 
know in knowing (1). Grim concludes, therefore, that God cannot be 
omniscient. 
The structure of Grim' s argument is as follows: 
(3) I know that I am making the mess. (i.e. I know what I know in 
knowing (1).) 
(4) God cannot know what I know in knowing (1). 
(5) Therefore, there is something knowable that God cannot know. 
(6) Therefore, God cannot be omniscient. 
If I know something that God cannot know, it follows that there is at least 
one knowable thing that is unknown to God, and thus, it would seem, God 
cannot be omniscient. Given that God is a being such that, if He exists, He 
knows all there is to know, it appears reasonable to deny the existence of 
God, as in fact Grim does. 
But if objects of knowledge are Russellian propositions, then what I know in knowing (1 ) 
just is what I know in knowing (2). It follows that Grim cannot think that objects of 
knowledge are Russellian propositions. Beyond this, however, Grim remains neutral on 
the nature of objects of knowledge. 
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2.2 Objections to Grim's Argument 
As we have seen, Grim' s argument consists only of two premisses: (3) and 
(4). Since (3) is innocuous, it seems that we should focus on (4). In this 
section, I briefly examine two attempts to undermine (4). 
Hector-Neri Castaneda (1967) argues that (4) is false because 
someone other than me can perfectly well know what I know in knowing 
(1) by using a 'quasi-indicator'. 7 Castaneda's solution is based on the 
following assumption: 
(P) If a sentence of the form 'X knows that a person Y knows 
that ... ' formulates a true statement, then · the person X knows the 
statement formulated by the clause filling the blank ' ... '. (p. 201) 
If the sentence 'I know that Mary knows that the capital city of France 
is Pa1is' formulates a true statement, it follows that I know that the capital 
city of France is Paris. If the sentence 'I know that Fred knows that 25 + 
12 = 37' formulates a true statement, it follows that I know that 25 + 12 = 
37. Similarly, Castaneda argues, someone else, like God, can know what I 
know in knowing (1) using a quasi-indexical statement of the form 'I know 
that Yujin Nagasawa knows that he (himself) is making the mess'. (Here 
'he (himself)' is the quasi-indicator.) 
7 In the text I treat Castaneda's objection as a criticism of Grim's argument, but in fact, 
Castaneda's objection, which is older than Grim's argument, is intended to undermine 
Norman Kretzmann's argument (1966) from which Grim derived his basic idea. 
Kretzmann argues that no one other than Jones can know what the statement 'Jones 
knows that he is in a hospital' describes Jones as knowing. Kretzmann also writes, 
'Anyone could have proved that Descartes existed, but that is not what Descartes proved 
in the Cogito, and what he proved in the Cogito could not have been proved by anyone 
else' (p. 421). 
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Since Castaneda's objection has already been criticised elsewhere8 I 
here provide only a small point that might support those criticisms. 9 
Obviously an assumption like (P) is not applicable to so-called 'know-wh', 
such as know-when, know-where, know-who, know-what and know-how. 
For example, even if the sentence 'I know that Mary knows how to ride a 
bicycle' formulates a true statement it does not follow that I know how to 
ride a bicycle. Or, to take another example, even if the sentence 'I know 
that Fred knows where he hid my book' formulates a true statement it does 
not follow that I know where he hid my book. This is why Castaneda 
formulates (P) so that it is applied only to know-that. Yet the distinction 
between know-that and know-wh is not so clear. Many philosophers have 
argued that know-wh (especially know-how) is essentially the same as 
know-that. 10 If their arguments are cogent, (P) is false. Given the 
uncertainty of (P), it is at least not as obvious as Castaneda thinks that God 
8 Grim argues against Castaneda as follows. Someone may well know that Yujin 
Nagasawa knows that he (himself) is making the mess and yet not know what I know in 
knowing (1). S/he may not know it, according to Grim, ifs/he does not know that I am 
Yujin Nagasawa. See Grim (1985), pp. 162-168. John E. Abbruzzese (1997) contends that 
Castaneda's argument is unsuccessful because (P) is subject to counter-examples. For 
instance, Abbruzzese argues, even if the sentence 'I know that Dr. Lawless of the Classics 
Department knows that vis consili expers mole ruit sua' formulates a true statement for 
someone s/he cannot be said to know that vis consili expers mole ruit sua unless s/he 
knows Latin (pp. 26-28). 
9 I am indebted to Daniel Stolj ar on this point. 
'
0 Perry (2001), for example, argues that know-how is a unique form of know-that, which 
involves a special kind of representations, namely, executable schemas. To take another 
example, Stanley and Williamson (2001) argue that knowing how to F is knowing, of 
some way w, that w is a way to F and entertaining the proposition that w is a way to F 
under a practical mode of presentation. For arguments against the know-that/know-how 
distinction see also Fred Dretske (1988), William G. Lycan (1966), Alan R . White (1982). 
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can know exactly what I know in knowing (1) using the quasi-indexical 
statement. 11 
John E. Abbruzzese (1997) proposes an alternative way to reject (4). 
He argues that the difference between what I know in knowing (1) and 
what God knows in knowing (2) is only the 'feelings of guilt or 
embarrassment I experienced' (p. 28). Obviously, such feelings have 
nothing to do with divine omniscience because feelings are not pieces of 
knowledge. Therefore, Abbruzzese concludes that God, who knows (2), 
does not fail to know anything. 
Abbruzzese, however, misses a crucial point here. The feelings that I 
come to have upon finding out that I am making the mess do not play a 
role in Grim's argument. Grim argues that I can know (1) without knowing 
(2) (or vice versa) and that my knowing (1) explains my surprise, surprise 
that my knowing (2) could not explain. Thus, '[w]e don't need feelings to 
go on to argue that these two pieces of know ledge cannot be the same. The 
non-identity of discemibles will suffice' (Grim, 2000, p. 143). 12 
11 Of course, this is not a knockdown argument against Castaneda's strategy. One may 
coherently hold that the inapplicability of (P) to know-wh is the very reason that we 
should not identify know-wh with know-that. 
12 One might think that Grim's use of the principle of the non-identity of discernibles is 
illegitimate. Consider Descartes' use of the same principle in his argument for dualism: 
(i) I can conceive that my body is independent of myself. 
(ii) I cannot conceive that my soul is independent of myself. 
Therefore, 
(iii) By the principle of the non-identity of discernibles, my body and soul are 
distinct entities. 
Therefore, 
(iv) Dualism is true. 
Descartes' use of the principle is widely regarded as being illegitimate because the 
principle seems inapplicable to propositional attitudes like 'conceive'. Similarly, one 
might claim that Grim' s use of the principle is illegitimate because he applies it to a 
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Castaneda's and Abbruzzese's arguments to undermine (4) are not 
compelling. Must we then accept Grim' s conclusion that God cannot be 
omniscient? In what follows I argue that given two plausible principles 
regarding divine attributes, each of which has been independently 
motivated, there is no reason to agree with Grim' s conclusion. 
2.3 First Principle: Divine Omniscience and Epistemic Powers 
The first principle says that a statement about divine omniscience can be 
restated in terms of a divine epistemic power. 
An epistemic power is a power to know a true proposition. So, for 
example, if I know that my shirt is blue then I have an epistemic power to 
know that my shirt is blue. However, from the fact that I have an epistemic 
power to know that my shirt is blue it does not follow that I know that my 
shirt is blue; for I might have not exercised the epistemic power. 
Assuming that p is true, consider the following statement relevant to 
divine omniscience: 
(7) God can know that p. 
(7) can be restated as follows: 
(8) God has an epistemic power to know that p. 
Or, again assuming that p is true, consider the negation of (7): 
(9) God cannot know that p. 
(9) can also be restated in terms of an epistemic power: 
(10) God does not have an epistemic power to know that p. 
propositional attitude, 'know'. However, this objection is unsuccessful. Descartes ' 
argument is fallacious not just because he applies the principle to a propositional attitude, 
but because he tries to derive a metaphysical conclusion, (iii) , from the alleged 
epistemological facts, (i) and (ii) , by appealing to the principle. Since Grim derives only 
an epistemological conclusion-viz. what I know in knowing (1) and what I know in 
knowing (2) are distinct objects of knowledge-from an alleged epistemological fact-viz. 
I can know (1) without knowing (2)-his use of the principle is legitimate. 
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Is it also possible to restate a non-modal claim about divine omniscience in 
terms of an epistemic power? Again assuming that p is true, consider the 
following: 
(11) God knows that p. 
(11) can be restated as follows. 
(12) God has, and has exercised, an epistemic power to know that p. 
Or, again assuming that pis true, consider the negation of (11): 
(13) God does not know that p. 
(13) can also be restated as follows: 
(14) Either God does not have an epistemic power to know that p 
or, while God does have such a power, He has not exercised it. 
This principle reveals a connection between divine omniscience and 
omnipotence. The doctrine of divine omnipotence subsumes, by definition, 
all the powers that God has, such as physical powers, sensory powers, 
epistemic powers and so on. God does not have, and does not have to have, 
any more powers than those under the scope of His omnipotence. Hence, 
divine omniscience can be understood as God's exercising a particular 
part-the epistemic part-of His omnipotence. 13 (See the following 
diagram). 
13 It should be noted that this is a simplified, approximate model of omniscience. As I 
argue in Chapter 4, it seems that in order for one to be omniscient one needs to have not 
only complete epistemic powers, but also other kinds of relevant powers. For other 
attempts to define omniscience in terms of power, see David Hunt (2000) and Charles 
Taliaferro (1985). Hunt's and Taliaferro's understanding of omniscience differs from 
mine in two respects. First, they think that omniscience is most closely associated with 
what they call 'cognitive powers'. This terminology is misleading. One might need to 
have cognition in order for one to be omniscient, but since to be omniscient is to know 
everything, omniscience should be most closely associated with epistemic powers. (In 
fact, it seems that what Hunt and Taliaferro mean by the term 'cognitive powers' are 
epistemic powers.) Second, they think that possession of cognitive powers itself suffices 
for omniscience. I think this is mistaken. In order for one to be omniscient one has to 
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Instantiation 
2.4 Second Principle: Divine Omnipotence and Necessary 
Impossibilities 
The second principle represents a consensus that theologians and 
philosophers have reached regarding the nature of divine omnipotence. It 
states that the fact that God does not have a power to do what it is 
necessarily impossible to do does not undermine His omnipotence. 14 
This principle is described in the following passage by Nick Trakakis 
(1997): 
No matter how much controversy and debate may currently 
surround the extraordinary attribute of divine omnipotence, there is 
a virtually complete consensus amongst philosophers and 
theologians that Aquinas is correct in saying that 'anything that 
exercise one's power to know everything; the mere possession of the power does not 
suffice. 
14 For the application of the second principle to the 'paradox of the stone' see Brown and 
Nagasawa (2002), and Mavrodes (1963). 
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implies a contradiction does not fall under God's 
. t '15 16 ( 55) omn1po ence . . . . p. 
According to this principle the fact that it is impossible for God, for 
example, to draw a square circle or to make a married bachelor does not 
threaten His omnipotence. As George I. Mavrodes (1963) notes, my failure 
to draw a circle in a geometry examination indicates my lack of 
geomettical skill, but God's, or anyone's, failure to draw a square circle 
does not indicate any such lack (p. 221); for it is not merely contingently, 
but necessarily impossible to do. 
Obviously, Aquinas, who was not aware of Saul A. Kripke' s 
distinction between what is necessary a priori and necessary a posteriori, 17 
had only necessary a priori impossibilities in mind when he formulated the 
second principle. However, the principle must be applied to necessary a 
posteriori impossibilities as well, because both of them are equally 
necessarily impossible; that is, impossible throughout all possible worlds. 
Consequently, divine omnipotence is not undermined even if God cannot 
bring about such necessary a posteriori impossibilities as separating water 
from H20 or Hesperus from Phosphorus. 
2.5 Applying the Principles 
As we have seen, Grim, Castaneda and Abbruzzese have disputed the issue 
of whether or not ( 4) is true. Grim argues that it is true and Castaneda and 
Abbruzzese disagree with him. However, a more crucial issue is whether 
15 Aquinas (1967), p. 167. 
16 Edward Wierenga (1983) similarly remarks, ' it has long been realized that in order to 
be omnipotent God need not be able to do exactly everything; for example, an omnipotent 
being need not be able to do what is logically impossible' (p. 363). See also Mavrodes 
(1963) , p. 221. 
17 See Kripke (1972). 
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(4), if it is true, really threatens the traditional doctrine of divine 
omniscience. 
Having in mind the two principles just introduced, consider Grim' s 
argument again. ( 4) states that God cannot know what I know in knowing 
(1). Employing the first principle, (4) can be restated as follows: 
(15) God does not have an epistemic power to know what I know 
in knowing (1). 
Now it is clear that Grim's argument is relevant to divine omnipotence as 
well. The reason that (4), or equivalently (15), is true, according to Grim, 
is that only I can know that I am making the mess. God, or anyone else 
other than me, cannot know what I know in knowing (1) simply because 
they are not me. There are no other reasons. In general, 
(16) If xis not me then x cannot know what I know in knowing (1). 
(16) is equivalent to the following: 
(17) If x is not me then x does not have an epistemic power to 
know what I know in knowing (1). 
Suppose, however, for the sake of argument, that God does have a 
miraculous power to know what I know in knowing (1). Then the 
following is true: 
(18) God has an epistemic power to know what I know in knowing 
(1). 
Grim' s assumption, exemplified in (17), is logically equivalent to: 
(19) If x has an epistemic power to know what I know in knowing 
(1) then xis me. 
Applying (19) to (18) we can derive: 
(20) God is me. 
However, (20) is false because, obviously, God is not me! Furthermore, 
(20) is not merely contingently, but is necessarily false. 18 Thus, by 
18 Here I simply mean that the proposition expressed by (20) is necessarily false. 
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assuming that God, as omniscient, must know what I know in knowing (1), 
Grim requires that God be able to do what it is necessarily impossible to 
do. However, as we have seen, the second principle states that the fact that 
God does not have a power to do what it is necessarily impossible to do 
does not undermine His omnipotence. So even if ( 4) is true, that is, even if 
God does not have an epistemic power to know what I know in knowing 
(1), it does not threaten divine omnipotence. Moreover, since, as I have 
argued, di vine omniscience can be understood as God's exercising the 
epistemic part of His omnipotence-the sum of all the powers that He has 
to have and He actually has-it does not undermine divine omniscience 
either. Therefore, given the two principles, Grim fails to derive the 
conclusion that God cannot be omniscient. 
2.6 Possible Objections 
I now examine four possible objections to my argument. 
First, one might claim that my argument is not compelling because it 
is based on an unusual theistic view of di vine omniscience, according to 
which the doctrine of divine omniscience is a doctrine about divine 
epistemic powers. While the doctrine of divine omnipotence is construed 
as being about what God can do, the doctrine of divine omniscience is 
usually construed as being about what God actually knows and not about 
what God can know. However, this would appear to make my argument 
unacceptable to the majority of theists. 19 
I have two responses here. First, the view that I adopt for my 
argument does not claim that the doctrine of divine omniscience is a 
doctrine about divine epistemic powers themselves. It rather claims that 
the doctrine of divine omniscience is a doctrine about God's exercising 
19 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion on this point. 
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His epistemic powers. Second, and more importantly, this claim is 
consistent with the standard theistic view of divine omniscience. For all it 
says is that God's knowing that p can be construed as God's exercising His 
epistemic power to know that p, which does not conflict with the standard 
· 20 view. 
Second, one might argue that the second principle of my argument is 
not compelling because God can do what it is necessarily impossible to 
do. 21 For example, according to Christianity, although God is one entity, 
20 It does not follow, however, that my strategy is applicable to any possible argument 
against the doctrine of divine omniscience. Suppose, for example, that there is an 
argument that allegedly shows that while God can know that p, He just does not. Since 
this argument does not commit to a claim that God cannot know that p my argument is 
not applicable to it. 
21 Many philosophers claim that Descartes does believe that God can do absolutely 
anything, including that which it is necessarily impossible to do. See Harry G. Frankfurt 
(1964), Frankfurt (1977), Peter Geach, (1973), D. Goldstick, (1990), Leonard G. Miller 
(1957), Alvin Plantinga (1980b), Trakakis (1997). For example, the following passage by 
Descartes (1970) is said to prove it: 
I do not think that we should ever say of anything that it cannot be brought about 
by God. For since everything involved in truth and goodness depends on His 
omnipotence, I would not dare to say that God cannot make a mountain without 
a valley, or that one and two should not be three. I merely say that He has given 
me such a mind that I cannot conceive a mountain without a valley, or an 
aggregate of one and two which is not three, and that such things involve a 
contradiction in my conception'. (pp. 236-237) 
See also Descartes (1970), pp. 11-12, pp. 14-15, pp. 150-151, pp. 236-237, pp. 240-241. 
La Croix (1984) argues, however, that Descartes does not really mean to contend that 
God can turn necessary impossibilities into possibilities. Other philosophers who endorse 
the doctrine of absolute omnipotence, according to which if God is omnipotent He has to 
be able to do everything, including that which it is necessarily impossible to do, include: 
Earl Conee (1991), Goldstick, (1990), Mackie (1955), John Ellis McTaggart (1906), Leon 
Shestov (1962). In this work I do not attempt to provide a precise definition of divine 
omnipotence. I assume, however, for the sake of argument, that an omnipotent God can 
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He is also a unity of three distinct entities: Father, Son and Holy Spirit. To 
cite another example, God became a man, Jesus Christ, without sacrificing 
His divinity at all. One might think that these examples represent 
necessary impossibilities. 
Many philosophers argue that a careful examination shows that those 
examples do not represent necessary impossibilities. 22 Suppose, though, 
for the sake of argument, that they are necessary impossibilities. Then we 
can reasonably assume that God, who can do what it is necessarily 
impossible to do, really can know what I know in knowing (1). Yet if He 
can know what I know in knowing (1) Grim cannot establish his argument 
in the first place. 
Third, one might object to my argument to the effect that the second 
principle is not applicable to the doctrine of divine omniscience. It is, 
according to this objection, exclusively applicable to the doctrine of divine 
omnipotence. 
If this objection is right, then the principle needs to be amended to 
read the fact that God does not have a power to do what it is necessarily 
i1npossible to do does not undermine His omnipotence, except that part 
which involves His epistemic powers. Obviously, this is ad hoc. I do not 
think that Aquinas or others would have ever meant to limit the principle 
in this way. It does not make sense to narrow the scope of the principle 
radically for the sole purpose of blocking my objection to Grim's 
argument. Moreover, if this revised second principle is cogent then the 
do everything that it is possible to do and cannot do that which it is necessarily impossible 
to do; and in fact , this is what most theists and anti-theists accept. See Conee (1991), 
Antoine Cote (1998), Louis Groarke (2001) , Trakakis (1997). 
22 For the debates on the coherence of the trinity see James Cain (1989), Richard 
Cartwright (1987), John Macnamara, Marie Reyes, and Gonzalo Reyes (1994) , Trakakis 
(1997), John Zeis (1993), on the coherence of the incarnation see Thomas V. Morris 
(1986a), Thomas V. Morris (1986b), Trakakis (1997), Keith E. Yandell (1994). 
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doctrine of divine omnipotence is easily undermined by the fact that, for 
instance, God cannot know a false proposition. However, of course, no one, 
even anti-theists, would think that God's inability to know a false 
proposition undermines the doctrine of divine omnipotence. 
Fourth, one might argue, by appealing to pantheism, that I am wrong 
in saying that it is necessarily impossible for God to know what I know in 
knowing (1). Pantheism says that divine unity is constituted by the totality 
of existence and hence that there is no radical distinction between God and 
His creation. Thus, given pantheism, my acts could be mine as well as 
God's. If my act of making the mess were also God's, then God would 
definitely know what I know in knowing (1). 23 
Whatever the merits of this position, it cannot save Grim, for he 
assumes that God cannot know what I know in knowing (1) precisely 
because I am distinct from God. This excludes pantheism from the start. If 
pantheism is right, then God can indeed know what I know in knowing (1) 
and Grim' s argument fails. 
Even if Grim is right in saying that God cannot know what I know in 
knowing (1), there is no reason to accept his conclusion that God cannot be 
omniscient, provided that we accept the two plausible principles regarding 
divine attributes to which I have appealed. 
2. 7 Application of My Strategy 
The two principles that I have adopted to undermine Grim' s argument 
have wide application. In this section I argue that those principles can be 
used to undermine another anti-theist argument, which is quite distinct 
from Grim's. 
23 Indeed, Richard Francks ( 1979) argues that cases similar to Grim' s entail a pantheism 
that is close to Spinoza's. 
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In 'Does God Know What It Is Like to Be Me?', William J. Mander 
(2002) examines an anti-theist argument that is based on Thomas Nagel's 
argument against physicalism (1974). 24 The argument goes as follows: In 
order for God to know what it is like to be me, He must have my point of 
view. However, since, according to Judaeo-Christian theism, God is 
necessarily unlimited and necessarily incorporeal, while I am limited and 
corporeal, He cannot have my point of view. Therefore, God cannot know 
what it is like to be me. In the following, I demonstrate: (i) Mander' s 
objection to the argument is unsuccessful; (ii) we can defeat the argument 
by utilising my objection to Grim' s argument. 
Mander (2002) himself claims that this anti-theist argument is 
fallacious because, according to him, God can in fact have His own point 
of view and my point of view at the same time: 
To say that one cannot simultaneously hold two perspectives is not 
quite right; this can be done where one of them includes the other. 
For where a point of view includes another more restricted sub 
point of view as one of its parts or components, in holding the 
wider view one is simultaneously holding the narrower view which 
it contains .... We may suggest that God knows what it is like to be 
us because his complete and· unlimited perspective on the world 
includes as one of its parts our limited and imperfect perspective on 
the same. 25 (p. 439) 
Mander cannot simply stipulate that God can have these two distinct points 
of view at the same time because that is the negation of the sub-conclusion 
of the anti-theist argument. (If he simply stipulates it then his argument 
begs the question against the anti-theist argument.) However, because of 
24 I discuss Na gel's argument in detail in Chapter 5. 
25 Mander uses the terms 'point of view' and 'perspective' interchangeably. I use only 
'point of view' throughout this chapter for the sake of uniformity. 
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its speculative nature, neither can Mander demonstrate his claim. Thus, he 
tries to motivate it by providing five relevant examples (p. 439): 
(A) University and Colleges: Individual colleges have their own points of 
view but the university as a whole has a point of view which includes 
those sub points of view. 
(B) Week and Days: Last Sunday and next Friday are different points from 
which we can regard the passing of time, but both are included within the 
wider point of view of this week. 
(C) Europe and Britain: Britain has its own point of view but, at the same 
time, it is a part of the European point of view. 
(D) Awareness and Senses: Our visual, tactile or auditory senses have their 
own points of view but they are parts of the wider point of view of our 
complete conscious awareness. 
(E) Adults and Children: Children's points of view are included in adults' 
point of view. 
Now, in the following, I maintain that those examples fail to motivate 
Mander' s objection to the anti-theist argument. 
(A), (B) and (C) are simply irrelevant to the anti-theist argument. As 
those examples show, the phrase 'point of view' is often ascribed to many 
different objects like colleges, countries, and so on. However, the point of 
view with which Nagel and the anti-theist argument-at least one version 
of the anti-theist argument-are concerned is one in a much more limited 
sense.
26 It is a point of view with which one's 'subjective phenomena is 
26 Mander (2002) himself admits, 'My use of the words 'perspective' and 'point of view' 
is a broad one, comparable to that found in T. Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), or A. W. Moore, Points of View (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997)' (ft. 14). As I claim in the main text, this makes Mander' s argument 
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essentially connected' (Nagel, 1974, p. 437). This type of point of view 
cannot be taken by colleges, days or countries, but only by an agent, such 
as a human being, that can have phenomenal experiences. 27 
(D) and (E) involve, contrary to (A), (B) and (C), agents that can have 
phenomenal experiences. Do they then motivate Mander' s objection to the 
anti-theist argument? The answer is, unfortunately, no. 
(D) says that while we have different forms of senses, each of which 
has its own point of view, they are parts of our complete conscious 
awareness. However, according to the restricted sense of a point of view 
noted above, senses themselves are not qualified to have points of view. 
For, again, they are not agents that can have phenomenal experiences. 
While it does make sense to say that I have my own point of view through 
those senses, it does not make sense to say that my visual sense alone or 
my tactile sense alone has its own point of view. 
(E) seems more promising than the others because it involves only 
adults and children, both of whom can have points of view in the restricted 
sense; and, in fact, (E) seems to prove that one can have two points of 
view at the same time. Nevertheless, this example does not support 
Mander's objection to the anti-theist argument. For although adults are 
different from children, they are not as different from children as God is 
from me. The main thrust of the anti-theist argument is that God cannot 
have my point of view because God and I are fundamentally distinct from 
each other. While God is necessarily unlimited and necessarily incorporeal , 
I am limited and corporeal. The anti-theist argument derives the 
particularly weak because the concerns of Nagel ' s and the anti-theist arguments are not a 
point of view in such a broad sense. 
27 If panpsychism is true then perhaps any physical object can have a point of view. I shall 
set aside this issue because the cogency or otherwise of panpsychism is not directly 
relevant to the current discussion. 
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impossibility of God's knowing what it is like to be me by appealing to 
this fundamental difference between God and me. This sort of 
distinctiveness is not present in the example of adults and children. For, 
~ 
after all, adults are merely grownup children! 
In order to motivate his objection to the anti-theist argument Mander 
needs to provide an example in the following form: while agents x and y 
are fundamentally distinct, x can have x' s and y' s points of view-points 
of view in the restricted sense-simultaneously because x' s point of view 
includes y's point of view. As we have seen, however, none of Mander's 
examples fits this form. 
At this point Mander might argue that his examples are mere 
metaphors. That is, they are not supposed to justify the truth of his 
objection to the anti-theist argument but merely to illustrate the 
relationship between God's point of view and my point of view. However, 
they are problematic even as metaphors. For those examples entail the 
exact opposite of what Mander needs to show for the purpose of defending 
his claim. 
Forget about a point of view in the restricted sense and consider again 
the example of Europe and Britain. Europe's point of view includes 
Britain's point of view. That is why Britain can have both the British point 
of view and the European point of view at the same time. Consider, again, 
the example of a university and colleges. The University of London's point 
of view includes Heythrop College's point of view. That is why Heythrop 
College can have both Heythrop College's point of view and the 
University of London's point of view at the same time. Thus those 
examples seem successfully to support Mander' s claim: 'To say that one 
cannot simultaneously hold two perspectives is not quite right; this can be 
done where one of them includes the other' (Mander, 2002, p. 439). 
However, given Mander' s assumptions that Europe and the University of 
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London correspond to God and that Britain and Heythrop College 
correspond to me, what those examples actually show is not that God can 
know what it is like to be me but that I can know what it is like to be God! 
This is the exact opposite of what Mander needs to show. Therefore, 
Mander's objection to the anti-theist argument is untenable. 
In what follows, I argue that we can undermine the anti-theist 
argument by using the strategy that I adopt to refute Grim' s argument. The 
anti-theist argument says that the following is true: 
(21) God cannot know what it is like to be me. 
According to the first principle regarding the doctrine of di vine 
omniscience (21) is equivalent to the following: 
(22) God does not have an epistemic power to know what it is like 
to be me. 
Now, again, it is clear that the anti-theist argument is relevant not only to 
the doctrine of divine omniscience but also the doctrine of divine 
omnipotence. The reason that (21), or equivalently (22) is true is that only 
I can have my own point of view. God, or anyone else other than me, 
cannot know what it is like to be me simply because they, who are distinct 
from me, cannot have my point of view. Therefore, 
(23) If xis not me then x cannot know what it is like to be me. 
(23) is equivalent to the following: 
(24) If x is not me then x does not have an epistemic power to 
know what it is like to be me. 
Suppose, however, for the sake of argument, that God does have a 
miraculous power to know what it is like to be me. Then the following is 
true: 
(25) God has an epistemic power to know what it is like to be me. 
The anti-theists' assumption, exemplified in (24 ), is logically equivalent to: 
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(26) If x has an epistemic power to know what it is like to be me 
then xis me. 
Applying (26) to (25) we can derive: 
(27) God is me. 
However, (27) is false because, again, God is not me. Furthermore, (27) is 
not merely contingently, but is necessarily false. Thus, by assuming that 
God, as omniscient, must know what it is like to be me, proponents of the 
anti-theist argument require, just as Grim does, that God be able to do that 
which it is necessarily impossible to do. However, as we have seen, the 
second principle states that the fact that God does not have a power to do 
what it is necessarily impossible to do does not undermine His 
omnipotence. So even if (22) were true, that is, even if God does not have 
an epistemic power to know what it is like to be me, its truth would not 
threaten divine omnipotence. Moreover, since, as I have argued, divine 
omniscience can be understood as God's exercising the epistemic part of 
His omnipotence-the sum of all the powers that He has to have and He 
actually has-its truth would not undermine divine omniscience either. 28 
Therefore, given the two principles, proponents of the anti-theist argument 
also fail to derive the conclusion that God cannot be omniscient. 
As Mander contends, there seems no obvious reason to think that God 
cannot know what it is like to be me. However, given the two principles 
regarding divine attributes, even if God cannot know what it is like to be 
28 Mander (2002) himself seems to be aware of the necessary impossibility at issue. He 
writes as follows: 
[A] man [cannot] know what it is like to be a dog, for even if he could become 
one, no dog can know what it is like to be a man .... You can't occupy more than 
one [point of view] at the same time. We may become adept at flitting from one 
[being] to another but we can no more hold two such perspectives in our mind 
together than we can simultaneously see both a duck and a rabbit in the famous 
duck-rabbit illustration from Gestalt Psychology' (p. 438). 
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me, for the reason to which the anti-theist argument appeals, the 
omniscience of God is not undermined at all. The anti-theist argument that 
Mander discusses fails to the same extent that Grim' s argument fails. 
2.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that Grim's argument from knowledge de se 
is unsuccessful. In particular, I have tried to show that, given two plausible 
principles regarding divine attributes, there is no reason for us to think that 
God cannot be omniscient. I have argued that even if Grim is right in 
saying that God cannot know what I know in knowing that I am making a 
mess, that claim does not undermine the doctrine of divine omniscience. I 
have also claimed that my objection to the argument from knowledge de se 
is applicable to another argument against the doctrine of divine 
omniscience, according to which God cannot know what it is like to be me. 
In the rest of Part II, I discuss what I call the 'argument from concept 
possession', a further argument against the doctrine of di vine omniscience. 
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Divine Omniscience and the Argument from 
Concept Possession (1) 
3.1 Introduction 
The primary concern for philosophers of religion for the last half century 
has undoubtedly been the argument from evil. 1 The core of the argument is 
construed as an apparent inconsistency between divine attributes. 
According to the Anselmian tradition, God is a being such that He is 
necessarily omnipotent, necessarily omniscient, and necessarily 
omnibenevolent. However, the existence of evil in this world seems to 
show that either God could not have created the actual world such that it 
be free from evil (that is, He is not omnipotent2), He does not know our 
1 According to Daniel Hill (1998) more than 3600 articles and books have been written on 
the problem of evil since 1960 alone (p. 32). For important papers on the problem of evil 
see, for instance, Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams (1990), Michael 
L. Peterson (1992), and William L. Rowe (2001). 
2 One might contend that the existence of evil does not show that God is not omnipotent 
but only that God was not omnipotent when He created the universe. However, no 
traditional theists would accept that God was not omnipotent when He created the 
universe. Here I am concerned with J. L. Mackie's logical argument from evil (1955, 
1982) rather than the evidential argument from evil. 
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suffering from evil (that is, He is not omniscient), or He does not care 
about our suffering from evil (that is, He is not omnibenevolent.) 
Therefore, the argument concludes, there is no Anselmian God. 
Just like the argument from evil, what I call the 'argument from 
concept possession' concerns an alleged inconsistency between divine 
attributes. It states that God cannot be both necessarily omnipotent and 
necessarily omniscient because if He is necessarily omnipotent then He 
does not fully understand certain concepts, possession of which requires 
Him to have particular experiences. For instance, according to one version 
of the argument, if God is necessarily omnipotent then He does not fully 
understand the concepts fear, frustration and despair, possession of which 
require Him to have experienced fear, frustration and despair. Therefore, 
the argument concludes, there is no Anselmian God. (As I noted in 
Chapter 1, I use the words, 'Judaeo-Christian God', 'Anselmian God' and 
'God' interchangeably.) 
Although the argument from concept possession has been recurrently 
introduced by a number of philosophers in various different forms, it has 
attracted far less attention than the argument from evil. The aim of this 
chapter and the next chapter is to shed light on the argument and examine 
its significance. I construct what I take to be the strongest possible version 
of the argument and demonstrate that it fails to derive any inconsistency 
between divine attributes. My conclusion is not, however, entirely negative. 
In Chapter 4 I argue that the failure of the argument from concept 
possession teaches us something important about God's necessary 
attributes. 
This Chapter has the following structure. In Section 3 .2, I review the 
historical background of the argument. In Section 3.3, I analyse its basic 
formulation. In Sections 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 I examine three types of objection 
to the argument, which attack the first, second and third of its premisses, 
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respectively. I argue that none of them succeeds. In Section 3.7 I discuss 
Torin Alter' s attempt to undermine the fourth premiss of the argument in 
more detail. I argue that while his argument is compelling, it does not 
ultimately save the Anselmian conception of God because it is inconsistent 
with traditional doctrines of Judeao-Christian theism. I summarise the 
discussion of this chapter in Section 3.8. 
3.2 Historical Background 
As I noted above, the argument from concept possession has been 
introduced by a number of philosophers. In this section I discuss its 
historical background by reviewing the various forms in which it has been 
presented. 
The Doctrine of Divine Impassibility 
Perhaps early Christian apologists and theologians influenced by pre-
Christian Greek philosophy, such as Justin Martyr, are the ones who first 
stated explicitly the basic intuition behind the argument from concept 
possession. According to their 'doctrine of divine impassibility' God is 
free from pain and sufferings because He is apathes, that is, he is not 
affected by any causal processes. 3 Regarding this doctrine Dennis Ngien 
(1997) remarks: 
Virtually all the early church fathers took it for granted, denying 
God any emotions because they might interrupt his tranquillity. 
The Council of Chalcedon (a.d. 451) declared as "vain babblings" 
the idea that the divine nature could suffer, and it condemned those 
who believed it. 
3 For contemporary discussions of divine impassibility, see Richard E. Creel (1986), Paul 
S. Fiddes (1992), J. K. Mozley (1926), Marcel Sarot (1992), Sarot (2001 ), Thomas G. 
Weinandy (2000), Weinandy (2002). 
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Like most theologians of Chalcedonian and earlier times, 
Calvin-and Reformed theology after him-assumed divine 
impassibility. The Westminster Confession of Faith explicitly 
asserted that God is "without body, parts, or passions, immutable." 
Similarly, a contemporary evangelical theologian argues that when 
Jesus died on the cross it was his human nature that suffered, not 
the divine. 
Augustine is also known for his endorsement of the doctrine of divine 
impassibility. He writes, 'who can sanely say that God is touched by any 
misery?' and 'far be it from us to imagine that the impassible nature of 
God suffers any vexation. For as He is jealous without any envy, is angry 
without any perturbation, is pitiful without any grief, repents without 
having any evil in him to correct so He is patient without any suffering' 
(Mozley, 1926, pp. 105-107). 
The doctrine of divine impassibility itself is not a thesis about God's 
knowledge. However, many theologians believe that the doctrine entails 
that God does not have complete know ledge about human pains and 
sufferings. 4 Notice that this idea is similar to the thrust of the argument 
from concept possession. That is, God lacks a certain kind of knowledge 
because of His very perfection. However, unlike contemporary anti-theists, 
proponents of the doctrine of divine impassibility still believe that God is 
omniscient. They think that God's impassibility represents His perfection. 
4 The following passage in Scripture appears to be inconsistent with those theologians' 
belief: 'And the LORD said, I have surely seen the affliction of my people which are in 
Egypt, and have heard their cry by reason of their taskmasters; for I know their sorrows' 
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Lachs 's Version 
As far as I can locate, the argument from concept possession was clearly 
formulated for the first time by John Lachs in 1963. In that year Lachs 
published two papers on omniscience. In the first paper, 'Omniscience' 
(1963a) he attempts to establish that '[o]n the supposition that a certain 
consciousness is omniscient, we can show that there is at least one thing it 
does not know' (p. 401). Lachs's argument is based on a form of 
empiricism, according to which it is impossible to know, for example, 'the 
nature of surprise without having experienced it' (p. 401). Lachs thinks 
that this thesis is cogent because, according to him, 'surprise is a feeling or 
experience, and as such no description can ever hope to capture its 
essence' (p. 401). From this thesis he infers that an omniscient being, who 
knows everything and accordingly has never been surprised, does not fully 
comprehend the concept surprise and concludes that the notion of 
omniscience is 'internally incoherent' (p. 401). 5 While Lachs does not 
explicitly talk about God in that paper it is clear that he has in mind a 
necessarily omniscient being, such as the Anselmian God. For, if the being 
at issue is not necessarily omniscient then it does not follow from Lachs' s 
empiricism that this being has not experienced surprise. The being might 
have had the experience by temporarily abandoning its omniscience. 
(Exodus 3:7). Whether or not they are really inconsistent is, however, a further issue 
which I do not examine in this work. 
5 Lachs's argument is a non sequitur. Even if it is true that no description can ever capture 
the essence of surprise, it does not immediately follow that one can know the essence of 
surprise only by being surprised. Consider a parallel example. Even if it is true that one 
cannot go to a certain place by car, it does not immediately follow that one can go there 
only by airplane, unless it is shown that one can go to that place only by car or airplane. 
In order to complete his argument, Lachs has to hold that knowledge can be acquired only 
by description or acquaintance, which is not obviously true, since it might also be 
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In the second paper, 'Professor Prior on Omniscience' (1963b) Lachs 
introduces a similar form of the argument in order to undermine the 
following formulation of divine omniscience introduced by A. N. Prior 
(1962): 
For every p, if p then God knows that p. (p. 114) 
Notice that this is almost identical to Kenny's formulation of omniscience, 
which I introduced in Chapter 1. 6 
Lachs contends that if Prior' s formulation really represents God's 
knowledge then God is not truly omniscient. According to Lachs (1963b), 
given that doubt is 'a consciousness of uncertainty or a sense of 
vacillation' God, who is omniscient according to Prior's formulation, does 
not fully understand such a proposition as 'Descartes doubted the existence 
of God'. For, Lachs says, '[n]o one can know the meaning of 'doubt' in 
this sense unless he is having or has had the experience of doubting' and 
presumably, God, who is necessarily omniscient, has not had it (p. 364). 
Interestingly enough, Prior (1963) does agree with Lachs's main point: 
I agree ... that Lachs is on to something here. Knowing whether p, 
and even knowing what it is to know whether p, do seem in some 
cases to presuppose having experiences, e.g. toothaches and 
sinking feeling and dismay, which it is difficult to imagine a divine 
being as having. I may, for example, mentally advert to a pain 
which I am experiencing, and ask myself, in my private language, 
acquired by inference or intuition. See Chapter 4 of this work for related issues. I owe this 
point to Daniel Stolj ar. 
6 As I mentioned in Chapter 1, this is a typical formulation of omniscience. The following 
is a list of philosophers who subscribe to this formulation, or one very similar to it: Peter 
Geach (1977, pp. 40-43), Anthony Kenny (1979, p. 10), William E. Mann (1975, pp. 153-
154), Alvin Plantinga (1980, p. 91), James F. Ross (1969, p. 214), Richard Swinburne 
(1977, p. 162), James E. Tomberlin and Frank McGuinness (1977, p. 472). See Patrick 
Grim (1983), p. 265, p. 275, fn 5. 
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whether God knows that a toothache feels to me like this, and I do 
not see how God can know either that or anything else directly 
involving a sensation of this quality without actually having one.7 
(p. 365) 
Prior continues to claim, however, that Lachs' s argument does not 
affect his formalisation of omniscience: 
I don't know, however, of any proof that having such experiences 
would be incompatible with omniscience; what emerges here is 
rather a question as to whether omniscience is itself compatible 
with other attributes traditionally ascribed to divine beings. (p. 365) 
Prior' s argument here is a straw man. He might be right, on the one 
hand, in saying that given God's necessary perfection He has not had 
toothaches, or experienced a sinking feeling and dismay. And it might 
follow, as Prior says, that God is precluded from fully understanding those 
concepts. However, on the other hand, while this is a version of the 
argument from concept possession, it is largely different from Lachs' s 
original version. Lachs's aim is not to show that God's omniscience is 
inconsistent with His other divine attributes but that the notion of 
omniscience is 'internally incoherent' (1963a, p. 401, my emphasis). 
Lachs contends that the notion of omniscience is self-contradictory 
because, given the form of concept empiricism, the very fact that God is 
omniscient entails that He does not fully understand what surprise and 
doubt are. The examples of toothaches, sinking feeling and dismay are 
Prior' s artefacts and Lachs does not even discuss them in his papers. 
7 One might think that Prior is here concerned with whether or not God can have certain 
indexical knowledge rather than experiential knowledge. I do not examine this construal 
in this work. On the issue of divine omniscience and indexical knowledge see Chapters 1 
and 2 of this work, John E. Abbruzesse (1997), Grim (1983), Grim (1985), Grim (2000), 
Norman Kretzmann (1966), Peter Ludlow (1995), Yujin Nagasawa (2003a), Thomas D. 
Sullivan (1991), Edward Wierenga (1988). 
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Martin's Version 
The second oldest version of the argument from concept possession that I 
can locate was introduced by Michael Martin in 19708. Martin (1974) says 
that God does not exist because if He did, He would have to satisfy the 
following two conditions at the same time9: 
(i) To be omnibenevolent. 
(ii) To have 'all of men's knowledge' (p. 234). 
Martin thinks that it is impossible to satisfy (i) and (ii) at the same time 
because, on the one hand, an omnibenevolent being does not know what 
lust and envy are but, on the other hand, a being that has 'all of men's 
knowledge' must know them. 10 Just like Lachs's argument, Martin's is 
based on a form of empiricism. He derives his conclusion that an 
omnibenevolent being does not know what lust and envy are by using the 
empiricist thesis that '[a] person who knows lust and envy has at least had 
the feeling of lust or envy' (p. 233-234). 
8 See Martin (1970), Martin (1974), Martin (1990) , Martin (2000). 
9 Martin notes that he does not mean to undermine every conception of God by his 
argument. He says that his target is not the 'God of professional philosophers or 
theologians' but the 'God of the common man'. In other words, he does not exclude the 
possibility that there is some coherent conception of God that is not vulnerable to his 
argument. 
10 Here, by the word 'know', Martin refers to a form of knowledge that is neither 
'knowledge-that' nor 'knowledge-how'. He writes: 
There is a use of 'know' in ordinary parlance which cannot be reduced to 
knowledge that or knowledge how. When one says "I know Smith," one does not 
ordinarily mean merely that one has certain propositional or procedural 
knowledge concerning Smith. . .. When one says "Jones knows sorrow," one 
does not usually mean only that Jones knows that sorrow results in such and 
such behavior or that sorrow is caused in such and such a way. One is usually 
suggesting rather that Jones has had the experience of sorrow. The same thing 
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Blumenfeld's Version 
Perhaps the best-known version of the argument from concept possession 
is that introduced by David Blumenfeld in 1978. 11 Blumenfeld argues that 
given the 'most restricted' (p. 204) form of concept empiricism, which he 
thinks 'obviously true' (p. 205), we can demonstrate the incoherence of the 
notion of the Anselmian God. The form of concept empiricism that 
Blumenfeld adopts for his argument is the following: 
For some concepts, in order fully to comprehend them, one must 
have had the experience of an instance or exemplification of them 
(p. 205). 
Consider the concept of the sensation of red. If Blumenfeld' s concept 
empiricism is right then one must have had the experience of an instance 
or exemplification of the concept red sensation. It is important to note, 
however, that he does not mean that one must have had the experience of 
seeing a red object in order to possess the concept: 
Surely one could not fully grasp this notion if one had never had an 
experience of redness. I do not say that one needs to experience a 
red object. One might come to understand the concept by pushing 
one's eyeball and getting the appropriate sensation in that way. But 
I do say that without any acquaintance with redness, one could not 
fully comprehend the sensation of red. (p. 205) 
Blumenfeld contends that there are concepts that God is precluded from 
fully comprehending. For example, he says, God cannot fully comprehend 
such concepts as fear, frustration and despair because the occurrence of 
fear, frustration and despair 'depends logically on the subject's believing 
goes for the expression "He has known lust" or "He has known envy". (1974, p. 
233) 
11 For debates on Blumenfeld ' s version of the argument from concept possession, see 
Alter (2002), Michael Beaty and Charles Taliaferro (1990), Nagasawa (2003b). 
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in the limitation of his power' (p. 206). According to Blumenfeld in order 
fully to comprehend the concept fear one has to believe that one was in 
danger; in order fully to comprehend the concept frustration, one has to 
believe that one was thwarted; and in order fully to comprehend the 
concept despair, one has to believe that one has faced a situation for which 
one is very unlikely to find a remedy (pp. 206-207). It might be the case 
that there is no reason for one to fear, be frustrated or be in despair because 
s/he is indeed very powerful. However, if one believes in the limitation of 
her/his power s/he might be able to comprehend fully fear, frustration and 
despair. Without believing it, Blumenfeld says, one cannot fully 
comprehend them. Since an omnipotent God does not believe in the 
limitation of His power, Blumenfeld says, He does not fully comprehend 
those concepts. The ref ore, Blumenfeld concludes, God cannot be 
omniscient. 
Blumenfeld' s argument has an obvious, minor defect. His 'minimal 
concept empiricism' says that for some concepts, in order fully to 
comprehend them, one must have had the experience of an instance or 
exemplification of them. However, it does not say that fear, frustration, 
and despair are among the concepts that require relevant experiences. All 
it says is that there are some concepts that require relevant experiences and 
it is completely silent as to exactly which concepts require one to have 
them. Thus Blumenfled' s minimal concept empiricism is consistent with a 
case in which while there are some concepts that require one to have 
certain relevant experiences, God can easily have those experiences. If this 
case is actual, then Blumenfeld' s version of the argument from concept 
possession fails to undermine God's omniscience. Therefore, instead of the 
above, Blumenfeld needs to endorse a form of empiricism as follows: 
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In order fully to comprehend the concepts fear, frustration and 
despair one must have had the experience of an instance or 
exemplification of them. 
Notice that this is even more restricted than what Blumefeld calls the 
'most restricted' form of concept empiricism. 
Bringsjord's Version 
Selmer Bringsjord (1989) provides another version of the argument from 
' concept possession in order to undermine Patrick Grim' s definition of 
omniscience. Letting Kxp mean 'x knows that p' Bringsjord formulates 
Grim' s definition as follows: 
• x(x is omniscient:=J•p(p is true-Kxp)) 12 (p. 186) 
Notice that this formulation of omniscience is very similar to the 
formulation by Prior that Lachs discusses. Just like Lachs, Bringsjord 
argues that the above formulation shows that 'there are certain 
propositions God can't possibly know' (p. 188). For example, Bringjord 
says, God does not know 'what it's like to be ignorant, finite, shortsighted, 
etc.' (p. 188). Bringsjord does not explicitly state a reason why God does 
not understand those concepts, but it is obvious that what he has in mind 
here is similar to Lachs' s and Blumenfeld' s concept empiricism. That is, 
God, who is necessarily omniscient, necessarily infinite and necessarily 
perfect, does not fully understand those concepts because He is precluded 
from having the relevant experiences. 
12 As Grim himself says (1990, p. 273) this is not in fact his definition of omniscience. He 
explicitly rejects this definition in his earlier (1983) paper. For his attempt to define 
omniscience see Grim (1983), pp. 265-267, Grim (1990). 
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3.3 The Structure of the Argument 
We have seen several different versions of the argument from concept 
possession. In the following, I try to provide the basic schema of the 
argument. 
The argument from concept possession relies on two important theses. 
The first is about God's necessary perfection, which is, as I noted earlier, 
based on the Anselmian tradition. According to this thesis, God is 
necessarily perfect; in particular, God is necessarily omniscient, 
necessarily omnipotent and necessarily omnibenevolent. 
The second is a claim about concept possession, which often, (though 
not always, as I explain later) depends on a form of empiricism about 
concept acquisition. Empiricism is a thesis about knowledge of the 
external world. It is based on the idea that, roughly speaking, having an 
appropriate experience is necessary for acquiring non-inferential 
know ledge about the external world. The form of empiricism that the 
argument from concept possession usually adopts is concept empiricism, 
which is more restricted than standard empiricism. The simplest 
formulation of concept empiricism is the following: 
For any agent x and for any concept c, x fully comprehends c only 
if x has actually had a relevant experience. 
However, this version of concept empiricism 1s subject to simple 
counter-examples. For instance, in order fully to comprehend the concept 
triangle we do not need to have an experience of looking at or touching a 
triangle at all. Thus a plausible version of concept empiricism needs to be 
much more restrictive than the above. All we need is something like the 
following: 
For any agent x, x fully comprehends the concept fear only if x has 
actually had an experience of being in fear. 
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As we have seen, different versions of the argument from concept 
possession focus on different concepts: Lachs's version focuses on 
surprise and doubt, which appear to conflict with God's necessary 
omniscience; Martin's version focuses on lust and envy, which appear to 
conflict with God's necessary omni benevolence; Blumenfeld' s version 
focuses on fear, frustration and despair, which appear to conflict with 
God's necessary omnipotence; Bringsjord's version focuses on ignorance, 
finitude and shortsightedness, which appear to conflict with God's 
necessary omniscience and necessary infinitude; 13 another possible version, 
which I did not discuss in the previous section, focuses on evil or hatred, 
which appear to conflict with God's necessary omnibenevolence. 14 In the 
following, however, for the sake of simplicity, I focus on the version that 
involves fear, though most of my claims apply equally to different 
versions of the argument. 
From these two theses about the perfection of God and concept 
empiricism it follows, it is claimed, that God cannot fully comprehend fear 
and, accordingly, that God is not omniscient. The general schema of the 
argument from concept possession may be presented as follows: 
(1) If God exists then necessarily, He is omniscient, omnipotent, 
and omnibenevolent. 
13 To be more precise, Bringsjord's focus is not on abstract concepts, such as ignorance, 
finitude and shortsightedness, but on so-called 'phenomenal concepts ' such as what it is 
like to be ignorant, what it is like to be finite , and what it is like to be shortsighted. I 
ignore the distinction between phenomenal concepts and non-phenomenal concepts in this 
work because it does not affect my discussion. See, for instance, David J. Chalmers 
(forthcoming) and Michael Tye (1999), Tye (2000), Tye (forthcoming) for issues 
regarding phenomenal concepts. 
14 This version of the argument from concept possession is introduced and critically 
examined by Alter (2002) . See also Nagasawa (2003b). 
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(2) If God does not fully comprehend the concept fear then He is 
not omniscient. 
(3) Because of His necessary omnipotence God has not actually 
experienced fear. 
( 4) For any agent x, x fully comprehends the concept fear only if x 
has actually experienced fear. 
Therefore, 
(5) God does not fully comprehend the conceptfear. (from (3) and 
(4)) 
Therefore, 
(6) God is not omniscient. (from (2) and (5)) 
Therefore, 
(7) God does not exist. ((1) and (6)) 
One might think, as do Lachs and Blumenfeld, that the argument from 
concept possession must be based on concept empiricism. However, this is 
not correct. While the · specific version of the argument from concept 
possession that I examine in this chapter relies on concept empiricism, the 
foundation of the argument is more general. The crucial assumption of the 
argument is not that the possession of certain concepts requires one to 
acquire them only through relevant experiences, but that the possession of 
certain concepts requires one to acquire them only in a particular, as yet 
unspecified, way. Thus, one can advance a similar argument without 
appealing to concept empiricism at all. 15 (This is why I call the argument 
the 'argument from concept possession' rather than the 'argument from 
concept empiricism'.) For example, one might hold the following prima 
facie plausible thesis about concept possession: 
15 I am indebted to Daniel Stoljar for this point. 
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For any agent x, x fully comprehends the concept water only if x 
has actually had an appropriate causal, physical interaction with 
water. 16 
Using this thesis one might argue that God does not fully comprehend the 
concept water because He, who is necessarily incorporeal and necessarily 
impassible, has not actually had a causal, physical interaction with water. 
In particular, He has not touched or drunk water. While the above thesis 
does concern the way a certain concept is acquired, it is distinct from 
. . . 17 
concept emp1nc1sm. 
In the next three sections I discuss attempts to undermine (1), (2) and 
(3) and demonstrate that none of them is successful. 
3.4 Objections to the Argument: Rejecting (1) 
(1) states that necessarily, God is omniscient, omnipotent, and 
omnibenevolent. This notion of God18 is not derived from Scripture but 
most notably, as I stated earlier, from Anselm's theism. 19 One might 
undermine the argument from concept possession by rejecting this 
Anselmian notion of God. 
Theists have long been perplexed by the nature of divine attributes. In 
particular, as I noted in Chapter 1, they have had difficulty in providing an 
adequate formulation of di vine omnipotence. Again, Peter Geach ( 1977) 
describes the situation as follows: 
When people have tried to read into 'God can do everything' a 
signification not of Pious Intention but Philosophical Truth, they 
have only landed themselves in intractable problems and hopeless 
16 I do not examine whether or not this thesis is true in this work. 
17 As we will see in Chapter 4, what I regard as the strongest form of the argument from 
concept possession does not rely on concept empiricism, either. 
18 John Bishop (1998) calls this the notion of 'omniGod'. 
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confusions; no graspable sense has ever been given to this sentence 
that did not lead to self-contradiction or at least to conclusions 
manifestly untenable from the Christian point of view. (p. 4) 
Recently some theist philosophers, who share similar worries, have 
made a radical move. They have dropped necessary omnipotence (at least, 
necessary omnipotence as it is defined by traditional Judaeo-Christian 
theism) from the list of God's necessary attributes. John Bishop (1993, 
1998), for example, is persuaded by the argument from evil against the 
existence of God and concludes that it is more reasonable to believe in an 
alternative conception of God, which does not include omnipotence as one 
of God's necessary attributes, than to retain the traditional Judaeo-
Christian conception. To take another example, Wes Morriston (2001a, 
2001 b) contends that since necessary omni benevolence is inconsistent with 
requirements for omnipotence, theists should endorse a different notion of 
God, according to which God is not omnipotent.20 Morriston thinks that 
while his alternative conception of God does not include omnipotence as 
one of His necessary attributes He is still properly regarded as a being than 
which no greater can be conceived. 
If such alternative conceptions of God are cogent then the argument 
from concept possession seems to fail because ( 1) turns out to be false. 
Given that God is not necessarily omnipotent He should be able fully to 
comprehend the concept fear by having a relevant experience. 
However, there are at least two reasons to resist this strategy to 
undermine the argument from concept possession. 
19 Generally, Scripture is not explicit about God ' s necessary attributes. 
20 In particular, Morriston thinks that there are states of affairs which a necessarily 
omnipotent being is able to bring about but which a necessarily omibenevolent is not 
justified in bringing about. (e.g . a state of affairs in which an innocent child is tortured). 
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First, since (1) represents one of the most central notions of traditional 
theism, this solution is not compelling for the majority of theists. Given 
that the aim of the argument from concept possession is to show the 
incoherence of the Anselmian notion of God, rejecting (1) is essentially the 
same as accepting the conclusion of the argument itself. Thus, this 
objection does not save traditional theism as based on Anselmian theism. 
Although I am sympathetic to the altemati ve notion of God for a number 
of reasons, I must admit that at the very least, this solution appears to be a 
significant compromise for most theists. It would be better if theists could 
undermine the argument without modifying the Anselmian notion of God. 
Second, and more importantly, even if God were not in fact 
omnipotent, the force of the argument from concept possession would not 
be eliminated completely. (In this respect, the argument from concept 
possession is much more persistent that the argument from evil; because, 
arguably, the argument from evil is not a threat to theists who are willing 
to drop at least one of three main attributes from God's perfection.21 ) For, 
21 Mackie (1955) w·rites, for instance, as follows: 
The problem of evil, in the sense which I shall be using the phrase, is a problem 
only for someone who believes that there is a God who is both omnipotent and 
wholly good. And it is a logical problem, the problem of clarifying and 
reconciling a number of beliefs: it is not a scientific problem that might be 
solved by further observations, or a practical problem that might be solved by a 
decision or an action .... In its simplest form the problem is this: God is 
omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some 
contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were 
true the third would be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of 
most theological propositions: the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and 
cannot consistently adhere to all three. . . . Now once the problem is fully stated 
it is clear that it can be solved, in the sense that the problem will not arise if one 
gives up at least one of the propositions that constitute it. If you are prepared to 
say that God is not wholly good, or not quite omnipotent, or that evil does not 
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as I noted in Section 2, there are forms of the argument from concept 
possession that involve attributes of God other than His omnipotence. For 
example, according to one version of the argument, God does not fully 
comprehend the concept surprise because He, who is necessarily 
omniscient, has not experienced surprise. To take another version, God 
does not fully understand the concept evil because He, who is necessarily 
omni benevolent, has not experienced being evil. 22 Even if proponents of 
the argument from concept possession decide to drop necessary 
exist, or that good is not opposed to the kind of evil that exists, or that there are 
limits to what an omnipotent thing can do, then the problem of evil will not arise 
for you. (pp. 200-201) · 
Similarly, Martin (1974) writes, '[T]he problem of evil presumably does not show that 
God does not exist when 'God' refers to some being that is either not omnipotent or not 
completely benevolent' (p. 232). Notice that the same claim does not apply to the 
argument from concept possession. As I contend in the main text, even if one is willing to 
eliminate omnipotence or omnibenevolence from the list of God's necessary attributes , 
the argument from concept possession is not thereby undermined. (It should be noted, 
however, that not all philosophers agree with Mackie ' s claim about the argument from 
evil: P. J. McGrath (1986, 1987) argues that even if theists revise the concept of God so 
that God is limited in His power or goodness the argument from evil persists; Peter 
Hutcheson (1992) argues that even if theists revise the concept of God so that God is 
limited in His knowledge the argument from evil persists. For objections to McGrath 
(1986) see Michael B. Burke (1987) and Roger Crisp (1986). 
22 Opponents of the argument from concept possession might contend that one does not 
need to have experienced being evil in order to understand it. One may understand it, they 
might claim, for instance, just by reading about the slaughter in East Timor in the 
newspapers. Proponents of the argument from concept possession have two responses 
here. First, they might contend that even if one understands the concept evil just by 
reading the newspapers one cannot fully understand it unless one becomes evil , or at least 
performs a morally wrong action. Second, they might contend that even if one may fully 
understand the concept evil by reading the newspapers, one might not understand the 
phenomenal concept what it is like to be evil unless one becomes evil, or at least performs 
a morally wrong action. 
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omnipotence from God's attributes they cannot block these versions as 
long as they hold that God is necessarily omniscient and necessarily 
omnibenevolent. However, it is not possible for theists to drop necessary 
omniscience and necessary omni benevolence from the list of God's 
attributes while maintaining a conception of God sufficiently robust to 
satisfy them. For, first, it does not make sense to drop those attributes 
because, again, doing so is equivalent to accepting the conclusion of the 
argument from concept possession, that the Anselmian God does not exist, 
from the start. And, second, traditional Judaeo-Christian theists in 
particular cannot eliminate ominbenevolence from God's necessary 
attributes because it is almost an uncontroversial consensus among them 
that God is necessarily omnibenevolent. 
Therefore, one cannot undermine the argument from evil by rejecting 
(1). 
3.5 Objections to the Argument: Rejecting (2) 
(2) says that if God does not fully comprehend the concept fear then He is 
not omniscient. One might reject this premiss by claiming that that even if 
God does not fully comprehend fear because He lacks the relevant 
experience, He can still be omniscient. For, according to this objection, 
having an experience is different from having knowledge of the experience, 
and so it is knowledge of the experience, and not the experience itself, that 
is relevant to God's omniscience. Thus, according to this objection, God 
can be omniscient without having a fearful experience. Suppose that while 
I have experienced fear, God has not. Then the difference between what I 
know in knowing that, say, I am in fear and what God knows in knowing 
that I am in fear seems to lie only in the feelings and sensations associated 
with niy fearful experience. However, since knowledge is, roughly 
speaking, a true justified belief, feelings and sensations are irrelevant to 
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God's knowledge. Thus, this objection says, God does not need to 
experience fear in order to be omniscient. 
Anthony Kenny (1979) adopts this line of reasoning. He argues that 
even if God cannot have a certain experience there is nothing to be added 
to His knowledge, which remains complete: 23 
To have a sensation is not the same thing as to be in possession of a 
piece of knowledge. We do, of course, acquire information by the 
senses, but whatever information we acquire by the senses can be 
reported to others provided that they possess the appropriate 
language; and whatever can be reported to others can be discovered 
by others without the use of the sense in question, and without 
having the sensation .... All the information which we can acquire 
by our senses is possessed by God but without the pleasure-pain 
modality which constitutes the acquisition of this information a 
form of sensation. (pp. 31-32) 
Kenny is correct in claiming that having a sensation is not identical to 
having a piece of knowledge. For example, the existence of animals that 
have the sensory apparatus to have conscious experience yet lack an 
epistemic apparatus to form relevant beliefs seems to support his claim. 
However, Kenny's argument is subject to the following counter-arguments. 
Suppose that there is a being that contingently satisfies Kenny's criteria of 
omniscience. While this being does not 'fully' comprehend the concept 
fear, because of its lack of having a relevant experience, it nevertheless has 
knowledge about fear. However, suppose further that this being has an 
experience of, say, fearing dental surgery for the first time. This being can 
have an experience of fearing because it can cease to be omnipotent for a 
while thanks to its contingent omnipotence. Upon having the new 
experience the being would say, 'This is what it is like to fear dental 
23 See Abbruzzese (1997) for a similar argument. 
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surgery! Now I understand it'. However, this situation seems to contradict 
the assumption that this being is omniscient. For if the being really 1s 
omniscient, it would be impossible for it to discover anything. 24 
Another way of undermining Kenny's claim is the following. In 
general, possession of a concept c is based on knowing a bundle of 
relevant descriptions of the form 'c is such and such'. Therefore if, as the 
argument from concept possession says, God does not fully understand the 
concept fear then it follows that God lacks some description about fear. If 
so, contrary to what Kenny says, God lacks certain propositional 
knowledge. 
Thus Kenny's narrow notion of omniscience 1s untenable and his 
strategy for rejecting (2) fails. 
3.6 Objections to the Argument: Rejecting (3) 
We have seen that attempts to undermine (1) and (2) fail. Should then 
proponents of the argument from concept possession take aim at (3)? 
(3) says that because of His necessary omnipotence God has not 
actually experienced fear. The justification for (3) is the following. We 
experience fear because our power is limited. However, since God is 
necessarily omnipotent there is no possible situation in which God fears. 
As Peter Geach (1977) writes, 'God is almighty: the source of all power, 
for whom there is no frustration or failure' (p. v). 
24 This scenano 1s, of course, parallel to the 'black-and-white Mary' case in Frank 
Jackson's knowledge argument (Jackson, 1982, 1986). In that case a brilliant scientist 
Mary, who lives in a black-and-white room, knows everything physical through her 
black-and-white books and black-and-white TV programs. When she leaves her room for 
the first time, Jackson says, Mary, who is physically omniscient, discovers what it is like 
to see red. From this scenario Jackson concludes that complete physical knowledge 
cannot be complete knowledge simpliciter and hence that physicalism is false. See 
Chapters 6 and 7 of this work. 
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One might think, however, that (3) is false. For if one has to have a 
limitation in power in order to experience fear then surely God must have 
had the experience by temporarily abandoning His omnipotence. Stephen 
T. Davis (1983) takes this line of reasoning. 25 
[E]ven if it is true that certain things cannot be known unless 
experienced, there is nothing to prevent an omniscient being who is 
also omnipotent from taking whatever steps are necessary to 
experience them. If God wants to know what watermelon tastes 
like, why can't he take bodily form and find out? If God wants to 
know what it is like to doubt, why can't he temporarily abandon 
some of his knowledge-e.g. his knowledge of when the world will 
end-and know doubt? Of course during that period he would not 
be omniscient, but unless omniscience is essential to God (using 
'God' here as a proper name) I see no reason why he could not do 
so. And ... there is no good reason to affirm that omniscience is an 
essential property of God. (pp. 39-40) 
Davis is correct in thinking that a perfect being can have limited 
beings' experiences if it can sacrifice its perfection. In particular, God can 
have an experience of being in fear if He can temporarily abandon His 
omnipotence. However, this point is i1Televant to the argument from 
concept possession. 
An obvious response to Davis's argument is that since, according to 
the Anselmian conception of God displayed in (1), omnipotence is a 
necessary attribute of God it is impossible for Him, even temporarily, to 
abandon His omnipotence. Theists would not be willing to concede that 
there is a possible world in which God is powerless. I think that this is the 
most straightforward response to Davis's objection. 
25 Davis's argument is directed at Lach's version of the argument from concept 
possession (1963a), which we saw in Section 3.2. 
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One might insist, however, that, whatever method He uses, God can 
abandon His omnipotence because there is Scriptural evidence for that: 
The New Testament reports that God incarnated as Jesus, and hence 
experienced life, and death with its concomitant suffering. If Jesus is God 
then it follows that God can indeed have human experiences by 
temporarily abandoning His omnipotence. 
However, even if we grant that it is possible for God to experience 
fear by incarnating, there are a number of reasons to resist the idea that this 
is how God actually completes His knowledge. 
First, it is difficult to believe that God would abandon His perfection 
and have every single experience relevant to each concept, merely in order 
to possess certain concepts.26 For instance, in order fully to comprehend 
the concept fear God might have to incarnate as a person who believes he 
is about to undergo extremely painful and protracted dental surgery; 1n 
order fully to comprehend the concept frustration God might have to 
incarnate as a person who drives a car in heavy traffic; and in order fully to 
comprehend the concept despair God might have to incarnate as a person 
who has been sentenced to a lifetime of hard labour in a Siberian gulag. It 
is simply implausible that God, who is necessarily perfect, has had such 
experiences merely for the purpose of possessing certain concepts and that 
God's incarnation is a necessary condition for His full understanding of all 
concepts. 
Second, even if God can have human experiences and possess relevant 
concepts about these experiences by incarnating as a human being it is not 
obvious at all that concepts that He acquires will be preserved. If there 
26 One might suggest that if pantheism is true then this sort of worry is needless . This 
suggestion is, however, irrelevant because the target of the argument from concept 
possession is not the pantheist notion of God, but the traditional Judaeo-Christian notion 
of a personal God who is distinct from His creation. 
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really is a kind of concept that, necessarily, only a limited being like us can 
possess, then it seems reasonable to think that God can continue to possess 
these concepts only as long as He remains a limited being. Thus, if He 
returns to His perfect, unlimited state after incarnation it seems reasonable 
to think that He loses the concepts that He has acquired while being a 
limited being. If so, the idea that God can incarnate does not lead to an 
effective objection to the argument from concept possession. 
Third, there is a worry that this objection might even entail that God is 
not in fact omniscient. It might be the case that there are infinitely many 
concepts, the possession of which requires one to have relevant 
experiences. If so, God will never be able to know everything. Perhaps 
God Himself is eternal, not subject to the constraints of time and space, but 
once He takes a bodily form in order to have human experiences, He is 
subject to all the limitations of a spatio-temporal being. According to the 
above supposition, when God finishes having one experience of a 
particular kind there will remain infinitely many experiences of different 
kinds that He still has to have. Yet it is not possible for a finite being ( one 
subject to the limitations of space and time) to complete an infinite number 
of tasks. It follows that God has never been omniscient. 
Fourth, even if proponents of the objection to (3) can show that God 
can temporarily abandon His omnipotence that does not defeat the 
argument from concept possession. For, as we have seen, some versions of 
the argument from concept possession involve God's other attributes. 
Consider again the one that involves God's omni benevolence. In order to 
undermine this version of the argument, proponents of the objection to (3) 
must contend that God has experienced evil by incarnating as a human 
being. However, no traditional theist would be willing to concede that God 
became evil for a while with the sole purpose of fully comprehending the 
concept evil. 
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I have discussed three objections to the argument from concept 
possession and shown that none of them is compelling. In the next section 
I introduce yet another objection to the argument, which seems more 
compelling. 
3.7 Objections to the Argument: Rejecting (4) 
In 'On Two Alleged Conflicts Between Divine Attributes' (2002) Torin 
Alter attempts to defeat the argument from concept possession by 
providing three elaborate objections to ( 4 ). In what follows, I claim that 
while Alter' s objections might be successful in showing that some beings 
can comprehend fear fully without having the relevant experience, they 
fail to show that God can do that. For, I argue, Alter' s objections are, 
contrary to what he thinks, 27 inconsistent with the attributes that are 
traditionally ascribed to God. I discuss Alter' s objections to the argument 
from concept possession in more detail than other objections because his 
objections are helpful in constructing a successful objection, as I explain in 
the next chapter. 
(4) says that for any agent x, x fully comprehends the concept fear 
only if x has actually experienced fear. 28 If God is omniscient then He has 
to understand all concepts fully. However, given (4), one's full 
27 Alter (2002) writes, his objections are 'consistent with the principal divine attributes' 
(pp. 47, 48). 
28 In the second section of his paper Alter (2002) remarks that ( 4) seems to gain support 
from Jackson's knowledge argument (p. 49-50). This remark is, however, perplexing 
because, as is shown by the passage from Jackson that Alter himself quotes in his paper (p. 
53), Jackson explicitly rejects concept empiricism, or a thesis like (4), for the exact same 
reason that Alter does. Jackson thinks that concept empiricism is untenable because, as 
Alter argues in his third objection, one may understand such the concept fear without 
actually experiencing it if one acquires relevant false memory traces. See Jackson (1998b), 
p. 77. See also Chapters 6 and 7 of this work for Jackson's knowledge argument. 
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understanding of the concept fear requ1res one to expenence fear. 
However, God cannot have those experiences because, by definition, He is 
necessarily omnipotent and so could not fall prey to the weakness entailed 
by the having of such experiences. Therefore, the argument concludes, 
God does not exist. Notice that in order to establish the argument anti-
theists have to hold that ( 4) is a necessary truth. For, if ( 4) were merely 
contingently true then an omnipotent God could bring it about that ( 4) is 
false and the argument would immediately become unsound. 29 
Alter' s First Objection 
As a first objection to ( 4 ), Alter (2002) argues that even if God Himself 
cannot experience fear there is no reason to conclude that He cannot 
possess concepts of them. For, according to Alter, God can possess such 
concepts by directly perceiving the 'contents of human consciousness ' (p. 
51). 3° For instance, if someone-say, in a silent prayer-reflects vividly 
29 This statement is based on the assumption that God is omnipotent if and only if, 
roughly speaking, He can do everything that it is possible to do and He cannot do that 
which it is necessarily impossible to do. However, as I noted in Chapters 1 and 2, some 
philosophers argue that if God is truly omnipotent then He can do absolutely anything, 
including that which it is necessarily impossible to do. In this case the argument from 
concept possession fails from the beginning. 
30 Martin (1974) discusses a similar objection. According to this objection, just as a great 
novelist can create certain emotions in ·her/his readers-emotions that are quite alien to 
the readers-by inducing them to identify empathetically with some character in a story, 
God can create feelings of envy and lust in Himself by empathetic identification with 
envious and lustful people without being lustful and envious Himself. Martin ' s response 
to this objection is as follows: either empathetic feelings are as strong as non-empathetic 
feelings , or they are not. If they are as strong as each other, then God is not 
omnibenevolent because He must have been morally tainted by His empathising. On the 
other hand, if they are not as strong as each other, then God does not fully understand 
what lust and envy are. See Martin (1974), pp. 238-239. 
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on her/his fear, Alter says, then God will be able to perceive this person's 
feeling and to come to understand fully what fear is. 
There are various difficulties with this objection.31 First, what Alter 
takes for granted, i.e., that God can perceive the contents of human 
consciousness, is controversial among theists. Most notably, as we have 
seen in Section 3.2, early Christians formulated and defended the doctrine 
of divine impassibility, according to which God cannot perceive human 
feelings, in particular, human sufferings. This doctrine states that God, 
who transcends space and time, is not in a position to share human feelings. 
A number of contemporary theists endorse this doctrine. 32 
Second, even if the doctrine of divine impassibility is false and God 
can in fact perceive human pains and sufferings, Alter' s objection is still 
untenable on two grounds: (i) it is unlikely that any attribute of God is 
dependent largely on the experience of humans. According to Judaeo-
Christian theism God is an independent, self-existing being. That is, God is 
entirely self-sufficient, not dependent upon anything or anyone outside of 
Himself. 33 Alter's claim that God's knowledge of fear, relies on the 
contents of human consciousness is inconsistent with this doctrine of 
divine independence. (ii) According to the Anselmian tradition, if God 
3 1 One might claim that if Alter's first objection is right then God would not have been 
omniscient before His creatures experienced, say, fear for the first time. Alter (2002) 
argues that we can block this claim if we suppose that God 'created a creature 
experiencing fear at the instant the universe began' and that He was 'able to perceive the 
first instant of that creatw·e's experience ' (p. 51). 
32 For the contemporary debate on divine impassibility see Creel (1986), Fiddes (1992), 
Mozley (1926) , Sarot (1992), Sarot (2001), Weinandy (2000), Weinandy (2002). 
33 For example, the following passage in Scripture is said to describe God ' s independence: 
The God who made the world and everything in it is the Lord of heaven and 
earth and does not live in temples built by hands. And he is not served by human 
hands , as if he needed anything, because he himself gives all men life and breath 
and everything else (Acts 17: 24-25). 
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exists at all He is necessarily omniscient. However, if Alter' s objection is 
cogent, God's omniscience is contingent at best, since it will largely 
depend upon contingent human experiences. Then Alter' s objection entails 
that the Anselmian God, who is necessarily omniscient, does not in fact 
exist. This is, for theists, as unfavourable as the conclusion of the 
argument from concept possession itself. Alter' s first objection is not 
successful. 
One might claim that God comprehends fully the concept fear by 
imagining or inferring what it would be like for a creature to have 
experiences pertaining to them, instead of directly perceiving the contents 
of human consciousness. This claim appears more compelling because in 
this case God's knowledge is not dependent on contingent human 
experiences. This idea leads to Alter's second objection to (4). 
Alter' s Second Objection 
As a second objection to ( 4 ), Alter (2002) argues that even if God cannot 
be directly acquainted with fear, itself, that may not preclude Him from 
fully understanding the concepts. For, God can be acquainted with 
'components' of fear, and deduce what it would be like to combine those 
components into states of fear, without actually having the appropriate 
experiences (p. 52). In other words, according to Alter, God can fully 
comprehend the concept fear by imagining or inferring what it would be 
like for a creature to have fear. 
It is not clear what exactly Alter means by components of fear. 34 And, 
in any case, it is a matter of enormous controversy in the philosophy of 
34 As candidates for components of fear, frustration and despair, Alter (2002) suggests 
'qualia that tend to accompany (or partially constitute) those mental states ' (p. 52). But 
without a further argument it is hard to see how they could actually be components of fear , 
frustration and despair. 
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mind whether mental states such as fear are reducible to something else. 
Suppose though, for the sake argument, that they are composite states and 
it is possible for God to understand fully what fear is by deducing what it 
would be like to combine their components. However, most theists would 
nevertheless disagree with Alter that God actually does so. For, according 
to the traditional doctrine of divine omniscience, God's knowledge is not 
discursive. Thomas Aquinas (1997) describes this doctrine as follows: 
In the divine knowledge there is no discursiveness .... God sees all 
things in one thing alone, which is Himself. Therefore, God sees all 
things together, and not successively. (p. 416) 
Similarly, Alvin Plantinga (1980) writes, 'Of course God neither 
needs nor uses logic; that is, he never comes to know a proposition A by 
inferring it from proposition B' (p. 144). 35 This means that God knows (if 
He knows at all) fear just as it is. 36 
Thus, even if Alter can prove that in principle God can know 
discursively what fear is, which, by itself, seems extremely difficult to do, 
that does not satisfy most Judaeo-Christian theists. Alter' s second 
objection is not successful. 
Alter' s Third Objection 
Alter' s final objection to ( 4) is the following. Again, because of His 
omnipotence, God might not be able to experience fear. However, He can 
come fully to comprehend the concept fear by creating false memory 
35 George I. Mavrodes (1988) also writes , '[The doctrine according to which God 's 
knowledge is discursive] has not been popular among Christian philosophers and 
theologians. I can think of no one who has positively defended this doctrine, and several 
seem to have explicitly denied it' (p. 346). 
36 Here I simply assume that being non-discursive is equivalent to being non-inferential , 
which suffices to undermine Alter's objection. I discuss the issue of non-discursive 
knowledge in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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traces of relevant experiences. In order to motivate his objection Alter 
(2002) invites us to imagine the following scenario (p. 54 ). Suppose that I 
have never seen red, but one night, while I am asleep, a neurosurgeon 
operates on my brain so that it is in the state it would have been, had I seen 
red. Then, thanks to these false memory traces created by the 
neurosurgeon I know exactly what it is like to see red without actually 
having expe1ienced red. Similarly, Alter contends, God can come fully to 
understand the concept fear by creating false memory traces of relevant 
experiences for Himself without actually having those experiences. 
Again, there are a number of problems with this objection. The first, 
obvious problem is that the case of false memory traces makes sense only 
if the agent under consideration has a physical body, because the case is 
based on the assumption that one's mental states are at least correlated 
with one's physical states; in particular, one's brain states. However, 
according to traditional Judaeo-Christian theism God is incorporeal. That 
is, unlike us, God does not have relevant physical states at all. 37 
Second, the above brain surgery case is plausible because it is possible 
that I could have seen red, even though I have not, and that a neurosurgeon 
can, in p1inciple, b1ing about the brain state that I would have been in had I 
seen red by operating on my brain. However, in the case of God, 
opponents of the argument from concept possession, like Alter, are not 
allowed simply to make a parallel supposition that counterfactually, God 
has been in fear; because that is the very thesis that the argument denies. 
37 One might argue that this is not a problem for theists because God can incarnate. 
However, as I argued in Section 3.6, it is still difficult to think that God's incarnation is a 
necessary condition for His full understanding of the concept/ear. Even if God can know, 
in principle, what fear is by incarnating that cannot be the way He in fact comes to know 
them. 
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Stipulating this thesis begs the question against the argument. Alter' s third 
objection is, again, unsuccessful. 38 
Alter (2002) notes that his objections 'are consistent with the principal 
divine attributes' (pp. 47, 48). However, I have argued the contrary. His 
first objection is inconsistent with the doctrines of divine impassibility and 
divine independence. His second objection is inconsistent with the doctrine 
of divine omniscience. His third objection is inconsistent with the 
doctrines of divine incorporeality. 
The simplest way for Alter to undercut my criticisms is to reject those 
doctrines. However, given that they have widely been accepted among 
Judaeo-Christian theists for hundreds of years, or more, Alter faces an 
uphill struggle. 
3.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have accomplished the following. First, I have reviewed 
the historical background of the argument from concept possession and 
introduced a number of different forms of the argument. Second, I have 
formulated the basic structure of the argument and claimed that the 
existing objections to premisses (1), (2) and (3) of the argument clearly fail. 
Third, I have discussed in detail Alter' s three objections to premiss ( 4) and 
contended that they also fail. However, it is important to emphasise that 
Alter is still correct in holding that ( 4) is the most dubious premiss in the 
argument. In the next chapter I provide new objections to ( 4 ), which 
improve on his third objection. 
38 There is another potential problem with Alter ' s third objection: If a definition of 
omniscience such as (8) in Chapter 1-viz., For any x and for any proposition p, x is 
omniscient if and only if, x does not have false beliefs and if it is true that p then x knows 
that p-is correct, then an omniscient being is not allowed to have false beliefs. However, 
false memories, which Alter demands that God have, are essentially false beliefs about 
past experiences. 
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Divine Omniscience and the Argument from 
Concept Possession (2) 
4.1 Introduction 
Here is the argument from concept possession against the existence of God 
again: 
(1) If God exists then necessarily, He is omniscient, omnipotent, 
and omnibenevolent. 
(2) If God does not fully comprehend the concept fear then He is 
not omniscient. 
(3) Because of His necessary omnipotence God has not actually 
experienced fear. 
(4) For any agent x, x fully comprehends the concept fear only if x 
has actually experienced fear. 
Therefore, 
(5) God does not fully comprehend the concept/ear. (from (3) and 
(4)) 
Therefore, 
(6) God is not omniscient. (from (2) and (5)) 
Therefore, 
(7) God does not exist. ((1) and (6)) 
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In Chapter 3 I have argued that philosophers' objections to (1), (2) and (3) 
are clearly fallacious. I have also argued that Torin Alter' s objections to ( 4) 
are more compelling than the others but still unsatisfactory. 1 At the end of 
the chapter, however, I noted that Alter is right in saying that ( 4) is the 
most dubious premiss of the argument. In this chapter I examine the 
argument further. 
This Chapter has the following structure. In Section 4.2, I demonstrate 
that ( 4) is indeed false. On the face of it, my objection to ( 4) is similar to 
one of Alter' s objections. However, I argue, the way in which I reject ( 4) 
is crucially different from Alter's. In Section 4.3, I formulate what I think 
is the strongest version of the argument, one that is not vulnerable to the 
objection of the previous section. In Section 4.4, I demonstrate that even 
the strongest version fails. Finally, in Section 4.5, I state and discuss the 
implication of the failure of the argument. 
1 Another objection to the argument from concept possession was suggested to me by 
Daniel Stoljar, in personal communication. Stoljar suggests that the argument from 
concept possession fails because it equivocates on the notion of experience. In (3)-viz. 
Because of His necessary omnipotence God has not actually experienced fear-the word 
'experience' is used to denote an event such that an agent comes to be in a certain mental 
state. Hence, it should be construed as follows: 
(3*) Given His necessary omnipotence there has been no event such that God 
comes to be in fear. 
However, in (4)-viz. For any agent x, x fully comprehends the concept f ear only if 
x has actually experienced fear-the word 'experience' is used to denote a kind of feeling 
that an agent has. Hence, it should be construed as follows: 
(4*) For any agent x, x fully comprehends the concept/ear only if x has actually 
had a particular feeling that is associated with a fearful situation. 
If we take the word 'experience' to denote an event then, while (3) is true (4) appears to 
be false. On the other hand, however, if we take it to denote a kind of feeling then while 
(4) is true (3) appears to be false. Although I do not examine this objection I make a 
similar point when I examine critically the conditional analysis of ability in Section 4.4. 
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4.2 A New Objection to (4) 
Consider ( 4) again: 
(4) For any agent x, x fully comprehends the concept fear only if x 
has actually experienced fear. 
Although ( 4) is much weaker than the traditional form of concept 
empiricism ( 4) is still vulnerable to prevalent counter-examples to a certain 
form of empiricism. 
In order to undermine ( 4 ), and, a forteriori, traditional empiricism, all 
we need to do is to provide a logically possible scenario in which the 
following are true at the same time: 
(i) An agent fully comprehends the conceptfear. 
(ii) The agent has not actually experienced fear. 
In what follows, I introduce three such scenarios. 
Scenario 1: The Instant Creation of the Universe 
Suppose that Kate fully comprehends the conceptfear. According to (4) it 
follows that she has actually experienced fear. However, what if God 
created the universe only a moment ago, which is not long enough for Kate 
to have had the experience? This is a variation of Bertrand Russell's 
sceptical hypothesis regarding the creation of the universe. According to 
Russell it is logically possible that the earth was created only, say, five 
minutes ago. Perhaps God just placed apparent historical objects like 
fossils and relics to make people believe that the uni verse has a long 
history.2 If this scenario is logically possible then (i) and (ii) can be both 
true, which entails that ( 4) is false. 
2 In fact, this is similar to what creationists believe. It is interesting to see that even an 
atheist like Russell regards creationism as a logical possibility. 
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Scenario 2: Molecular Duplication 
We do not even have to imagine the creation of the entire uni verse. 
Perhaps only Kate herself was created a moment ago. Again, according to 
( 4) , if Kate fully comprehends the concept fear then she has experienced 
fear. But it seems logically possible that she did not exist until now. 
Perhaps she is just created as a consequence, say, of a miraculous event. 3 
Suppose that Kathy fully comprehends the concept fear thanks to her 
experience of having horrible dental surgery. Suppose further that on the 
way Kathy back to her house from the dental surgeon lightning hits the 
swamp and Kate, a molecular duplicate of Kathy, is created. 4 If (4) is true 
then Kate, who has never experienced fear, does not fully comprehend the 
concept fear. But is this plausible? Since Kate is a physical duplicate of 
Kathy there is not a single difference between their brain states , which 
means that Kate knows everything that Kathy knows. It then appears that 
both Kathy and Kate fully understand the concept fear. This scenario 
shows, just like the previous one, that (i) and (ii) can be true at the same 
time and, accordingly, that ( 4) is false. 
Scenario 3: Neurosurgery 
Perhaps neither the universe nor Kate was created but only her apparent 
memory traces were created. Suppose that Kate has never experienced fear. 
And suppose further that at one night, while Kate is asleep, a mad scientist 
performs neurosurgery on her brain so that she has apparent memory 
3 By a miraculous event, I do not mean an event such that it is logically impossible for it 
to occur. I rather mean something that is extremely unlikely, but the occurrence of which 
is, nevertheless, logically possible. 
4 This scenario is parallel to Donald Davidson's famous thought experiment of 
'swampman' (1 987) though Davidson does not use it as an objection to concept 
empiricism. Peter Unger (1 966), among others, articulates a similar scenario while 
constructing counter-examples to concept empiricism. 
93 
Chapter 4: Divine Omniscience and the Argument from Concept Possession (2) 
traces of being in fear. In this case it seems that, after the operation, Kate 
can fully comprehend the concept fear without actually having 
experienced fear. Again, this case shows that (i) and (ii) can be both true 
and that ( 4) is false. 
David Lewis (1988) rejects a certain form of empiricism on the same 
ground: 
[T]he exact same change [that occurs when one comes fully to 
comprehend the concept fear] could in principle be produced in 
you by precise neurosurgery, very far beyond the limits of present-
day technique. Or it could possibly be produced in you by magic. If 
we ignore the laws of nature, which are after all contingent, then 
there is no necessary connection between cause and effect: 
anything could cause anything. (p. 448) 
While the above are just prevalent counter-examples to traditional 
empiricism they are nonetheless powerful enough to undermine even such 
a restricted thesis as (4). 5 Chris Daly (1998), Frank Jackson (1998b), 
Daniel Stoljar (2002), Peter Unger (1966) and Robert Van Gulick 
(forthcoming), agree with Lewis and reject empiricism in the same way. 
Furthermore, even empiricists themselves admit the force of those counter-
examples. For instance, Michael Tye (1999, 2000, forthcoming) thinks that 
the above scenarios do undermine his version of concept empiricism, 
which is essentially identical to (4). 6 However, at the same time, he also 
5 One might think that these scenarios are possible only if physicalism is true. This is not 
co1Tect. In order to accept them we need to assume only a coITelation between Kathy's 
acquisition of the concept f ear and her relevant brain states. I ignore the possibility that 
there cannot be any coITelation because most, if not all, anti-physicalists believe that there 
is a correlation. 
6 Tye (1999) describes his empiricism as follows: 
To possess the phenomenal concept RED, for example, is to possess a simple 
concept that has been acquired by undergoing experiences of red (baITing 
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claims that he can save his empiricism simply by adding a proviso that it 
does not apply to cases that involve a 'neurosurgery to induce the [relevant 
brain] state or a miracle' (1999, p. 712). He seems to think that the 
addition of the proviso is innocuous because the counter-examples are 
always based on imaginary, sci-fi style scenarios that are far from reality. 
However, Tye's strategy is not compelling for two reasons. First of all, 
it is widely assumed that if empiricism is true then it is necessarily true. 
Thus formulating empiricism as a contingent truth, as Tye does, is simply 
a rejection of empiricism.7 Second, Tye's proviso is useless, particularly in 
the context of the argument from concept possession. For, even if the 
above scenarios, which contradict ( 4 ), are unrealistic for us, God can easily 
bring them about. For, as (1) says, God is necessarily omnipotent. Hence, 
He can do at least anything that it is logically possible to do. 8 Therefore, 
proponents of the argument cannot dismiss the counter-examples by 
adopting Tye's ploy. 
One might think that my objection to ( 4) is identical , in essence, to 
Alter' s third objection, because both of them are based on prevalent 
counter-examples to empiricism. However, there is a crucial difference 
between them. As we have seen, Alter tries to undermine the argument by 
stating that God can fully understand the concept fear without having a 
neurosurgery to induce the state or a miracle) and that not only disposes one to 
form a visual image of red in response to a range of cognitive tasks pertaining to 
red but also is brought to bear in discriminating the experience of red from other 
color experiences in a direct and immediate manner via introspection. (p. 712) 
7 See Stoljar (2002) for a similar point. 
8 It is controversial how to interpret this statement. According to one interpretation, God 
can do anything that it is logically possible for Him to do , but according to the other, God 
can do anything that it is logically possible for anyone to do . I do not commit myself to 
either interpretation in this chapter, because my argument is consistent with both of them. 
See Chapter 5 of this work for further discussion of this issue. 
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relevant experience if He creates false memory traces for himself. And I 
have argued that, if proponents of the argument are right, it is impossible 
for God to do that because there is no counterfactual situation in which 
God fears. By contrast, my objection does not say that God can possess the 
concept fear without having a relevant experience but merely that someone, 
like Kate, can do that, which is sufficient to falsify ( 4 ). 
How, then, can proponents of the argument from concept possession 
block the counter-examples while retaining the argument? Notice that all 
the counter-examples to (4) concern human beings' full understanding of 
the concept fear but not God's or diving beings'. All they show is that 
human beings like Kate can in principle fully comprehend the concept/ear 
without actually having relevant experiences. However, what is really 
relevant to the argument from concept possession is whether or not God 
can do that. Thus proponents of the argument might amend ( 4) by limiting 
its scope strictly to God as follows: 
(4') God fully comprehends the concept fear only if He has 
actually experienced fear. 
(4') is no longer vulnerable to the above counter-examples. For the 
scenarios of Kate do not show that God can fully comprehend the concept 
fear without actually having a relevant experience. All it shows is that 
human beings like Kate can do that. 
Can opponents of the argument from concept possession construct 
parallel counter-examples to (4') that involve, not human beings, but God? 
Unfortunately, they cannot. Those scenarios make sense only if an agent at 
issue has a physical body. As I have argued, this kind of scenario is based 
on the assumption that one's mental states are at least correlated with 
her/his physical states; in particular, brain states. However, according to 
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traditional Judaeo-Christian theism God is necessarily incorporeal.9 That is, 
unlike us, God does not have relevant physical states at all. Take the third 
scenario, the case of false memory traces. This case is plausible because 
we can suppose that counterfactually, Kate has been in fear and that a 
neurosurgeon can, in principle, create the brain state that Kate would have 
been in had she been in fear by operating on her brain. However, again, 
opponents of the argument from concept possession are not allowed to 
make a parallel supposition that counterfactually, God has been in fear. For 
the argument is based on the very supposition that God cannot be in fear in 
any situation. Stipulating that there is a counterfactual situation in which 
God is in fear begs the question against the argument. 
At this point one might argue that those scenarios are effective even if 
an agent at issue does not have a physical body. I have taken the moral of 
those scenarios to be as follows: one can fully comprehend such a concept 
as fear without having a relevant experience because all one needs to do is 
to be in particular physical states rather than to have a relevant experience. 
Thus I regard the scenarios as being effective only if an agent at issue has 
a physical body. However, one might draw a different moral from those 
scenarios. One might think that what they teach us is simply that 'anything 
can cause anything' (Lewis, 1988, 1997). Thus even if an agent at issue 
does not have a physical body, one might say, we can still establish 
parallel scenarios. While I do take this suggestion as a possibility I think 
that a parallel scenario for a non-physical agent like God is at least 
significantly weaker than the original scenarios in which an agent has a 
9 One might argue that this is not a problem because, according to Christianity, God can 
incarnate as a human being. However, as I argued in Chapter 3, it is difficult to think that 
God ' s incarnation is a necessary condition for His full understanding of concepts. Even if 
God can, in principle, fully understand relevant concepts by incarnating that cannot be the 
way He actually comes to know them. 
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physical body. The original scenarios clearly show how a physical agent 
can comprehend fully the concept fear without having a relevant 
experience. That is, of course, to be in physical states in which the agent 
would have been in had s/he be in fear. However, if an agent does not have 
a physical body then the parallel scenario does not show exactly how the 
agent can comprehend the concept fully without having a relevant 
experience. All it shows, if it shows anything, is that somehow the agent 
can comprehend the concept fully without having a relevant experience. 
However, stipulating that an agent can somehow comprehend the concept 
fully is equivalent to simply stipulating the negation of (4'), which begs 
the question against the argument from concept possession. 
However, (4') raises a difficulty of its own, which is that there is no 
motivation to hold (4'). Original (4)-viz., For any agent x, x fully 
comprehends the concept fear only if x has actually experienced fear-is 
at least prima facie plausible through our ordinary experiences. People 
often think that we fully understand what fear is only if we have actually 
been in a fearful situation. Plants or primitive animals, for example, do not 
understand it because, they say, these creatures cannot have such 
experiences. However, this motivation is lost in (4') because (4') is not 
relevant to our ordinary experiences. (4') is plausible only if (4) is true but 
here ( 4') is introduced because of the failure of ( 4). 
In sum, with ( 4) the argument from concept possession is unsound and 
with (4') it is simply unmotivated. 
4.3 Amending ( 4) 
In the last section we saw the following: On the one hand, although ( 4) is 
motivated by our ordinary experiences, it is subject to counter-examples. 
On the other hand, although (4') is not subject to counter-examples it is not 
motivated by our ordinary experiences. 
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Thus in order to improve on the argument from concept possession 
one needs to revise ( 4) so that it satisfies the following two conditions: (i) 
it blocks the counter-examples; (ii) it retains the original motivation. 
Now I submit that the following thesis, which satisfies both (i) and (ii), 
can replace ( 4) and constitute the strongest form of the argument: 
(4") For any agent x, x fully comprehends the concept fear only if 
x has an ability to experience fear. 
Notice that, unlike (4) and (4'), (4") does not represent concept 
emp1nc1sm because according to (4") a necessary condition for fully 
comprehending fear is not to actually have a relevant experience but to 
have an ability to have a relevant experience. ( 4") is not, unlike ( 4 ), 
undermined by the counter-examples because it is consistent with them. 
According to (4") Kathy and her molecular duplicate, Kate can fully 
comprehend the concept fear not because they have experienced fear but 
because they have an ability to experience it. Moreover, unlike (4 ' ), (4") 
is also motivated to the same extent that (4) is motivated. While we can 
fully comprehend fear, plants or primitive animals, for instance, cannot 
because they do not have an ability to have a relevant experience. 
In order to preserve the validity of the argument from concept 
possession (3)-viz., Because of His necessary omnipotence God has not 
actually experienced fear-needs to be amended as follows: 
(3 ') Because of His necessary omnipotence God does not have an 
ability to experience fear. 
Proponents of the argument may contend that, given His omnipotence, 
it is not only the case that God has not experienced fear but also that, as (3) 
says, he does not have an ability to experience it. 
Hence the strongest version of the argument from concept possession, 
which blocks effective counter-examples to concept empiricism while 
keeping its original motivation, may be schematised as follows: 
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(1) If God exists then necessarily, He is omniscient, omnipotent, 
and omnibenevolent. 
(2) If God does not fully comprehend the concept fear then He is 
not omniscient. 
(3 ') Because of His necessary omnipotence God does not have an 
ability to experience fear. 
(4") For any agent x, x fully comprehends the concept fear only if 
x has an ability to experience fear. 
Therefore, 
(5) God does not fully comprehend the concept/ear. (from (3') and 
(4")) 
Therefore, 
(6) God is not omniscient. (from (2) and (5)) 
Therefore, 
(7) God does not exist. ((1) and (6)) 
In the following I call the above the 'new argument from concept 
possession', or the 'new argument' for short. 
4.4 ·Objections to the_New Argument 
We have seen that (3') and (4") constitute the most powerful version of 
the argument from concept possession. (3 ') and ( 4' ') undercut the strong 
counter-examples to empiricism while retaining the motivation of the 
original argument. Is then the existence of God finally refuted by the new 
argument? Although it is not as easy as before I believe that we can still 
provide effective objections to the new argument, of which I shall now 
provide two. The first rejects (3') and the second rejects (4' ') . 
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Rejecting ( 3 ') 
(3 ') says that given His necessary omnipotence, God does not have an 
ability to experience fear. But why does He not have the ability if He is 
necessarily omnipotent? Proponents of the new argument might answer as 
follows: God is necessarily omnipotent. Thus necessarily, there is no 
situation in which He actually fears. (Notice that the necessary part of 
necessary omnipotence plays a crucial role here. If God is merely 
contingently omnipotent then He can be in a situation in which He fears by, 
for example, temporality abandoning His omnipotence.) However, since 
God is necessarily omnipotent He does not, even in principle, fear in any 
possible situation. Therefore, He does not have an ability to experience 
fear. Opponents of the new argument might try to reject (3') by saying that 
it is self-contradictory. For, they might claim, if God is omnipotent then 
surely He has an ability to do anything, including an ability to experience 
fear. However, this objection is not successful. The point of (3) is that the 
very fact that God is omnipotent precludes from Him having an ability to 
be in fear. Thus, proponents of the new argument would say, if (3 ') is self-
contradictory then that is because the notion of divine omnipotence is self-
contradictory. 
The above consideration seems to show that (3 ') 1s based on the 
following conditional analysis of an ability to fear: 
(A) For any agent x, x has an ability to fear if and only if x would 
fear ifs were in a certain situation (e.g. standing on the edge of a 
cliff). 
According to (A), I have an ability to fear because I would fear if, for 
instance, I stood on the edge of a cliff. On the other hand, God does not 
have an ability to fear because He would not fear if He stood on the edge 
of a cliff. In the following, however, I demonstrate that (A) is false. 
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(A) is parallel to the so-called 'simple conditional analysis' of fragility 
(Lewis, 1997): 
(F) For any x, x is fragile if and only if x would break if x were 
dropped. 
According (F), for instance, a vase is fragile because it would break if it 
were dropped. It is widely known, however, that the simple conditional 
analysis of fragility like (F) is fallacious. In particular, (F) is defeated by 
the following counter-examples 10: 
First Counter-Example to (F): A gold cup is not fragile. However it would 
break if God decided to shatter it when it is dropped. Therefore, it is not 
the case that a gold cup is fragile if and only if it would break if it were 
dropped. 
Second Counter-Example to (F): A glass is fragile. However, it would not 
break if God decided to make it shatterproof when it is dropped. Therefore, 
it is not the case that a glass is fragile if and only if it would break if it 
were dropped. 
Third Counter-Example to (F): Again, a glass is fragile. However, it would 
not break when it is dropped if it had an internal packing to stabilise it 
against hard knocks. Therefore, it is not the case that a glass is fragile if 
and only it would break if it were dropped. 
Since (F) is parallel to (A) we can defeat (A) with similar counter-
examples: 
to See, for example, Johnston (1992), Lewis (1997). 
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First Counter-Example to (A): Bill does not have an ability to fear because 
congenitally he misses certain neurons in his brain that enable him to fear. 
However, he would fear when he stood on the edge of a cliff if a 
neuroscientist implanted silicon chips to his brain that are functionally 
isomorphic to the missing neurons. Therefore, it is not the case that Bill 
has an ability to fear if and only if he would fear if he stood on the edge of 
a cliff. 
Second Counter-Example to (A): I have an ability to fear. However, I 
would not fear when I stood on the edge of a cliff if God decided to change 
my brain state so that I experience only happiness. Therefore, it is not the 
case that I have an ability to fear if and only if I would fear if I stood on 
the edge of a cliff. 
Third Counter-Example to (A): Again, I have an ability to fear. However, I 
would not fear when I stood on the edge of a cliff if I acquired an 
extremely strong body by training myself. Therefore, it is not the case that 
I have an ability to fear if and only if I would fear if I stood on the edge of 
a cliff. 
Since those scenarios are logically possible (A) is false. Therefore, (3 ' ) is 
false if it is based on (A). 
Proponents of the argument from concept possession might claim that 
they can vindicate the new argument if they modify (A) appropriately so 
that it undercuts the counter-examples. For instance, they might modify (A) · 
by restricting its scope as follows: 
(A') God has an ability to fear if and only if He would fear if He 
were in a certain situation (e.g. standing on the edge of a cliff). 
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It is true that (A') is not undermined by the counter-examples to (A) 
because agents of the scenarios are always limited beings like us, but not 
divine beings like God. However, (A') inherits a familiar problem. That is, 
while (A') is not vulnerable to the counter-examples it is simply 
unmotivated. (A') is plausible only if (A) is true but here (A') is 
introduced because of the failure of (A). 
One might point out that metaphysicians have proposed more 
sophisticated conditional analyses of dispositions that are not vulnerable to 
the counter-examples. If we adopt a conditional analysis of ability that is 
parallel to the sophisticated conditional analyses of dispositions then, one 
might think, the new argument withstands. The most well-known and 
arguably the most sophisticated version of the conditional analysis of 
dispositions is that introduced by David Lewis (1997). Lewis's analysis is 
formulated as follows: 
Something xis disposed at time t to give response r to stimulus s if 
and only if, for some intrinsic property B that x has at t, for some 
time t' after t, if x were to undergo stimulus s at time t and retain 
property B until t', s and x's having of B would jointly be an x-
complete cause of x's giving responser. (p.149) 
Lewis's analysis is quite complicated. However, we can simplify it safely 
by setting aside complications that are irrelevant to our current discussion. 
Focusing on fragility the core of Lewis's analysis is formulated as follows: 
(F-L) For any x, xis fragile if and only if xis intrinsically such that 
if it were dropped it would break. 
(F-L) is not vulnerable to the counter-examples. (F-L) tells that a gold cup 
is not fragile even if it is true that it would break if God decided to shatter 
when it is dropped. For, according to (F-L), a gold cup is not intrinsically 
such that if it were dropped it would break. A glass is fragile even if it is 
true that it would not break if God decided to make it shatterproof or it had 
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internal packing to stabilise it against hard knocks because, according to 
(F-L), a glass is intrinsically such that if it were dropped it would break. 
Now we can introduce the following dispositional analysis of ability 
which is parallel to (F-L): 
(A-L) For any x, x has an ability to fear if and only if x is 
intrinsically such that x would fear if x were in a certain situation 
(e.g. standing on the edge of a cliff). 
(A-L) is not vulnerable to the counter-examples. Bill does not have an 
ability to fear even if it is true that he would fear if a neuroscientist 
implanted silicon chips to his brain. For, according to (A-L), he is not 
intrinsically such that he would fear if he stood on the edge of a cliff. 
Similarly, I do have an ability to fear even if it is true that I would not fear 
if God decided to change my brain states appropriately or if I acquired an 
extremely strong body by training myself. For, according to (A-L), I am 
intrinsically such that I would fear if I stood on the edge of a cliff. 
Now the question is whether or not God can be said to have an ability 
to fear if we adopt (A-L). Consider (3 ') once more: 
(3') Because of His necessary omnipotence God does not have an 
ability to experience fear. 
Combining (A-L) with (3') we can derive the following: 
(3 ") Because of His necessary omnipotence God is not 
intrinsically such that He would fear if He were in a certain 
situation (e.g. standing on the edge of a cliff). 
(3 ") seems true. 11 When theists say that God is necessarily omnipotent 
they mean that God is intrinsically such that He is not powerless. This 
seems to be consistent with what (3 ") says. 
11 I accept (3' ') for the sake of argument, but I do not commit myself to the analysis of an 
ability described as (A-L). I also do not examine whether or not (3') undermines God's 
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Hence, if proponents of the new argument from concept possession 
adopt a sophisticated conditional analysis of ability like (A-L) then we 
cannot easily undermine (3 '). However, this still does not mean that the 
new argument is sound. In what follows I argue that (4") should be 
rejected. 
Rejecting ( 4' ') 
( 4 ), the fourth premiss of the original argument from concept possession, 
states that for any agent x, x fully comprehends the concept fear only if x 
has actually experienced fear. In Chapter 3 we saw that Torin Alter (2002) 
attempts to reject this premiss by showing that God can indeed fully 
comprehend fear without actually experiencing it. In particular, Alter 
suggests that God can accomplish it by: (i) directly perceiving the content 
of human consciousness; (ii) being acquainted with components of fear 
and deducing what it would like to combine those components into states 
of fear; or (iii) creating false memory traces of relevant experiences. I 
argued, however, that even if Alter' s suggestions successfully establish 
that some beings can fully comprehend fear without actually experiencing 
it, they do not establish that God can do that. For, God has various 
attributes that are incompatible with Alter' s suggestions. 
We may say the same thing with respect to the fourth premiss of the 
new argument, (4"). (4") states that for any agent x, x fully comprehends 
the concept fear only if x has an ability to experience fear. If we apply 
Alter's strategy to (4"), then, again, while we might be able to establish 
that some beings can fully comprehend fear without having an ability to 
experience fear, we cannot establish that God can do that because of the 
attributes that He has. Hence, in order to undermine (4"), we need to seek 
omnipotence. For, as I noted in Chapters 1 and 3, the issue of how to define omnipotence, 
particularly divine omnipotence, is enormously controversial. 
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for another way for God to comprehend fear fully without having an 
ability to experience fear. 
As I noted in Chapter 3, traditionally, philosophers of religion 
maintain that God's knowledge is non-discursive. For example, again, 
Thomas Aquinas (1997) writes, 'In the divine knowledge there is no 
discursiveness' (p. 416). But what exactly is non-discursive knowledge? 
Various views have been propounded as to the nature of non-discursive 
know ledge. 
According to the first view, non-discursive know ledge is non-
propositional. Thomas D. Sullivan (1991), for instance, writes, 'In a more 
contemporary idiom ... [Aquinas's contention is] that God's knowledge is 
non-propositional, i.e., God does not form propositions to understand the 
world' (pp. 25-26). It is not entirely clear, however, what 'forming 
propositions' means. Richard Sorabji (1983) describes the idea more 
clearly without endorsing it. He writes, 'It is commonly held that non-
discursive thinking does not involve thinking that something is the case. 
Instead it contemplates concepts in isolation from each other, and does not 
string them together in the way they are strung together in 'that' -clauses' 
(p. 137). According to this view, non-discursive knowledge is not a 
propositional attitude because it does not grasp the object of knowledge as 
a proposition. In other words, non-discursive knowledge is, as it is 
sometimes put, 'knowledge-of' rather than 'knowledge-that'. 
According to the second view, non-discursive knowledge 1s non-
inferential. Alvin Plantinga (1980), for example, holds that God's 
knowledge is propositional and non-inferential. He writes, 'Of course God 
neither needs nor uses logic; that is, he never comes to know a proposition 
A by inferring it from proposition B' (p. 144 ). God knows each 
proposition, this view says, independently without any inference or 
derivation. 
107 
Chapter 4: Divine Omniscience and the Argument from Concept Possession (2) 
According to the third view, non-discursive knowledge is intuitive. I 
think that this view captures the essence of non-discursive knowledge most 
accurately. Intuition is immediate intellectual insight which involves 
nothing, not even direct perception of an object. 12 The nature of intuition is 
nicely summarised by George Bealer (2002): 13 
Intuition is the source of all a priori knowledge-except, of course, 
for that which is merely stipulative. The use of intuition as 
evidence (reasons) is ubiquitous in our standard justificatory 
practices in the a priori disciplines .... By intuitions here, we mean 
seemings: for you to have an intuition that A is just for it to seem to 
you that A. Of course, this kind of seeming is intellectual, not 
experiential-sensory, introspective, imaginative. Typically, the 
contents of intellectual and experiential seeming cannot overlap. 
You can intuit that there could be infinitely many marbles, but such 
a thing cannot seem experientially (say, imaginatively) to be so. 
Intuition and imagination are in this way distinct. Descartes was 
right, I believe, to distinguish sharply between imagination and 
understanding, especially intuitive understanding. (p. 73) 
The view that non-discursive knowledge is intuitive entails that it is also 
non-inferential. Suppose that you intuitively know that there could be 
infinitely many marbles. Even though it might be possible for you to prove 
it and know it inferentially, the intuition itself does not require any 
inference. As Bealer says, intuitive knowledge is also non-experiential. 
Hence, even if there are some facts that are only known by intellectual 
12 Descartes, Locke, Leibniz and Hume subscribe to a similar conception of intuition to 
mine but Kant does not. He uses the term 'intuition' to mean direct perception of an 
object, because he thinks that there are only sensory intuitions, and no non-sensory, 
intellectual intuitions. 
13 I am indebted to Daniel Stoljar for bringing this passage to my attention. 
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intuition that does not follow that empiricism-at least versions of 
empiricism that I rejected in Chapter 3-is true. However, Bealer' s claim 
that 'intuitions are seemings' is slightly misleading, especially when it 
comes to God's knowledge. For, while seemings imply fallibility, God's 
intuition is infallible. 
I assume that intuitive knowledge is propositional for the following 
reasons. First, it is not clear whether or not there really is such a thing as 
non-propositional knowledge. Second, even if there is non-propositional 
knowledge, it is still unclear whether or not intellectual intuition itself is 
non-propositional. 14 Third, considering the possibility of non-propositional 
know ledge creates an unnecessary complication in the current discussion, 
given that I have formulated omniscience in terms of propositions, as is 
standard. 
Consider again the new argument from concept possession. Again, 
(4") states that for any agent x, x fully comprehends the concept fear only 
if x has an ability to experience fear. Referring to the third view on non-
discursive knowledge I submit that (4") is false because God could 
comprehend a proposition that tells what fear is intuitively. This is 
consistent with (3 '), according to which God does not have an ability to 
experience fear, as well as the rejection of concept empiricism formulated 
in ( 4 ). God can just intuit what fear is accurately without possessing or 
exercising an ability to fear. Hence, He can grasp the concept fear and 
perhaps also other propositions on which the concept is imbedded before 
14 For an argument against the idea that intuitive knowledge is non-propositional see, for 
instance, Sorabji (1983). Sorabji also denies the common claim that intuition as non-
propositional thinking is to be found in Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus. 
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inferring anything from other propositions that He knows. Admittedly, my 
suggestion here is speculative, 15 but I can see no reason to reject it. 
An interesting question here is whether or not God's intuitive 
knowledge of the concept fear has any ground. Two possible responses are 
in order. First, we might claim that it does not have any ground at all and 
that the nature of fear is just self-evident to Him. In other words, His 
intuitive knowledge of fear does not require any justification. Second, we 
might think, on the other hand, when God knows what fear is His intuition 
serves as a justificatory ground of His knowledge of the concept fear. 16 I 
leave both possibilities open. 17 Whichever turns out to be true ( 4") is false 
and the new argument from concept possession fails. 18 
15 See George I. Mavrodes (1988) and Peter Forrest (1994) for the nature of philosophical 
speculations. 
16 Notice that, in the passage quoted in the main text, Bealer (2002) seems to hold this 
position. He says that '[t]he use of intuition as evidence (reasons) is ubiquitous in our 
standard justificatory practices in the a priori disciplines' (p. 73). 
17 Another question that I do not attempt to answer here is whether or not God ' s 
knowledge is entirely intuitive. Some might think that God knows every proposition 
intuitively but other might think that God intuits only certain kinds of propositions. 
18 Here is another possible .objection to (4"), which I do not discuss in detail in the main 
text: Again, (4" ) says that for any agent x, x fully comprehends the concept fear only if x 
has an ability to experience fear. However, (4 " ) seems to have a gap. That is , there is no 
obvious connection between x 's full comprehension of the concept f ear and x ' s ability to 
experience fear. For while the former concerns x 's epistemic capacity the latter concerns 
x's sensory or experiential capacity. 
The only way to fill the gap is to argue as follows: Suppose that x does not have an 
ability to experience fear. Then x has not experienced fear and, consequently, x does not 
fully comprehend the concept/ear. 
However, this argument is unacceptable because it presupposes a form of concept 
empiricism, according to which in order to comprehend the concept/ear fully one has to 
experience fear. As we have seen in Chapter 3, this thesis is untenable. Therefore, there is 
no reason to hold (4"). 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Principally, I have made the following two points in this chapter: (i) The 
standard version of the argument from concept possession is vulnerable to 
the traditional counter-examples to empiricism. (ii) Although the strongest 
version of the argument is not vulnerable to the same counter-examples it 
nevertheless fails to show that God cannot comprehend fully what fear is. 
Should we conclude at this point that the argument from concept 
possession has no significance for traditional Judaeo-Christian theism? I 
think not. 
As I contended at the beginning of Chapter 3, the thrust of the 
argument from concept possession is the following: because of His very 
perfection God cannot be omniscient. The argument says that God is not 
omniscient because His other divine attributes preclude Him from 
acquiring certain concepts that are necessary for having complete 
knowledge. However, curiously enough, what we have seen motivates the 
exact opposite to this: because of His very perfection God can be 
omniscient. For, as we have seen, in order to undermine the argument with 
the counter-examples we need to rely on the fact that God is necessarily 
perfect; in particular, . that He is necessarily omnipotent. If God is not 
necessarily omnipotent then the argument from concept possession does 
successfully disprove the existence of God. This seems to show that the 
failure of the argument from concept possession indeed illuminates God's 
perfection. 
In Chapters 2, 3 and 4 I discussed two anti-theist arguments that 
concern divine omniscience. To examine these arguments is , of course, an 
important task in itself. However, in the rest of this work I argue that my 
analyses of these arguments can be utilised when we evaluate quite 
different arguments in the philosophy of mind: Thomas Nagel ' s bat 
argument and Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, the two most well-
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known arguments against the physicalist position on the mind-body 
problem. 
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Part III 
Physical Omniscience: Puzzles in the Philosophy of 
Mind 
Chapter 5 
Physical Omniscience and Nagel's Bat 
Argument 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2 I discussed Patrick Grim's argument from knowledge de se 
against the doctrine of di vine omniscience. I argued that the argument was 
unsuccessful because it appealed to a necessary impossibility. In this 
chapter I discuss Thomas Nagel' s bat argument against physicalism in the 
philosophy of mind. On the face of it, there is no connection between 
Grim's argument and Nagel's argument. I argue, however, that Nagel's 
argument fails for essentially the same reason that Grim' s does. 
In his famous paper, 'What Is It Like To Be a Bat?' (1974) Nagel 
illustrates the difficulty of characterising phenomenal consciousness in 
general. Nagel argues that in order for us to know the subjective nature of 
a bat's phenomenal experience we need to share a bat's 'point of view'. 
However, he contends, a bat's sensory apparatus is so fundamentally 
different from ours that it appears impossible for us to have that point of 
view. Therefore, he concludes, we seem unable to know 'what it is like to 
be a bat'. 
While Nagel is not himself explicit about the implication of this line 
of reasoning in his 1974 paper, his argument has been taken as a strong 
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critic ism of ph ysicalism. In fact, many philosophers claim that Na gel's 
argument is, at its root, identical to Frank Jackson's knowledge argument 
(1982, 1986), which is specifically designed to defeat physicalism. 1 Some 
even call this style of anti-physicalist argument the 'Nagel-Jackson 
knowledge argument' .2 Moreover, Nagel himself rejects physicalism in his 
later book (1986). In this chapter I hope to show that, whatever may be the 
verdict on Jackson's knowledge argument, Nagel's argument does not 
undermine physicalism. 
As Daniel C. Dennett (1991) writes, the argument is regarded as '[t]he 
most widely cited and influential thought experiment about consciousness' 
(p. 441) and accordingly a number of objections have already been made 
to it. 3 However, I propose to undermine Nagel's argument in a novel way, 
which appeals to Thomas Aquinas's principle regarding the nature of 
divine omnipotence that I introduced in Chapter 2, which, at first sight, has 
no connection with the argument. 
5.2 The Bat Argument 
Nagel's bat argument (1974) 1s based on a prevalent worry among 
contemporary physicalists that the phenomenal aspect of the world might 
necessarily remain physically or objectively uncharacterised. Nagel claims, 
'If physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological features must 
themselves be given a physical account. But when we examine their 
1 See, for example, David Lewis (1983), Carolyn McMullen (1985), Derek Pereboom 
(1994). I discuss the knowledge argument in Chapters 6 and 7. 
2 See, for example, Torin Alter (2002), Pereboom (1994). 
3 See, for example, Kathleen Akins (1993a), Akins (1993b), Jeff E. Foss (1989), Foss 
(1993), Vinit Haksar (1981), John Kekes (1977), Lewis (1983), Lewis (1988), McMullen 
(1985), D. H. Mellor (1993), Lawrence Nernirow (1980) Nernirow (1990), B. R. 
Tilghman (1991), Robert Van Gulick (1985), Van Gulick (1993). 
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subjective character it seems that such a result is impossible' (p. 437). 
In order to illustrate his claim Nagel introduces the famous example of 
a bat. A bat presents a range of activities and a sensory apparatus that are 
radically different from ours. In particular, it has a unique perceptual 
system: sonar. While bat sonar is 'clearly a form of perception', Nagel 
says, 'it is not similar in its operation to any sense that we possess' (p. 
438). Nagel considers a bat, rather than a bird or a fish, as he explains it, 
for the following two reasons. First, since a bat is a mammal there is no 
doubt that it has consciousness, just as much as a dog or a chimpanzee. 
Second, a bat's extremely unusual sensory apparatus enables it to have its 
own, very special, point of view. Since 'every subjective phenomenon is 
essentially connected with a single point of view' (p. 437), Nagel argues, a 
human being like him, who cannot have a bat's point of view, is precluded 
from knowing what it is like to be a bat. 
Nagel's bat argument may be schematised as follows: 
The Bat Argument 
(1) If xis not a bat-type creature, then x does not have a bat's point 
of view. 
(2) If x does n_ot have a bat's point of view, then x cannot know 
what it is like to be a bat. 
Therefore, 
(3) If xis not a bat-type creature, then x cannot know what it is like 
to be a bat. 
(4) Nagel (a human being) is not a bat-type creature. 
Therefore, 
(5) Nagel (a human being) cannot know what it is like to be a bat. 4 
4 (4) is true of metaphysical necessity. However, the question is whether or not (1) and (2) 
are also true of metaphysical necessity. If (1) and (2) are both true of metaphysical 
necessity then (3) and (5) are also true of metaphysical necessity. On the other hand, if 
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By a bat-type creature, I mean a creature that is reasonably similar to a bat 
with respect to its perceptual apparatus. Roughly speaking, if a creature is 
bat-type, it can have a bat's point of view and hence it is in a position to 
know what it is like to be a bat. 5 However, since Nagel is not a bat-type 
creature he cannot have a bat's point of view and accordingly he is not in a 
position to know what it is like to be a bat. 
5.3 Objections to the Bat Argument 
Notice that so far, the bat argument does not say anything about the status 
of physicalism. It says only that Nagel (a human being) cannot know what 
it is like to be a bat. Hence, in order to derive the falsity of physicalism 
from the bat argument, more premisses are needed, as I explain in detail in 
the next section. For the present, I wish to consider two typical objections 
to the bat argument itself, both of which say that there is something wrong 
with it because we can know what it is like to be a bat. Nagel's replies to 
those objections clarify what exactly he means by the phrase 'what it is 
like to be a bat'. We then see that knowing what it is like to be a bat is 
much harder than people tend to think. 
Objection 1: Imagination I Silnulation 
One might object to Nagel's argument by stating that if we have great 
powers of imagination, or a sophisticated simulation system, it is perfectly 
either (1) or (2) is not true of metaphysical necessity, but say, only nomological necessity, 
then (3) and (5) are not guaranteed to be true of metaphysical necessity. Throughout this 
chapter, I present my argument so that it does not rely on the status of these necessities. 
However, if either (1) or (2) is not true of necessity at all , then (3) and (5) are not 
guaranteed to be true of necessity either. In this case my argument appears to be in 
trouble. I come back to this point in Section 5.8. 
5 Whether or not, apart from a bat itself, there really is such a creature is not our concern 
here. 
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possible for us to know what it is like to be a bat without being a bat-type 
creature. That is, according to this objection, (3) is false. Surely, we cannot 
know what it is like to be a bat just by reading textbooks on physics or 
biology. However, the objection says, we can know it by carefully 
imagining or simulating how a bat, for example, flies and detects the 
location of its target~ just as one, who has never controlled an airplane, can 
know what it is like to be a pilot by using a well-designed flight simulator. 
However, this objection is not to the point, for imagination or simulation 
plays no part in what Nagel means by what it is like to be a bat: 
In so far as I can imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me 
only what it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But 
that is not the question. I want to know what it is like for a bat to be 
a bat. Yet if I try to imagine this, I am restricted to the resource of 
my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task. I 
cannot perform it either by imagining additions to my present 
experience, or by imagining some combination of additions, 
subtractions, and modifications. 
To the extent that I could look and behave like a wasp or a bat 
without changing my fundamental structure, my experiences would 
not be anything like the experiences of those animals. (1974, p. 439) 
The above passage suggests that what Nagel intends is the following: 
(6) Nagel (a human being) knows what it is like for a bat to be a 
6 bat. 
However, if Nagel imagines or simulates being a bat he can bring about 
only the following: 
(7) Nagel (a human being) knows what it is like for a human being 
to behave as a bat behaves. 
6 In what follows, I use phrases 'what it is like to be a bat' and 'what it is like for a bat to 
be a bat' interchangeably. 
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(7) is clearly different from (6). And the bat argument says that (6) is 
impossible to bring about. 
Objection 2: Transformation I Transplant 
One might also object to Nagel' s argument by claiming that it is possible 
for Nagel to know what it is like to be a bat by transforming himself into a 
bat or transplanting a bat's neurophysiological system into his body. That 
is, according to this objection, again, (3) is false. What this objection 
suggests might sound unrealistic, but we may at least imagine it as a 
possibility. However, Nagel says, this is not what he intends either: 
[I]t is doubtful that any meaning can be attached to the supposition 
that I should possess the internal neurophysiological constitution of 
a bat. Even if I could by gradual degrees be transformed into a bat, 
nothing in my present constitution enables me to imagine what the 
experience of such a future stage of myself thus metamorphosed 
would be like. The best evidence would come from the experience 
of bats, if we only knew what they were like. (1974, p. 439) 
If Nagel transforms himself into a bat then he may bring about at most the 
following: 
(8) Nagel (a bat) knows what it is like for a bat to be a bat. 
Again, this is different from what he intends: 
(6) Nagel (a human being) knows what it is like for a bat to be a 
bat.7 
Colin McGinn (1999) suggests that in order to bring about what Nagel 
wants ' [ w ]e would have to become half bat-bat men, literally' (p. 54 ). 
However, even if we grant that Nagel can really become a batman and that 
7 If Nagel can transform from a human being into a bat and then into a human being again, 
while preserving his memory, then perhaps Nagel, as a human being, can know what it is 
like for a bat to be a bat; but I take it that Nagel does not regard that as a possibility. 
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a batman is reasonably similar to a bat it would still not suffice. For by 
being a batman Nagel can bring about only the following: 
(9) Nagel (a batman) knows what it is like for a bat to be a bat. 
Although (9) might be slightly closer to what Nagel intends it is still far 
from satisfactory. For what he intends is not that a half-bat, half-human 
monster knows what it is like for a bat to be a bat. What he really wants is 
that he, as a normal human being, knows what it is like for a bat to be a bat. 
A batman is like a bat that is as intelligent as a human being. If there 
were such a being then perhaps it could talk about what it is like to be a bat 
in a human language. However, Nagel's complaint is not that there is not 
such a creature. It is rather that we are not equipped with a bat's sensory 
system and that this fact precludes us, as regular human beings, from 
knowing the subjective nature of a bat's phenomenal experience. 
5.4 The Anti-Physicalist Argument 
We have seen that Nagel shows vividly what a 'fundamentally alien form 
of life' (p. 438) a bat is and how hard it is for us to have a bat's point of 
view. Thus, we may say that Nagel's bat argument is successful in 
showing the difficulty for a human being, of knowing what it is like to be a 
bat. However, it is not at all clear how this difficulty could threaten 
physicalism. 
Nagel's ultimate goal is to undermine physicalism by showing the 
difficulty of giving a purely physical characterisation of what it is like to 
be a bat. However, the bat argument shows only that it is hard to know 
what it is like to be a bat in general. Knowing what it is like to be a bat in 
general is not the same as knowing a physical characterisation of what it is 
like to be a bat. For it might be possible that we manage to know what it is 
like to be a bat in general without being able to characterise it in physical 
terms. I claim that this might be possible because we do know what it is 
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like to be a human being without being able to characterise it in physical 
terms. Thus, there is a gap between the difficulty of knowing what it is like 
to be a bat in general, which the bat argument elaborately shows, and the 
difficulty of knowing a purely physical characterisation of what it is like to 
be a bat, which Nagel really needs to show. In order to fill this gap, Nagel 
is required to add more premisses to the bat argument. 
Regarding what physicalism needs to accomplish, Nagel states as 
follows: 
While an account of the physical basis of mind must explain many 
things, this appears to be the most difficult. It is impossible to 
exclude the phenomenological features of experience from a 
reduction in the same way that one excludes the phenomenal 
features of an ordinary substance from a physical or chemical 
reduction of it-namely, by explaining them as effects on the 
minds of human observers. If physicalism is to be defended, the 
phenomenological features must themselves be given a physical 
account. (1974,p.437) 
Nagel claims that physicalism has to, if it is true at all, provide complete 
explanation of not only physical, chemical and biological but also 
phenomenological features of the world. It follows that if physicalism is 
true then one who knows everything physical knows everything simpliciter. 
Applying this claim to the bat case we get the following: 
(10) If physicalism is true then x, who knows everything physical 
about bats, knows everything about bats. 
An addition of the following innocuous statement enables Nagel to derive 
the falsity of physicalism: 
(11) If x knows everything about bats then x knows what it is like 
to be a bat. 
In order to simplify (10) and (11) it will be useful to introduce our 
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own terminology. Recall the concept of omniscience that I formulated in 
Chapter 1: 
For any x and for any proposition p, xis omniscient if and only if, 
if it is true that p then x knows that p. 
This concept of omniscience may rightly be called 'omniscience 
simpliciter' because it subsumes absolutely all true propositions. It is also 
possible for one to be omniscient with respect to a specific kind of 
proposition. For instance, we can define omniscience with respect to 
physical propositions-call it 'physical omniscience'-as follows: 8 
(12) For any x and for any physical proposition p, x is physically 
omniscient if and only if, if it is true that p then x knows that p. 
By 'physical propositions' I mean (i) propositions about events, entities 
and properties in the world that have basic physical entities and properties 
as their ultimate constituents and (ii) propositions that are entailed a priori 
by such propositions. Although it is highly controversial whether the 
relevant entailment is only a priori I accept it for the sake of argument 
because both Nagel and Jackson, the proponents of the anti-physicalist 
arguments that I discuss in this work, accept it. Using this terminology, we 
may rephrase (10) and (11) as follows: 
(10') If physicalism is true, then if xis physically omniscient about 
bats then x is omniscient about bats. 
(11 ') If x is omniscient about bats, then x knows what it is like to 
be a bat. 
Now consider a particular example. Suppose that Nagel is physically 
omniscient about bats. If physicalism is true, then, according to (10 ' ), he is 
8 Authoritative self-knowledge is construed as another form of omniscience with respect 
to a specific kind of proposition. For, as I noted in Chapter 1, the doctrine of authoritative 
self-knowledge is often regarded as claiming that we are omniscient with respect to 
propositions about our own mental states. 
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omniscient about bats. And if he is omniscient about bats, according to 
(11), then he knows what it is like to be a bat. However, as the bat 
argument shows, he cannot know what it is like to be a bat, that is, he 
cannot be omniscient about a bat, simply because he is not a bat-type 
creature. It follows that Nagel, who is physically omniscient about bats, is 
not indeed omniscient about bats and accordingly that physicalism 1s 
false. 9 This line of reasoning can be schematised as follows: 
The Anti-Physicalist Argument 
(13) If physicalism is true then Nagel, who is physically omniscient 
about bats, is omniscient about bats. 
(14) If Nagel is omniscient about bats then he knows what it is like 
to be a bat. 
(15) Nagel cannot know what it is like to be a bat. (Conclusion of 
the bat argument) 
Therefore, 
(16) Nagel is not omniscient about bats. 
Therefore, 
(17) Physicalism is false. 10 
9 One might also expand Nagel's bat argument in the following way: the bat argument 
shows that we cannot know what it is like to be a bat. Therefore, we cannot provide a 
complete physical explanation of what it is like to be a bat, for we do not know what 
needs to be explained in the first place! In this case, however, Nagel's argument has an 
impact only on the epistemological status of physicalism. Thus, it entails what we may 
call mysterianism, according to which phenomenal consciousness is not ontologically but 
only epistemologically distinct from the physical. However, Nagel himself (1974) argues 
that he is 'not raising [an] epistemological problem' with his argument (p. 442) . 
10 (15) says that Nagel cannot know what it is like to be a bat, but in order to derive the 
conclusion of the anti-physicalist argument, (17), Nagel needs only the weaker claim that 
Nagel does not know what it is like to be a bat. That is, (15), which is the conclusion of 
the bat argument, is unnecessarily strong. I believe that this is what makes his anti-
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The most popular response to the above anti-physicalist argument is to 
reject (13) by appealing to so-called a posteriori physicalism. According 
to this response, even if physicalism is true it is perfectly possible that 
Nagel, who knows everything physical about bats, does not know 
everything phenomenal about bats. For, there is no a priori derivation 
from physical facts (about bats) to phenomenal facts (about bats). I do not 
examine this response here 11 because what I try to show in the following 
entails that even if a posteriori physicalism is false, Nagel' s argument does 
not undermine physicalism. 
In order to defeat Nagel's argument I use the second principle 
introduced in Chapter 2 of this work, a principle about omnipotence. I 
claim that Nagel's argument is similar to Grim's because it, also, appeals 
to a necessary impossibility. 
5.5 The Thomistic Principle 
According to Judaeo-Christian theism, God is necessarily omnipotent. 
Thus, roughly speaking, He is able to do anything. 12 However, as I noted 
in Chapter 2, Aquinas says that 'anything that implies a contradiction does 
not fall under God's omnipotence' (1967, p. 167). He writes: 
physicalist argument problematic. Those who are familiar with Jackson's knowledge 
argument should notice that it uses only a claim which con-esponds to the weaker one. 
11 For issues of a posteriori physicalism see, for instance, Daniel Stoljar (2000). 
12 Since the issue of defining omnipotence is enormously controversial, I do not attempt 
to provide a precise definition here. I try to minimise the dependence of my argument on 
a particular definition of omnipotence. For the debate on how to define omnipotence see 
Richard La Croix (1978), Thomas P. Flint and Alfred J. Freddoso (1983), Peter Geach 
(1973), Geach (1977), Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosenkrantz (1980), Hoffman and 
Rosenkrantz (1984), Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1988) Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (2002), 
George I. Mavrodes (1977), Wes Mon-iston (2001b), Bruce R. Reichenbach (1980), 
Richard Swinburne (1973), Erik J. Wielenberg (2000), Edward Wierenga (1983). 
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[God] cannot make one and the same thing to be and not to be; He 
cannot make contradictories to exist simultaneously. Contradiction, 
moreover, is implied in contraries and privative opposites: to be 
white and black is to be white and not white; to be seeing and blind 
is to be seeing and not seeing. For the same reason, God is unable 
to make opposites exist in the same subject at the same time and in 
the same respect. (1975, p. 8) 
So, for example, according to Aquinas, the fact that God cannot draw a 
square circle or make a married bachelor does not entail that God is not 
omnipotent. Using somewhat contemporary terminology, in Chapter 2 I 
formulated Aquinas's principle-call it the 'Thomistic Principle'-as 
follows: 
Thomistic Principle (TP): The fact that God does not have a power 
to do what it is necessarily impossible to do does not undermine 
His omnipotence. 
Ever since Aquinas, (TP) has been used only to defend the 
omnipotence of God. However, I believe, the idea behind (TP) is more 
general and the principle may be modified so as to be applicable to other 
sorts of argument as well. I demonstrate this in the next section. 
5.6 The Revised Thomistic Principle 
The applicability of (TP) may be widened significantly if we reformulate it 
according to the fallowing three points. 
First, as I stated in Chapter 2, when Aquinas formulated (TP) he was, 
of course, not aware of Kripke' s distinction between the necessary a priori 
and the necessary a posteriori (Kripke, 1972). Thus Aquinas had only 
necessary a priori impossibilities in mind, impossibilities such as drawing 
a square circle or creating a married bachelor. However, (TP) must be 
applied to all necessary impossibilities, both a priori and a posteriori. 
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Hence, the omnipotence of God is not undermined even though he cannot 
perform such necessary a posteriori impossibilities as separating water 
from H2O or Hesperus from Phosphorus. 
Second, (TP) may be more clearly formulated by introducing the 
notions of 'pseudo tasks' and 'real tasks'. It is necessarily impossible to 
perform pseudo tasks, while it is possible to perform real tasks. Drawing 
upon the distinction appealed to above, concerning a priori and a 
posteriori impossibilities, it may be either a priori, or a posteriori, 
impossible to perform any given pseudo task. While arguably an 
omnipotent God is able to perform all real tasks, such as drawing a circle 
or baking a chocolate cake, He does not have to be able to perform, 
according to (TP), any kind of pseudo task, such as drawing a square circle 
or creating a chocolate cake that is Socrates at the same time, for they are 
not, in fact, tasks at all! 13 
Third, the basic idea in Aquinas's principle is relevant not only to God 
but also to anyone. For, if an omnipotent God does not have to be able to 
perform a pseudo task, then surely no one has to be able to perform a 
pseudo task. Hence, for example, my failure to draw a circle in a geometry 
examination indicates my lack of geometrical skill, but my-or 
anyone's-failure to draw a square circle does not indicate any such lack 
(Mavrodes, 1963, p. 221); for, again, it is not merely contingently, but 
13 Richard Swinburne (1977) makes a similar point in terms of action: 'A logically 
impossible action is not an action. It is what is described by a form of words which 
purport to describe an action but do not describe anything which it is coherent to suppose 
could be done.' (p. 231). It is interesting to note that pseudo tasks are not always easily 
distinguishable from real tasks. For instance, the Athenian and Cyzician schools were 
trying to solve the duplication of a cube, the trisection of an angle and the squaring a 
circle. However, all of them turned out to be necessarily insoluble. That is, while they had 
believed (or hoped) that they could solve them, solving these problems was found to be a 
pseudo task. See C. Anthony Anderson (1984), p. 113. 
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necessarily impossible to do. 
Taking the above three points into consideration, (TP) can be revised 
as follows: 
Revised Thomistic Principle (RTP): For any agent x, the fact that x 
does not have a power to perform a pseudo task does not entail x' s 
lack of power. 
I now apply (RTP) to Nagel's argument. 
5. 7 Applying the Revised Thomistic Principle 
With (RTP) in mind, consider the bat argument again. 
(1) If xis not a bat-type creature, then x does not have a bat's point 
of view. 
(2) If x does not have a bat's point of view, then x cannot know 
what it is like to be a bat. 
Therefore, 
(3) If x is not a bat-type creature, then x cannot know what it is like 
to be a bat. 
(4) Nagel (a human being) is not a bat-type creature. 
Therefore, 
(5) Nagel (a human being) cannot know what it is like to be a bat. 
According to this argument, Nagel (a human being) cannot know what it is 
like to be a bat simply because he is not a bat-type creature. However, 
suppose, for the sake of argument, that Nagel (a human being) does have a . 
miraculous power to know what it is like to be a bat. Then the following is 
true: 
(18) Nagel (a human being) can know what it is like to be a bat. 
(3) is logically equivalent to the following: 
(19) If x can know what it is like to be a bat, then x is a bat-type 
creature. 
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Appl ing (19) to (18) we can derive: 
(20) agel (a human being) is a bat-type creature. 
Ho e er ( .. 0) is fal e because as agel emphasises, a human being is 
fundamentall · different from a bat-type creature. Furthermore, (20) is not 
merel ontingently but necessarily false. 14 Thus, by proposing his 
argu1nen agel require physicalism to place him in a position to perform 
a p eu o ta k namely being a bat-type creature while being a non-bat-
t pe • reature. otice that thi is very similar to the result of Grim' s 
argument from knowledge de se that I introduced in Chapter 2 of this work. 
G1im a hat God i not omni cient becau e He cannot know what I 
know 1n knowing that I am making a mess. However I argued that if 
G1im a mption were right then Gods knowing what I know in 
knowing that I am making a me would entail that God is me, which is 
JU li re (20) ne e aiil fal e. 
o it i lear that agel s anti -ph icali t argument is parallel to a 
t pi al un u e ful argument against Judaeo-Christian theism: 
The Anti-Theist Ar0 unient 
(...., 1) If Judaeo-Chri tian thei mi true then God is omnipotent. 
(- - ) If God i omnipotent then God an draw a quare cir le. 
(- 3) God annot draw a quare ir le. 
Therefore 
(. ... A) God i not omnipotent. 
Therefore 
(- "" ) Judaeo-Chri tian thei m i false. 
The ontrapo iti e of (-1 ) a that if God annot draw a quare circle 
th n Go i not omnipotent. Ho e er (RTP) a that e en if God annot 
perform a p u o t r li r dra ing a quare ir le that doe not entail Hi 
14 Here I impl mean that the propo ition ex:pre ed b (_Q) i ne e aril fal e. 
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lack of power. Therefore, given (RTP), the anti-theist argument is 
unsuccessful. Judaeo-Christian theism is not undermined just by the fact 
that God cannot perform a pseudo task. 
The following is Nagel's anti-physicalist argument that we have 
discussed: 
(13) If physicalism is true then Nagel, who is physically omniscient 
about bats, is omniscient about bats. 
(14) If Nagel is omniscient about bats then he knows what it is like 
to be a bat. 
(15) Nagel cannot know what it is like to be a bat. (Conclusion of 
the bat argument) 
Therefore, 
(16) Nagel is not omniscient about bats. 
Therefore, 
(17) Physicalism is false. 
Just as the argument against Judaeo-Christian theism is unsuccessful, the 
above argument against physicalism is unsuccessful. Given that an 
acquisition of knowledge requires one to have particular powers-
epistemic powers, as I called them in Chapter 2-N agel, who is 
omniscient about bats, is regarded as omnipotent with respect to knowing 
about bats. The contrapositive of (14) says that if Nagel does not know 
what it is like to be a bat then he is not omniscient about bats. However, 
(RTP) says that even if Nagel cannot perform a pseudo task that does not 
entail his lack of power. Hence, the fact that Nagel cannot perform such a 
pseudo task as knowing what it is like to be a bat does not undermine 
Nagel's omnipotence with respect to knowing about bats. Therefore, given 
(RTP), the argument is unsuccessful. Physicalism is not undermined just 
by the fact that Na gel cannot perform a pseudo task. 
Notice that if Nagel's bat argument is cogent then God, who is not a 
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bat-type creature, cannot know what it is like to be a bat either. 15 And, 
according to (TP), God does not have to be able to do it in order to be 
omnipotent. Why, then, do human beings have to be able to do what even 
God does not have to be able to do in order only to defend physicalism? 
5.8 Possible Objections 
I now examine three possible objections to my argument. 
Objection A: The McEar Problem 
One might try to undermine my argument by rejecting (TP), on which 
(RTP) is based, on the grounds that it is unacceptable because it entails 
that a being that is obviously not omnipotent is omnipotent. This is the 
infamous 'McEar problem'. Borrowing Bruce Reichenbach's refinement 
(1980) of Alvin Plantinga' s example (1967), imagine an extraordinary 
creature called Mr. McEar. Mr. McEar is a being such that necessarily he 
is only capable of scratching his left ear. If (TP) is correct then, according 
to this objection, one cannot undermine the omnipotence of Mr. McEar 
because he can do everything except what it is necessarily impossible for 
him to do. 'Everything' is, of course, to scratch his left ear. 
However, as many philosophers argue, even if (TP) 1s true, this 
absurdity does not follow. For, there is no possible world in which Mr. 
McEar exists. Edward Wierenga (1989), for example, contends as follows: 
Necessarily, scratching one's ear takes time. Accordingly, it is 
necessary that there are infinitely many intervals of time t such that 
15 One might argue that God can know what it is like to be a bat if He incarnates as a bat. 
However, this results in the trouble that we discussed in Section 5.3. That is, by 
incarnating as a bat, God can bring about only the following: God (as a bat) can know 
what it is like for a bat to be a bat. This is crucially different from the claim that God (as 
God, that is, as a non-bat-type being) knows what it is like for a bat to be a bat. 
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anyone who is able to scratch his ear is also able to scratch his ear 
throughout t. So if McEar is able to scratch his ear, he is able to do 
infinitely many things. Moreover, if McEar can scratch his ear, he 
must be able to do so by moving some other part of his body, 
perhaps his arm, in the appropriate way. But then McEar can also 
move his arm, contract his muscles, disturb adjacent air molecules, 
and do countless other things as well. So it does not seem possible 
that there be such a being as McEar. (p. 29) 
Wierenga is correct in saying that it is metaphysically impossible for Mr. 
McEar to exist, given that the task of scratching his ear itself involves 
complicated procedures. However, at the same time, it is not at all obvious 
that there can never be a primitive being that is necessarily able to perform 
only one very simple task or no task at all. Suppose that this sort of being 
is possible. Does it then immediately follow from (TP) that this being is 
omnipotent?16 
(TP) says that the fact that God does not have a power to do what it is 
necessarily impossible to do does not undermine His omnipotence. As I 
16 Thomas P. Flint and Alfred J. Freddoso (1983, n. 4) make the following interesting 
historical remarks: 
To best of our knowledge, McEar makes his first contemporary appearance in 
Alvin Plantinga 's God and Other Minds (Ithaca, 1967), pp. 168-73. But a similar 
difficulty was recognized at least as early, as the later Middle Ages. For instance, 
the following note was added by an anonymous writer to one of the manuscripts 
of Ockaham's Ordinatio I, distinction 42: "Nor is a being said to be omnipotent 
because he can do all things which are possible for him to do ... since it would 
follow that a minimally powerful being is omnipotent. For suppose that Socrates 
performs one action and is not capable of performing any others. Then one 
argues as follows: 'he is performing every action which it is possible for him to 
perform, therefore, he is omnipotent"' (See Etzkorn and Kelly, 1979, p. 611). 
It is worthy of note that the formulation of the McEar problem in the Middle Ages is 
much less susceptible to criticism than the modern formulation. 
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stated earlier, if (TP) is true then it should be applied to other beings, like 
Mr. McEar and us, as well. Thus (TP) can be generalised as follows: 
(TP') For any agent x, the fact that x does not have a power to do 
what it is necessarily impossible to do does not undermine x' s 
omnipotence. 
Now there are two possible interpretations of (TP'): 
(TP' 1) For any agent x, the fact that x does not have a power to do 
what it is necessarily impossible for x to do does not undermine x' s 
omnipotence. 
(TP'2) For any agent x, the fact that x does not have a power to do 
what it is necessarily impossible for anyone to do does not 
undermine x' s omnipotence. 
If we adopt (TP' 1), then a primitive being, called Ms. X, who can 
necessarily perform only one very simple task, k, is indeed omnipotent. 
She can only perform k and there are many other tasks, such that others 
can perform them but Ms. X cannot. Nevertheless, according to (TP' 1), 
this fact does not undermine her omnipotence because they are necessarily 
impossible for her to perform. However, (TP' 1) does not seem compelling. 
As we saw earlier, the motivation for holding (TP) is to block an argument 
against omnipotence that appeals to, for instance, God's inability to draw a 
square circle. God does not have to be able to do it precisely because it is 
what no one can do, even in principle. Thus, the tasks to which (TP') 
applies are those that are necessarily impossible, not just for a particular 
being, but for any being at all, to perform. Therefore, (TP'2) seems to be 
the correct interpretation of (TP'), and if we adopt (TP'2), then clearly, 
neither Mr. McEar nor Ms. X, who cannot do many things that others can 
do, is regarded as omnipotent. 
There is, however, an apparent drawback to my argument. Judaeo-
Christian philosophers often prefer (TP' 1) to (TP'2) because if they accept 
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(TP' 1) they can show that even if God cannot, for example, kill someone 
or break a promise His omnipotence is not thereby undermined. For, 
according to them, given His necessary omnibenevolence, killing someone 
or breaking a promise is necessarily impossible for Him to do. 17 However, 
this line of reasoning is costly because it conflicts with our commonsense 
notion of power. 
Suppose that necessarily Ms. X can perform only task kl and that 
necessarily Dr. Y can perform tasks kl and k2 but nothing else. In this case, 
it is natural to claim that Dr. Y is more powerful than Ms. X because, 
numerically, Dr. Y has more abilities than Ms. X. However, if we adopt 
(TP' 1), Ms. X and Dr. Y are both omnipotent because both of them can do 
everything except what is necessarily impossible for them to do. And this 
entails the absurdity that, even though Dr. Y can perform numerically 
more tasks than Ms. X, they are as powerful as each other! 18 The upshot is 
that it seems better to think that (RTP) is based not on (TP' 1), but on 
(TP'2), which does not entail that a being that is obviously non-omnipotent 
is omnipotent. 
At this point, one might claim that if (TP'2) 1s the correct 
interpretation (RTP) cannot be applied to Nagel's anti-physicalist 
17 Some theists argue that they do not have to give up omnibenevolence of God even if 
they hold (TP '2). For, they say, the general thrust of (TP) is directed only to metaphysical 
necessity and it is not metaphysically, but only morally , impossible for God to kill 
someone. That is, God can kill someone, but He just does not. 
18 An interesting question here is which should be regarded as being more powerful if 
tasks that they can perform are not neatly overlapping. Suppose, for example, that Dr. Y 
can calculate 1+2, 0.9999+2 and 0.99999+2. Suppose further that Ms. X can calculate 
1 +2 and build a house. One might claim that although Dr. Y can perform numerically 
more tasks than Ms. X, Dr. Y is less powerful than Ms. X. For, one might say, Ms. Y's 
ability is more practical or more useful. For the sake of simplicity, I set aside this issue in 
the main text. 
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argument. For, while knowing what it is like to be a bat is necessarily 
impossible for a human being, it is possible for a bat. I now examine this 
objection. 
Objection B: Is It Really a Pseudo Task? 
One might try to reject my argument by claiming that Nagel' s bat 
argument does not involve a pseudo task. Drawing a square circle or 
making a married bachelor are clearly pseudo tasks because no one can 
perform them. However, according to this objection, knowing what it is 
like to be a bat is not a pseudo task because, by definition, at least a bat 
can perform it. And if it is not a pseudo task, then I cannot undermine 
Nagel's argument by using (RTP). 
However, this objection is based on a misunderstanding. I have not 
claimed that knowing what it is like to be a bat is a pseudo task. As Nagel 
himself allows, not only a bat, but even we could know what it is like to be 
a bat if we transformed ourselves into bats or transplanted bats' neural 
system into our bodies. My complaint is rather that, given the premisses of 
Nagel' s bat argument, bringing about the following is a pseudo task: 
(6) Nagel (a human being) knows what it is like for a bat to be a bat. 
If the premisses of the bat argument are true, in order for Nagel to bring 
about (6) he has to do the following two things at the same time: be a 
human being and know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. If Nagel fails to 
do either of them, he fails to bring about (6). However, while being a 
human being entails being a non-bat-type creature, knowing what it is like 
for a bat to be a bat requires, if Nagel is right, being a bat-type creature. 
Hence, in order to bring about (6) Nagel has, essentially, to do the 
following two things at the same time: be a non-bat-type creature and be a 
bat-type creature. This is as necessarily impossible as, say, being married 
and being a bachelor at the same time or being a chocolate cake and being 
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Socrates at the same time. Although knowing what it is like to be a bat is 
possible for a bat and for us, knowing what it is like to be a bat while being 
a non-bat-type creature is clearly necessarily impossible, even for a bat. 
Objection C: This is Not Nagel' s Argument 
Finally, one might claim that my argument is unacceptable because I have 
not correctly interpreted Nagel's bat argument. According to this objection, 
Nagel's argument does not involve a pseudo task because he does not 
maintain that it is necessarily impossible for a non-bat-type creature to 
know what it is like to be a bat. If it is not necessarily impossible, then, 
contrary to my supposition, bringing about (6) is not indeed a pseudo task. 
It is true that Nagel does not explicitly claim that it is necessarily 
impossible for a non-bat-type creature to know what it is like to be a bat, 
but if Nagel does not endorse the claim, his entire argument will be trivial. 
I have taken the intermediate conclusion of Nagel' s bat argument to 
be the following: 
(3) If xis not a bat-type creature, then x cannot know what it is like 
to be a bat. 
However, according to the objection under consideration, the real 
intermediate conclusion is as follows: 
(3') If x is not a bat-type creature, then it is difficult for x to know 
what it is like to be a bat. 
But, after all, who would deny that it is difficult for a non-bat-type creature 
like us to know what it is like to be a bat? (3 ') is so weak that it fails to 
show anything about the cogency or otherwise of physicalism and its 
alternatives. Given (3') physicalists would hope that a future theoretical 
revolution within physicalism will enable us to know what it is like to be a 
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bat. 19 And, by the same token, dualists, would claim that it is not 
physicalism but dualism that will enable us to know what it is like to be a 
bat. Further, some other anti-physicalists, such as mysterians, would claim 
that while it is possible in principle for some non-bat creatures to know 
what it is like to be a bat, at least we are cognitively bounded with respect 
to this know ledge. 
Nagel (1974) summarises his main claim as follows: 'physicalism is a 
position we cannot understand because we do not at present have any 
conception of how it might be true' (p. 176). However, this conclusion 
cannot be derived from (3') without presupposing that physicalism is true. 
And, as I have stated, (3 ') is completely silent about the cogency or 
otherwise of physicalism. All it says is that it is difficult for us to know 
what it is like to be a bat, a thesis which does not have any significant 
impact on physicalism or its alternatives. Hence, if (3 ') is the conclusion 
then, while it does not involve a pseudo task, Nagel's bat argument turns 
out to be trivial. 
5.9 Conclusion 
Most philosophers have taken it for granted that Nagel's argument raises 
an important issue for physicalism. However, I have maintained that there 
is a fundamental problem with his argument, which is that he tries to 
derive an apparent difficulty for physicalism by appealing to a necessary 
19 In fact, Na gel himself (197 4) is inclined to bet on this possibility. He argues that 
perhaps contemporary physicalists' hypothesis that a mental event is a physical event is 
analogous to the pre-Socratics' hypothesis that matter is energy (p. 447). Just as pre-
Socratic philosophers needed a concept that enabled them to understand how matter could 
ever be energy, according to Nagel, perhaps we need a concept that enables us to 
understand how a bat's phenomenal experience can ever be physical. But as I mentioned 
earlier, Nagel rejects physicalism in his later book (1986). 
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impossibility. Whether or not we can characterise the subjective nature of 
a bat's phenomenal experience in physical terms is a genuine philosophical 
question, one that might lead to a strong objection to physicalism. But the _ 
necessary impossibility of our knowing what it is like to be a bat, while 
being ourselves, does not count against the case for physicalism.20 
Apart from their names(!), there is no obvious connection between 
Thomas Nagel's philosophy of mind and Thomas Aquinas's philosophy of 
religion. However, as I have argued, Aquinas's principle regarding divine 
omnipotence provides an effective argument against Nagel's challenge to 
physicalism. 
20 As I noted in the main text many philosophers contend that Nagel's argument is, at its 
root, identical to Jackson 's knowledge argument. However, Jackson (1982) clearly 
distinguishes his argument from Na gel's by taking a similar line of reasoning to mine: 
When I complained that all the physical knowledge about Fred was not enough 
to tell us what his special colour experience was like, I was not complaining that 
we weren't finding out what it is like to be Fred. I was complaining that there is 
something about his experience, a property of it, of which we were left ignorant. 
And if and when we come to know what this property is we still will not know 
what it is like to be Fred, but we will know more about him. No amount of 
knowledge about Fred, be it physical or not, amounts to knowledge "from the 
inside" concerning Fred. We are not Fred. There is thus a whole set of items of 
knowledge expressed by forms of words like 'that it is I myself who is ... ' which 
Fred has and we simply cannot have because we are not him. (p. 132) 
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Physical Omniscience and Jackson's 
Knowledge Argument (1) 
6.1 Introduction 
I discussed Thomas Nagel' s bat argument against physicalism in Chapter 5. 
In the remainder of this work I discuss another well-known argument 
against physicalism: Frank Jackson's knowledge argument. 
The knowledge argument (1982, 1986), which, just like the bat 
argument, purports to show that there can be no physicalist account of 
phenomenal consciousness, is one of the most famous and provocative 
thought experiments in the philosophy of mind. In contemporary 
philosophy there are few arguments that have attracted greater 
philosophical attention. Daniel C. Dennett (forthcoming) describes the 
argument as 'one of the most successful intuition pumps ever devised by 
analytic philosophers' and Robert Van Gulick (1993) regards it as 'the 
most widely discussed anti-physicalist argument in the American 
philosophical world during the 1980' s' (p. 462). Once we accept the 
knowledge argument, physicalism appears hopeless and there seems no 
choice other than dualism. The argument, however, might not give dualists 
cause to rejoice, after all. According to what I call the 'parity of reasons 
objection', which is introduced by Paul Churchland, the knowledge 
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argument is so strong that if it served to defeat physicalism it would 
equally well serve to defeat 'substance dualism'. 
The purpose of this two-part chapter is to articulate the parity of 
reasons objection, which, in spite of its strength, has attracted little 
attention. In the first part, I examine Churchland' s formulation of the 
parity of reasons objection. I suggest that while his formulation is not 
wholly satisfactory, it may be modified so that the knowledge argument 
would defeat a particular form of dualism to the exact extent that it would 
defeat physicalism. I demonstrate this point by using the concept of 
physical omniscience, which I introduced in Chapter 5, and a new concept, 
'dualistic omniscience'. In the second part, I consider an application of the 
parity of reasons objection. David J. Chalmers, a well-known dualist and a 
proponent of the know ledge argument, introduces two possible forms of 
dualism and explicitly states his preference for one over the other. 
However, I demonstrate, by applying the parity of reasons objection, that 
his preferred option would be defeated by the knowledge argument to the 
exact extent that physicalism would be defeated. Therefore, I conclude, if 
he wishes to reject physicalism on the basis of the knowledge argument, he 
has to subscribe to the form of dualism which he does not prefer. 
6.2 The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism 
Imagine Mary, a brilliant scientist who is confined to a black-and-white 
room. Although she has never been outside her room in her entire life, she 
has learned everything there is to know about the physical from black-and-
white books and lectures on a black-and-white television. Mary's complete 
knowledge includes everything about the physical facts and laws of 
physics, which will include causal and relational facts, and functional roles. 
This is the beginning of the know ledge argument. 
139 
Chapter 6: Physical Omniscience and Jackson's Knowledge Argument (1) 
Physicalism is the metaphysical thesis that, in the relevant sense, 
everything is physical, or as contemporary physicalists often put it, 
everything logically supervenes on the physical. Thus, if physicalism is 
true Mary, who has complete knowledge about the physical, must have 
complete knowledge simpliciter. 1 
What will happen, Jackson continues, when Mary leaves her room and 
looks at, say, a ripe tomato for the first time? According to physicalism 
she should not come to know anything new because she is supposed to 
know everything about the physical. It appears obvious, however, that she 
will discover something new upon her release; namely, 'what it is like to 
1 The knowledge argument-at least Jackson's original formulation of the knowledge 
argument-is based on the assumption that if physicalism is true then a prwrz 
physicalism is true. A priori physicalism states that mental phenomena logically 
supervene on physical phenomena and that there is an a priori derivation from physical 
facts to mental facts. However, many philosophers reject a priori physicalism. For 
example, a posteriori physicalists, such as Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker (1999), argue 
that neither macrophysical nor mental phenomena logically supervene on microphysical 
phenomena and that there is not an a priori but only an a posteriori derivation from 
physical facts to mental facts. A posteriori physicalists reject the knowledge argument on 
the ground that Mary does not have to be able to make an a priori derivation from 
physical facts, which she knows in a black-and-white room, to mental facts, which she 
comes to know upon her release. Hence Mary's surprise at finding out what it is like to 
see red is, they claim, perfectly consistent with (a posteriori) physicalism. I set aside the 
issue of a posteriori physicalism and use the notion of reduction that is based on a priori 
physicalism throughout this work. This does not affect the force of the parity of reasons 
objection because, as we will see later, the targets of the parity of reasons objection are 
proponents of the knowledge argument, such as Jackson and Chalmers, who accept the 
assumption that if physicalism is true then a priori physicalism is true. (If they do not 
accept it, then they cannot undermine physicalism by the knowledge argument in the first 
place.) It is important to note that a posteriori physicalism has been introduced and 
elaborated as a response to anti-physicalist arguments like the knowledge argument. 
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see red', a phenomenal feature of her visual experience.2 This contradicts 
the physicalist assumption that Mary, prior to her release, has complete 
knowledge simpliciter. Therefore, Jackson concludes, physicalism is 
false. 3 
Jackson (1986) provides a 'convenient and accurate way of 
displaying' the knowledge argument: 
(1) Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to 
know about other people. 
(2) Mary (before her release) does not know everything there is to 
know about other people (because she learns something about 
them on her release). 
Therefore, 
(3) There are true propositions about other people (and herself that 
escape the physicalist story). 4 (p. 293) 
Physicalists need this sort of independent response to the knowledge argument because 
the parity of reasons objection is not applicable to all kinds of dualism. 
2 If we want to be precise we need to add many conditions to this thought experiment: 
Mary's body must be painted completely black-and-white; Mary must not rub her eyes so 
that she does not experience phosphenes; Mary must not experience any colourful 
illusions or dreams, etc. · In order to get rid of this complication, Howard Robinson 
stipulates instead that the protagonist of the thought experiment is a congenitally deaf 
scientist. See Robinson (1982), pp. 4-5 , Robinson (1993), p. 159. 
3 After sixteen years of defending the knowledge argument, Jackson announced in 1998 
that he had changed his mind, stating that although the argument contained no obvious 
fallacy, its conclusion, that physicalism is false, must be mistaken. In this work, I am 
concerned only with Jackson's original claim. It should be emphasised, however, that 
even since his 'conversion' Jackson still insists that if physicalism is true Mary must 
know what it is like to see red before she goes outside her room. That is, he still believes 
that if physicalism is true a priori physicalism is true. See Jackson (1995), Jackson 
(1998b), Jackson (2003), Jackson (forthcoming). 
4 I have modified (3) slightly so that we can see the connection between the knowledge 
argument and my formulation of omniscience. Jackson's original statement of (3) is 
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In Chapters 1 and 5, I formulated the concept of omniscience simpliciter as 
follows: 
For any x and for any proposition p, xis omniscient if and only if, 
if it is true that p then x knows that p. 
Further, I articulated the concept of physical omniscience as follows: 
For any x and for any physical proposition p, x is physically 
omniscient if and only if, if it is true that p then x knows that p. 
Using these concepts, we rephrase the above formulation of the knowledge 
argument as follows: 
( 4) Mary (before her release) is physically omniscient about other 
people. 
(5) Mary (before her release) is not omniscient simpliciter about 
other people (because she leanis something about them on her 
release). 
Therefore, 
(6) Physical omniscience is not omniscience simpliciter.5 
Since, if it is successful, the knowledge argument defeats physicalism, its 
proponents, such as Chalmers (1996), John Foster (1991), J. P. Moreland 
(2003), and Howard Robinson (1982, 1993), subscribe to dualism. 6 
'There are truths about other people (and herself) that escape the physicalist story'. 
Jackson would not mind this modification because he thinks, as he must on pain of 
inconsistency, that what Mary comes to know upon her release are new propositions. 
5 In fact it is a common practice to describe Mary as a 'physically omniscient scientist'. 
See, for example, Chalmers (2002a), Chalmers (forthcoming), Brian Loar (1997), 
William G. Lycan (2003), Philip Pettit (forthcoming), Tillmann Vierkant (2002). 
6 The important question that arises here is whether the mere distinction of the mental 
from the physical is really sufficient to establish dualism. One might argue that even if 
the knowledge argument showed the falsity of physicalism it would not immediately 
follow that dualism is true. The following passage by John Searle (1992) illustrates this 
point: 
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However, Churchland contends that dualists who defend their position by 
appeal to the know ledge argument are on shaky ground, because the 
argument against physicalism may be directed, in an exactly parallel form, 
against substance dualism. I call this the 'parity of reasons objection'. 
6.3 The Parity of Reasons Objection 
Churchland (1985a, 1985b, 1989) argues that if the knowledge argument 
were sound, it would prove far too much, contending that if, as Jackson 
says, the knowledge argument showed physicalism to be false it would 
equally show 'substance dualism' to be false. He defines substance 
Dualists asked, "How many kinds of things and properties are there?" and 
counted up to two. Monists, confronting the same question, only got as far as 
one. But the real mistake was to start counting at all. ... It is customary to think 
of dualism as coming in two flavors, substance dualism and property dualism; 
but to these I want to add a third, which I will call "conceptual dualism." This 
view consists in taking the dualistic concepts very seriously, that is, it consists in 
the view that in some important sense "physical" implies "non-mental" and 
"mental" implies "non-physical." Both traditional dualism and materialism 
presuppose conceptual dualism, so defined. (p. 26) 
Although Searle ' s claim deserves serious consideration, it has no impact on the parity of 
reasons objection. For both proponents and opponents of the knowledge argument would 
agree with Jackson's objection (1998a) to Searle as follows: 
Searle is right that there are lots of kinds of things. But if the thought is that any 
attempt to account for it all , or to account for it all as far as the mind is 
concerned ... in terms of some limited set of fundamental ( or more fundamental) 
ingredients, is mistaken in principle, then it seems to me that we are being, in 
effect, invited to abandon serious metaphysics in favour of drawing up big lists. 
(p. 4) 
It should be noted, however, that Searle ' s main thrust is consistent with the idea behind 
the parity of reasons objection. That is, if physicalism really were false then the mere 
introduction of an additional entity, such as mental substance, could not be a significant 
improvement. 
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dualism as the thesis that there exists a mental substance called 
'ectoplasm', the 'hidden constitution and nomic intricacies' of which form 
mental phenomena, such as visual experiences (1985a, p. 24, 1985b, p. 
119). It seems that, just like physicalism, substance dualism is a perfect 
target for the know ledge argument because no belief about ectoplasm, its 
structure, function, composition, etc., appears to enable Mary to know, in a 
black-and-white room, what exactly it is like to see red. Churchland (1989) 
thus concludes, 'Given Jackson's anti-physicalist intentions, it is at least 
an irony that the same form of argument should incidentally serve to blow 
substance dualism out of the water' 7 (p. 574). Churchland's idea is simple. 
He thinks that if we could defeat physicalism by appealing to a scenario in 
which Mary is omniscient with respect to the physical, then we could also 
defeat substance dualism by appealing to a scenario in which an agent is 
omniscient with respect to the physical and the ectoplasmic. 
Now we can illustrate Churchland' s parity of reasons objection by 
providing the following case, a simple variation of the original knowledge 
argument. 
6.4 The Knowledge Argument Against Dualism 
Imagine Mark, a brilliant thirty-fifth century scientist who is confined to a 
black-and-white room. People at this time have not only the complete 
science of the physical, but also the complete science of the mental stuff 
'X', which one of their ancestors discovered in the thirty-second century. 
The constitution and nomic intiicacies of X ground all mental phenomena. 
7 It should be emphasised that, as a physicalist, Churchland does not accept the 
knowledge argument. While he provides several objections to the argument, his main 
complaint is that the knowledge argument equivocates on the notion of knowledge. 
According to Churchland, while in premiss (1) of the knowledge argument Jackson 
focuses on propositional knowledge in premiss (2) he focuses on non-propositional 
knowledge. See Churchland (1985a), Churchland (1989). 
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Although Mark has never been outside his room in his entire life, he has 
learned everything there is to know about the nature of the physical and of 
X from black-and-white books and lectures on a black-and-white 
television. Mark's complete knowledge includes everything about the 
physical facts and laws of physics, which will include causal and relational 
facts, and functional roles. Moreover, his knowledge of X provides 
explanations about our ordinary mental phenomena, such as thoughts and 
feelings in terms of their relations to X. What will happen, we may ask, 
when Mark leaves his room and looks at, say, a ripe tomato for the first 
time? Since Jackson's original knowledge argument is valid, the following 
argument is equally valid. 
(7) Mark (before his release) knows everything physical and 
everything 'X-ish' there is to know about other people. 
(8) Mark (before his release) does not know everything there is to 
know about other people (because he learns something about them 
on his release). 
Therefore, 
(9) There are true propositions about other people (and himself) 
that escape the physicalist and X-ish stories. 
In order to see further that the above 'knowledge argument for dualism' is 
parallel to the original knowledge argument, the following new 
terminology will be useful: 
For any x and for any dualistic-i.e. physical plus X-ish-
proposition p, xis dualistically omniscient if and only if, if it is true 
that p then x knows that p. 
Using this concept, the above formulation of the know ledge argument 
against dualism is rephrased as follows: 
(10) Mark (before his release) 1s dualistically omniscient about 
other people. 
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(11) Mark (before his release) is not omniscient about other people 
(because he learns something about them on his release). 
Therefore, 
(12) Dualistic omniscience is not omniscience simpliciter. 
Just as Mary's omniscience with respect to the physical is silent about the 
phenomenal character of her visual experience, Mark's omniscience with 
respect to the physical and X is silent about the phenomenal character of 
his visual experience. Therefore, if the knowledge argument were cogent, 
it would refute dualism based on X as completely as it would refute 
physicalism. It is now clear that the knowledge argument is much stronger 
than people tend to think; perhaps too strong. Of course, the know ledge 
argument itself cannot be rejected solely by pointing out that it might be 
too strong, but Mark's case shows that there is, at least at first glance, the 
parity of reasons problem for dualists. Dualists adopt the knowledge 
argument in order to reject physicalism despite the fact that the argument 
might equally well defeat certain forms of dualism. It is at least unfair for 
dualists to emphasise only the anti-physicalist aspect of the knowledge 
argument. 
In sum: if the know ledge argument served as an argument against 
physicalism, it would equally well serve as an argument against a 
particular form of dualism. 
6.5 Replies from Dualists 
Jackson (1986) does not accept the parity of reasons objection to dualism. 
According to him, while it is possible to acquire complete knowledge 
based on physicalism in a black-and-white room, it is impossible to 
acquire complete knowledge based on dualism in a black-and-white room: 
To obtain a good argument against dualism (attribute dualism; 
ectoplasm is a bit of fun), the premise in the knowledge argument 
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that Mary has the full story according to physicalism before her 
release, has to be replaced by a premise that she has the full story 
according to dualism. The former is plausible; the latter is not. 
Hence, there is no 'parity of reasons' trouble for dualists who use 
the knowledge argument. (p. 295) 
One might think that the key issue here 1s the distinction between 
substance dualis1n and property ( attribute) dualisni. Churchland argues 
that ectoplasmic substance dualisni 1s vulnerable to the know ledge 
argument as much as physicalism 1s. Jackson replies to him that 
ectoplasmic substance dualisni is just a 'bit of fun ' and that property 
dualisni, a much more realistic option for him, can avoid the parity of 
reasons problem. 8 
Substance dualism is the metaphysical thesis that our world consists 
of t\vo fundamentally distinct substances: the physical and the mental. 
According to this thesis , mental states are derived solely from the states of 
mental substances, which have only nomological connections to physical 
bodies. On the other hand, property dualism states that mental properties 
exist, while mental substances do not. According to this thesis , mental 
states are mere physical states with special mental properties , properties 
that are clearly distinct from physical properties. Hence, the essential 
8 One might argue that Jackson 's concern here is not merely the distinction between 
substance dualism and property dualism. Perhaps his intention is simply to dismiss 
ectoplasmic substance dualism out of hand, as a viev,rpoint not even worthy of 
consideration, taking property dualism, instead, as a more plausible position. Then, he 
may be taken as arguing that there is no parity of reasons trouble because it is simply not 
plausible to suppose that an ·one could have the full story according to property dualism. 
If this is the correct interpretation of Jackson's passage, it runs into trouble of its own. If 
it is not plausible to suppose that an one could have the full story according to property 
duali m the position becomes a mere ad hoc hypothesis, with no substance of its own 
other than to shore up gaps in our kno ledge. 
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difference between substance dualism and property dualism comes from 
what each takes as components of the mental nature of the world. 
Substance dualism regards the mental nature as composed of mental 
substances and property dualism regards it as composed of mental 
properties. While classifying dualism in this way is a common practice in 
the philosophy of mind, this distinction has, essentially, nothing to do with 
the parity of reasons objection, because it makes no difference whether 
one identifies X with substances or properties. Mark's story could work 
perfectly well in either case. 
Howard Robinson (1993), another proponent of the knowledge 
argument, correctly realises the irrelevance of the distinction between 
substance dualism and property dualism. He claims that a certain kind of 
substance dualism is not vulnerable to the know ledge argument: 
Jackson points out that [the parity of reasons objection] does not 
touch property dualism, which is all that the argument proves.9 But 
neither does it touch a sensible substance dualism. 'Mental 
substance' is not something composed of 'ghostly atoms'-
whatever that would mean-but something that is not made of 
anything at all. In so far as it has a structure, that structure would 
be entirely psychological-that is, would consist of the faculties , 
beliefs, desires, experiences, etc. There would be no autonomous 
sub-psychological stuff. Such a notion faces many problems, of 
course, but this is the Cartesian conception, not the ectoplasmic 
one; and against this conception the knowledge argument is 
irrelevant. (p. 183) 
In the above passage Robinson shows that there are two kinds of substance 
dualism. According to the first, mental substance is composed of 'ghostly 
atoms'. Robinson implies that this kind of substance dualism would be 
9 Here Robinson refers to Jackson ' s passage quoted in the main text. 
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defeated by the knowledge argument to the extent that physicalism would 
be defeated. According to the second kind, mental substance is not made 
of anything at all. Robinson claims that this kind of substance dualism 
would not be defeated by the know ledge argument. Now we can make a 
parallel claim about property dualism. While one kind of property dualism, 
according to which mental properties are composed of 'ghostly atomic 
properties', would be defeated by the know ledge argument to the extent 
that physicalism would be defeated, another kind of property dualism, 
according to which mental properties are not composed of anything at all, 
would not be defeated. 
At this point it is clear that Churchland' s simple claim that substance 
dualism is vulnerable to the knowledge argument and Jackson's simple 
claim that property dualism is not vulnerable to the argument, are both 
incomplete. I now introduce a new way of looking at dualism in order to 
distinguish clearly a kind of dualism that would be defeated by the 
knowledge argument from a kind of dualism that would not. This 
classification relies on the reducibility of our ordinary mental phenomena. 
6.6 Reductive Dualism and Non-Reductive Dualism 
Reductive explanations are important for the scientific understanding of 
nature. For example, thermodynamics explains the temperature of a gas 
reductively, in terms of the mean kinetic energy of the constituent 
molecules. 10 The molecules that make up a gas are in constant motion and 
the temperature of a gas is a measure of the speed at which they move. The 
faster they move, the higher the temperature. Again, meteorology explains 
10 It is often said that temperature (in general) is reducible to the kinetic energy of the 
constituent molecules of the object whose temperature is at issue. However, strictly 
speaking, this is mistaken. It is true only for a gas , and not for a solid. See Churchland 
(1996), p. 41. 
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lightning reductively in terms of electric discharge. Electric discharge 
occurs as a result of the separation of positively and negatively charged 
particles in storm clouds, and lightning occurs when the power of 
attraction between positive and negative particles increases to a certain 
point. In general, the physical sciences provide reductive explanations of 
higher-level physical phenomena in terms of their underlying lower-level 
physical phenomena. 
Similarly, dualists may suppose that we can reductively explain 
higher-level mental phenomena, like thoughts and feelings, in terms of 
their underlying lower-level mental phenomena, of which those ordinary 
mental phenomena are comprised. Call the form of dualism that adopts 
this kind of reductive explanation 'reductive dualism'. On the other hand, 
other dualists may suppose that there is no reductive explanation 
whatsoever for our ordinary mental phenomena. According to this form of 
dualism, no matter how far our sciences may advance, those mental 
phenomena will remain irreducible, perhaps because they are fundamental 
primitives of the universe. Call this kind of dualism 'non-reductive 
dualism'. I now examine those two forms of dualism and argue that 
reductive dualism would be defeated by the know ledge argument to the 
extent that physicalism would, while non-reductive dualism would not. 
Reductive dualism is, in a sense, an elegant hypothesis because it 
presents a symmetry of the mental and physical natures of the world. 
Higher-level physical phenomena are reducible only to their underlying 
lower-level physical phenomena, and higher-level mental phenomena are 
reducible only to their underlying lower-level mental phenomena. The 
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physical and mental natures of the world are clearly distinct and never 
overlap each other. 11 
Ectoplasmic substance dualism, which Churchland introduces, 
represents one kind of reductive dualism. It explains our ordinary mental 
phenomena, such as visual experiences, in terms of their underlying 
mental substance, ectoplasm, of which those mental phenomena are 
comprised. Just as the temperature of a gas is fully explained in terms of 
kinetic energy of the constituent molecules, or lightning in terms of 
electric discharge, our thoughts or feelings are, according to this doctrine, 
fully explained in terms of ectoplasm. 
If we replace X with ectoplasm, we can see that ectoplasmic substance 
dualism would be defeated by the know ledge argument to the same extent 
that physicalism would. In the same manner, we can construct the 
knowledge argument against any form of reductive dualism. We replace X 
11 Since dualism is realism about two distinct kinds of substances or properties, the 
physical and the mental, one might think that there are two possible claims that reductive 
dualists may hold: 
(Rl) Our ordinary mental phenomena are reducible to their underlying physical 
phenomena, out of which those phenomena are composed. 
(R2) Our ordinary mental phenomena are reducible to their underlying mental 
phenomena, out of which those phenomena are composed. 
However, (Rl) is not an option for dualists because it says essentially that there are no 
mental phenomena over and above physical phenomena and that everything is ultimately 
explained in terms of the physical. It is, rather, a form of physicalism. Therefore, all 
reductive dualists must hold (R2). 
It is also possible for reductive dualists to claim that not only higher-level mental 
phenomena, but also some physical phenomena, are reducible to lower-level mental 
phenomena, or that not only higher-level physical phenomena but also some mental 
phenomena are reducible to lower-level physical phenomena. However, no dualists 
should want to hold this idea because it would violate fundamental conditions of 
acceptability on what would constitute a good explanation in both science and 
metaphysics; for example, simplicity, elegance and parsimony. 
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with mental substances or mental properties, out of which our ordinary 
mental phenomena are composed, and then let Mark learn, in addition to 
the knowledge afforded by the physical sciences, every reductive 
explanation provided by reductive dualism. Just like physically omniscient 
Mary, dualistically omniscient Mark would come to know, if the 
know ledge argument were successful, something new upon his release. 
It is worth emphasising again that the distinction between property 
dualism and substance dualism does not play a crucial role here, since it 
makes no difference whether higher-level mental phenomena are 
composed of underlying lower-level mental substances, like ectoplasm, or 
underlying lower-level mental properties. The knowledge argument 
against dualism above would be perfectly applicable to both reductive 
substance dualism and reductive property dualism to the exact extent that 
the original knowledge argument would be applicable to physicalism. 
It is also worth emphasising that I am not here merely claiming that 
we can reject reductive dualism because the knowledge argument is cogent. 
The cogency or otherwise of the know ledge argument is an interesting but 
completely separate issue, which I discuss in the next chapter. I am, rather, 
making the conditional claim that if the knowledge argument successfully 
defeated physicalism, it would equally successfully defeat reductive 
dualism. For as far as the knowledge argument is concerned, reductive 
dualism is exactly parallel to physicalism. If reductive dualists rejected 
physicalism by the knowledge argument, physicalists could reject 
reductive dualism by the argument as well. Conversely, if reductive 
dualists eliminated the force of the knowledge argument, physicalists 
could eliminate its force as well. (For example, if reductive dualists were 
allowed to say that the knowledge argument against reductive dualism 
fails because Mark cannot be dualistically omniscient in a black-and-white 
room, which dualists do tend to say, then physicalists would equally be 
152 
Chapter 6: Physical Omniscience and Jackson's Knowledge Argument (1) 
allowed to say that the knowledge argument against physicalism fails 
because Mary cannot be physically omniscient in a black-and-white room. 
I will return to this point in the next section.) The upshot is that, as 
regards physicalism and reductive dualism, there is no reason to favour 
one or the other as far as the knowledge argument is concerned. 
6.7 Application of the Parity of Reasons Objection: Chalmers' 
Panprotopsychism 
Dualists might argue that even if the parity of reasons objection is 
acceptable it has nothing to do with contemporary dualists anyway, since 
none of them subscribes to reductive dualism. According to this objection, 
while reductive dualism might have been popular in the modem period, it 
is no longer regarded as a tenable option, even among dualists. However, 
some serious contemporary dualists do subscribe, consciously or 
unconsciously, to reductive dualism. In this section, I apply the parity of 
reasons objection to Chalmers' panprotopsychism, which represents a 
contemporary version of reductive dualism. 
In trying to establish a well-formed theory of consciousness, Chalmers 
(1996) introduces two options that dualists may take: 
There are two ways this might go. Perhaps we might take 
[phenomenal] experience itself as a fundamental feature of the 
world, alongside space-time, spin, charge and the like. That is, 
certain phenomenal properties will have to be taken as basic 
properties. Alternatively, perhaps there is some other class of novel 
fundamental properties from which phenomenal properties are 
derived .... [T]hese cannot be physical properties, but perhaps they 
are non-physical properties of a new variety, on which phenomenal 
properties are logically supervenient. Such properties would be 
related to experience in the same way that basic physical properties 
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are related to non-basic properties such as [the] temperature [of a 
gas]. We could call these properties protophenomenal properties, 
as they are not themselves phenomenal but together they can yield 
the phenomenal. (pp. 126-127) 
Although Chalmers does not explicitly talk about reduction here, it is 
obvious that of the two hypotheses cited above, the former is non-
reductive dualism and the latter, panprotopsychism, is reductive dualism. 12 
The former states that phenomenal properties are not reducible to anything, 
because they are fundamental features of the world for which there is no 
further reductive explanation available in principle. That is, according to 
this thesis, phenomenal properties do not logically supervene on anything. 
The latter, panprotopsychism, states, on the other hand, that, just as the 
temperature of a gas is reducible to the kinetic energy of the constituent 
molecules, phenomenal properties are reducible to protophenomenal 
properties, of which those phenomenal properties are composed. 
Phenomenal properties, concerning which physicalism is completely silent, 
are explained in terms of protophenomenal properties. For, according to 
Chalmers, phenomenal properties logically supervene on protophenomenal 
properties (p. 126). 
While Chalmers (1999) entertains those two possible dualist options, 
he explicitly admits his preference for panprotopsychism. 13 
12 Another doctrine that might represent contemporary reductive dualism is J. C. Eccles' 
interactionist dualism. According to Eccles, a given mental event is composed of millions 
of 'psychons', which correspond to what Descartes and Hume call an 'idea'. Psychons 
interact, Eccles says, with dendrons, collections of dendrites in the cerebral cortex. See 
Eccles (1994), Daniel C. Dennett (1991), p. 37. 
13 It seems that Chalmers was initially inclined towards non-reductive dualism but 
changed his mind at some point. Now he is much more sympathetic to panprotopsychism 
than non-reductive dualism. Compare, for example, Chalmers (1995) with his (2002b). 
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Hill & McLaughlin say that I endorse epiphenomenalism, and that 
my anti-materialist argument implies epiphenomenalism. This is 
not strictly true. In fact my preferred position on the mind-body 
problem ... is not epiphenomenalism but the 'panprotopsychist' ( or 
'Russellian') position on which basic physical dispositions are 
grounded in basic phenomenal or protophenomenal properties . (p. 
492) 
In the following, I demonstrate that the parity of reasons objection presents 
Chalmers with a dilemma. As long as he wants to use the knowledge 
argument to undermine physicalism he has to give up panprotopsychism, 
which he prefers, and endorse non-reductive dualism, which he does not 
prefer. Conversely, if he wishes to endorse panprotopsychism, he must 
relinquish his appeal to the knowledge argument. 
Chalmers (1996) rejects physicalism by appeal to the knowledge 
argument, which he thinks successfully demonstrates the 'failure of logical 
supervenience' (p. 140). However, panprotopsychism, to which he adheres , 
is an exact parallel of physicalism as far as the knowledge argument is 
concerned. While physicalism says that phenomenal properties logically 
supervene on physical properties, panprotopsychism says that phenomenal 
properties logically supervene on protophenomenal properties (p. 126). 
Because of their parallel structure, the knowledge argument defeats 
panprotopsychism to the exact extent that it defeats physicalism. We 
replace X in Mark's case with protophenomenal properties, and then let 
Mark learn, in addition to the knowledge afforded by the physical sciences, 
every reductive explanation provided by the complete science of 
protophenomenal properties. Again, dualistically omniscient Mark would 
come to know, if the knowledge argument were successful, something new 
Recently, he contends that on one interpretation it is even possible to regard his 
panprotopsychism as a form of reductive monism. See Chapter 7 of this work. 
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upon his release. We could simply reject Chalmers' reductive dualism as a 
result of this consequence if the knowledge argument really did defeat 
physicalism. 
Now I consider two possible objections that Chalmers might raise 
against my argument. 
Objection 1: Panprotopsychism is Not Reductionist 
Chalmers might claim that his panprotopsychism is not reductionist, on the 
grounds that even if phenomenal properties are reducible to 
protophenomenal properties, protophenomenal properties themselves are 
not reducible to anything. Hence, he might conclude, Mark cannot have 
complete know ledge of protophenomenal properties and, contrary to 
physicalism, panprotopsychism would not be unde.rmined by the 
know ledge argument. 
This reply is vulnerable to another parity of reasons objection. If 
dualists were allowed to reject the knowledge argument simply by saying 
that, before his release, Mark does not have complete dualistic know ledge, 
physicalists would equally be allowed to reject the knowledge argument 
simply by saying that, before her release, Mary does not have complete 
physical knowledge. For, as Chalmers himself admits, certainly there are 
fundamental physical primitives, such as space-time, spin or charge, that 
are not explained reductively by the physical sciences. It is clear that Mary 
cannot reductively explain what space-time, spin or charge are. Thus, to 
the extent that Chalmers could escape the consequences of the knowledge 
argument, physicalists could escape its consequences too . 
Obviously, this reply expects too much of reductive explanations. 
Although there are many basic irreducible physical properties, the physical 
sciences have successfully explained higher-level physical phenomena in 
terms of their underlying lower-level physical phenomena. It is hard to see 
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why Chalmers' panprotopsychism does not work similarly if phenomenal 
properties do logically supervene on protophenomenal properties and if 
protophenomenal properties are related to phenomenal properties 'in the 
same way that basic physical properties are related to non-basic properties 
such as [the] temperature [of a gas]' (Chalmers, 1996, pp. 126-127). 
Changing the topic from phenomenal properties to protophenomenal 
properties does not save Chalmers' dualism. 
Objection 2: Mark Cannot Learn About Protophenomenal Properties in a 
Black-and-White Room 
Chalmers might also argue that panprotopsychism is irrelevant to the 
knowledge argument because although phenomenal properties are 
reducible to protophenomenal properties, Mark cannot know what 
protophenomenal properties are in a restricted environment. That is , 
protophenomenal properties of colour experiences are not something 
leamable in a black-and-white room. 14 If this response were right, we 
would not be able to apply Mark's case to panprotopsychism. However, 
this objection is not compelling. 
Chalmers (1996) contends that protophenomenal properties 'are not 
themselves phenomenal' (p. 127). (Imagine how absurd it would be to say, 
for example, 'I had a protophenomenal experience of a red sensation 
yesterday'!). Protophenomenal properties are supposed to be, rather, 
fundamental constituents of phenomenal properties that are necessary for 
reductive explanations of phenomenal properties. Chalmers also says that 
combining protophenomenal properties yields phenomenal properties (p. 
127), which implies that each phenomenal property is identified by the 
composition of its underlying protophenomenal properties . From these 
14 Notice that this response resembles Jackson 's reply to Churchland' s parity of reasons 
objection. 
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characteristics of protophenomenal properties there seems no reason to 
suppose that panprotopsychism requires Mark actually to have a red 
experience in order to know what it is like to see red. If panprotopsychism 
were true then Mark should be able to be dualistically omniscient and 
come to know what it is like to see red in a black-and-white environment. 
Of course, Chalmers might choose to accept all this and still stipulate 
that Mark has to have a relevant experience in order to understand its 
underlying protophenomenal properties. However, it is hard to understand 
the motivation for doing that when, again, protophenomenal properties 
'are not themselves phenomenal' (p. 127). It is unclear how having a 
particular experience helps in understanding protophenomenal, that is non-
phenomenal, properties. Chalmers says that 'it is very hard to imagine 
what a protophenomenal property could be like' (p. 127), but he cannot 
just stipulate characteristics of protophenomenal properties without 
providing good reasons. 
Chalmers argues that the physical sciences cannot solve the 'hard 
problem' of phenomenal consciousness by saying that '[p ]hysical 
explanation is "Well suited to the explanation of structure and of 
function ... [b Jut the explanation of consciousness is not just a matter of 
explaining structure and function' (p. 107). However, as we have seen, 
assuming that panprotopsychism is intelligible at all, it can merely provide 
structural and functional explanations of phenomenal properties in terms 
of their underlying protophenomenal properties. 
otice, ironically, that Chalmers ' panprotopsychism may here be 
parallel to ph sicalism thus leading again to trouble in the form of parity 
of reasons. Chalmers argues that protophenomenal properties are not 
themsel es phenomenal, but that together they yield the phenomenal (p. 
127). Hov e er, ph sicalists may equally argue that the physical 
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constituents of the brain are not themselves phenomenal, but that together 
they yield the phenomenal. 
Chalmers is a well-known proponent of the knowledge argument15, 
but if he endorses panprotopsychism he is not entitled to use the argument 
in the way he does. In other words, if he wants to reject physicalism on the 
basis of the knowledge argument, he has to endorse non-reductive dualism, 
which states that 'conscious experience [is] a fundamental feature, 
irreducible to anything more basic' (Chalmers 1995, p. 337). However, the 
problem is that Chalmers thinks, as we have seen, non-reductive dualism 
is less plausible than panprotopsychism. At this point, therefore, the parity 
of reasons objection presents Chalmers with a dilemma: He has to either (1) 
hold onto panprotopsychism and give up the knowledge argument or (2) 
hold onto the knowledge argument and give up panprotopsychism. 
Obviously, Chalmers would not want to do either of these. 
6.8 Conclusion 
The knowledge argument has been welcomed by dualists as one of the 
strongest motivations for rejecting physicalism and endorsing dualism. 
However, as we have seen, the parity of reasons objection shows that, as 
far as the know ledge argument is concerned, reductive dualism is no more 
advantageous than physicalism. Why then, has the knowledge argument 
been so vigorously supported by dualists and opposed by physicalists? 
Jackson (1982) contends that the knowledge argument is based on an 
anti-physicalist intuition that 'there are certain features of bodily 
sensations ... which no amount of purely physical information includes ' (p. 
127). However, this intuition seems to be based on a more basic intuition: 
there are certain features of bodily sensations which no amount of 
15 For Chalmers' defence of the knowledge argument, see Chalmers (1 996), pp. 140-146. 
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intelligible, reductive explaining can include. 16 Clearly, by itself, this is 
not an intuition about physicalism. Perhaps the reason it has been taken for 
granted by both dualists and physicalists that the knowledge argument is 
an argument against physicalism is the following: physicalists are the ones 
who have most ambitiously and eagerly tried to provide intelligible, 
reductive explanations of phenomenal consciousness in the last couple of 
decades. However, it seems to me, providing this sort of explanation is not 
only a necessary condition for the completion of the physicalist project, 
but also for that of any alternatives. 
16 For similar claims see Churchland (1989), pp. 573-574, Torin Alter (1998), pp. 49-51. 
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Physical Omniscience and Jackson's 
Knowledge Argument (2) 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 6 I argued, using the concepts of physical omniscience and 
dualistic omniscience, that Frank Jackson's know ledge argument was not 
necessarily good news for dualists, because if it were successful in 
undermining_ physicalism it would be equally successful in undermining at 
least a certain form of dualism. I did not discuss , however, whether or not 
the know ledge argument was in fact successful. Hence, the aim of this 
final chapter is to consider the cogency of the argument. 
In Chapter 5 I provided a new objection to Thomas Nagel 's bat 
argument by comparing it with the argument from Patrick Grim about 
knowledge de se that I discussed in Chapter 2. Similarly, in this chapter, I 
pro idea new objection to Jackson 's knowledge argument by comparing it 
ith the argument from concept possession that I discussed in Chapters 3 
and 4. Howe er, the way I formulate an objection to the knowledge 
argument in this chapter ill be slightly different. While in Chapter 5 I 
formulated the objection to the bat argument by appealing to its overall 
similarity vvith the argument from kno ledge de se, in this chapter I 
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formulate a new objection to the knowledge argument by appealing to its 
crucial dissimilarity with the argument from concept possession. 
As I have noted, Jackson's know ledge argument represents one of the 
most famous and provocative thought experiments in the philosophy of 
mind. Philosophers have worked on the argument intensively over the last 
twenty-two years and have reached almost complete consensus on the 
verdict of the argument: 1 it is not successful in refuting physicalism. This 
is not surprising, given that most contemporary philosophers are attracted, 
if not committed, to physicalism. What is surprising is, however, that they 
have not reached a consensus at all as to exactly what is wrong with the 
argument: some contend that the intuition behind the argument is mistaken 
(Dennett, 1991, Jeff E. Foss, 1993); some contend that the argument 
erroneously mixes up knowledge-how and knowledge-that (Lewis, 1988, 
Laurence Nemirow, 1980); some contend that it fails to distinguish 
knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance (John Bigelow 
and Robert Pargetter, 1990, Paul M. Churchland, 1985a, 1989, Earl Conee, 
1994); some contend that it overlooks the unique nature of phenomenal 
concepts (Brian Loar, 1990, 1997, Michael Tye, 2000, forthcoming). Since 
these objections are distinct from one another, they cannot coherently be 
advanced at the same time. 2 Thus, analysts of the argument are in a 
1 Almost complete, because, as I noted in Chapter 6, there are still a few philosophers 
who subscribe to the knowledge argument: David J. Chalmers (1996), John Foster (1991), 
J. P. Moreland (2003), and Howard Robinson (1982, 1993). It should be noted again that 
now even Jackson himself thinks that the argument fails to undermine physicalism. See 
Jackson (1998b), Jackson (2003), Jackson (forthcoming). In this work, however, I focus 
on Jackson's original anti-physicalist position. 
2 The fact that they are distinct is shown as follows: Dennett (1991) argues that Mary does 
not gain anything new upon her release, Bigelow and Pargetter (1990), Churchland 
(1985a), Churchland (1989), Conee (1994), Lewis (1988) and Nemirow (1980) argue that 
while Mary does gain something new upon her release from her black-and-white 
162 
Chapter 7: Physical Omniscience and Jackson's Knowledge Argument (2) 
dilemma; on the one hand they are quite confident that it is fallacious but, 
on the other hand, they cannot reach an agreement regarding the precise 
location of a defect. 3 
In this chapter I elaborate a new objection to the argument, which is 
largely different from those mentioned above. I try to accomplish my aim 
by adopting various concepts of omniscience. This chapter has the 
following structure. In Section 7.2 I review the knowledge argument. In 
Section 7 .3 I review the argument from concept possession. In Section 7 .4 
I argue that there is an apparent structural similarity between these 
arguments by using various concepts of omniscience. In Section 7 .5 I 
explain the most important difference between these arguments by 
reformulating them in terms of sets. In Sections 7.6 and 7.7 I focus on the 
difference and argue that the knowledge argument fails because it is based 
on an untenable assumption about physical omniscience. In order to 
defend my position I introduce what David Lewis (2001) calls 'Ramseyan 
humility'. I conclude this chapter's discussion in Section 7. 8. 
environment it is mere non-propositional knowledge. Loar (1990), Loar (1997), Tye 
(2000) and Tye (forthcoming) argue that while Mary does gain something new and it is 
propositional knowledge it is mere old knowledge in a different guise. 
3 Jackson, with David Braddon-Mitchell, examines various physicalist objections to the 
argument and states that what they call the 'there must be a reply' reply is the most 
compelling response to the argument. According to this response, while it is not clear 
exactly what is wrong with the argument, there must be something wrong with it, given 
the number of compelling reasons to hold physicalism. (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson, 
1996, pp. 134-135) It is interesting to note that this reply represents the very dilemma for 
philosophers that I mention in the main text. That is, although they are confident that the 
knowledge argument is fallacious they cannot pinpoint a defect. 
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7.2 The Knowledge Argument Again 
Again, the goal of the knowledge argument is to show that the physicalist 
position on the mind-body problem is untenable. It would seem extremely 
difficult to accomplish the goal, given that physicalism is by far the most 
widely accepted doctrine in the philosophy of mind. Jackson purports to 
accomplish this, however, with a simple thought experiment using the 
character black-and-white Mary. The following is Jackson's 'convenient 
and accurate way of displaying the argument' that I introduced in Chapter 
6: 
( 1) Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to 
know about other people. 
(2) Mary (before her release) does not know everything there is to 
know about other people (because she learns something about 
them on her release). 
Therefore, 
(3) There are true propositions about other people (and herself) that 
escape the physicalist story. 4 (Jackson, 1986, p. 293) 
When Jackson says that Mary knows 'everything physical there 1s to 
know' he means the following: 
[Mary knows] all the physical facts about us and our environment, 
in a wide sense of 'physical' which includes everything in 
completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is 
to know about the causal and relational facts consequent upon all 
this, including of course functional roles. (p. 291) 
4As I noted in Chapter 6, I have modified (3) slightly so that we can see the connection 
between the knowledge argument and my formulation of omniscience. Jackson ' s original 
statement of (3) is 'There are truths about other people (and herself) that escape the 
physicalist story'. Jackson would not mind this modification because he thinks, as he 
must think on pain of inconsistency, that what Mary comes to know upon her release is a 
new proposition. 
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In the above formulation Jackson adds the phrase 'about other people' to 
the description of Mary's complete physical knowledge so that we can 
focus on propositions about people's colour experiences and ignore 
propositions that are not directly or indirectly related to phenomenal 
consciousness.5 It would not really matter to the cogency of the knowledge 
argument even if, for example, Mary did not know that the capital city of 
Australia is Canberra or that Harvard is a private university. By adding the 
phrase 'about other people' we can safely set aside these sorts of irrelevant 
propositions. In what follows, however, for the sake of simplicity, I omit 
the phrase 'about other people' when I describe Mary's knowledge. 
7.3 The Argument from Concept Possession Again 
One of the two main arguments that I discussed in Part II of this work is 
the argument from concept possession. As I stated in Chapter 3, while the 
argument from concept possession has been introduced in a number of 
different forms by many philosophers,6 a standard form can be presented 
as follows: According to Judaeo-Christian theism God is necessarily 
omnipotent and necessarily omniscient. In order for one to comprehend 
certain concepts fully one needs to have a relevant experience. For 
example, in order for one to comprehend the concept fear fully one has to 
have an experience of being in fear. However, if God is necessarily 
omnipotent, He cannot have had an experience of being in fear. Hence 
5 Jackson adds the phrase 'about other people' for the particular purpose of emphasising 
that he is not concerned with indexical or demonstrative knowledge that is only relevant 
to Mary's personal colour experience. It is also important to note that Jackson's addition 
of the phrase has nothing to do with scepticism about other minds. See Jackson (1986, p. 
294). 
6 See David Blumenfeld (1978), Selmer Bringsjord (1989), John Lachs (1963a), Lachs 
(1963b), Michael Martin (1970), Martin (1974), Martin (1990), Martin (2000). 
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God does not fully understand what fear 1s. Therefore, God 1s not 
omniscient. 
I have formulated the argument from concept possession as follows: 
(4) If God exists then necessarily, He is omniscient, omnipotent, 
and omnibenevolent. 
(5) If God does not fully comprehend the concept fear then He is 
not omniscient. 
(6) Because of His necessary omnipotence God has not actually 
experienced fear. 
(7) For any agent x, x fully comprehends the concept fear only if x 
has actually experienced fear. 
Therefore, 
(8) God does not fully comprehend the concept/ear. (from (6) and 
(7)) 
Therefore, 
(9) God is not omniscient. (from (5) and (8)) 
Therefore, 
(10) God does not exist. ((4) and (9)) 
This is a version of the argument from concept possession introduced by 
Lachs, Martin, Blumenfeld and Bringsjord, which is based on concept 
empiricism. I argued in Chapters 3 and 4 that there was a more powerful 
version of the argument from concept possession that does not rely on 
concept empiricism. However, I refer to the above specific version in this 
chapter because the comparison between this version and the know ledge 
argument highlights a defect of the knowledge argument most effectively. 
The knowledge argument and the argument from concept possession 
appear, on the surface, to be very different. While the knowledge argument 
concerns the cogency of physicalism the argument from concept 
possession concerns the existence of the Judaeo-Christian God. Moreover, 
166 
Chapter 7: Physical Omniscience and Jackson's Knowledge Argument (2) 
as I mentioned briefly in Chapter 3, the argument from concept possession 
is based on an assumption that the know ledge argument is not based on, 
namely, concept empiricism presented as premiss (7). One might think that 
the knowledge argument is based on a similar assumption as follows: 
(11) For any agent x, x knows what it is like to see red only if x has 
had an experience of seeing a red object. 
However, Jackson (1998b) rejects (11). He contends that in order for Mary, 
to know what it is like to see red she does not have to have an experience 
of seeing a red object: 
Our knowledge of the sensory side of psychology has a causal 
source. Seeing red and feeling pain impact on us, leaving a 
memory trace which sustains our knowledge of what it is like to 
see red and feel pain on the many occasions where we are neither 
seeing red nor feeling pain. This is why it was always mistake to 
say that someone could not know what seeing red and feeling pain 
is like unless they had actually experienced them: false 'memory' 
traces are enough. 7 (p. 77) 
In sum: on the face of it, the knowledge argument and the argument from 
concept possession are quite distinct. Both their targets and main 
assumptions are different. However, in the following, I argue that there is a 
7 In order to vindicate the knowledge argument Jackson needs to reject concept 
empiricism. For, if concept empiricism is true and consistent with physicalism, then 
concept empiricism can provide a straightforward physicalist refutation of the knowledge 
argument: Mary does not know what it is like to see red before her release simply because 
she has never seen a red object. There is nothing mysterious or non-physical, according to 
this objection, in Mary ' s new experience. In fact, this is one of the most popular 
physicalist objections to the knowledge argument. For this type of objection to the 
knowledge argument see, for example, Bigelow and Pargetter (1990), Churchland (1985a), 
Churchland (1989), Conee (1994), Tye (2000), Tye (forthcoming). 
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structural similarity between these arguments. In order to accomplish my 
aim I utilise various concepts of omniscience. 
7 .4 The Structural Similarity Between the Arguments 
Jackson (1986) writes as follows: 
If Physicalism is true, [Mary] knows all there is to know. For to 
suppose otherwise is to suppose that there is more to know than 
every physical fact, and that is just what physicalism denies. 
Physicalism is not the noncontroversial thesis that the actual 
world is largely physical, but the challenging thesis that it is 
entirely physical. This is why physicalists must hold that complete 
physical knowledge is complete knowledge simpliciter. For 
suppose it is not complete: then our world must differ from a world, 
W(P), for which it is complete, and the difference must be in non-
physical facts; for our world and W(P) agree in all matters physical. 
Hence, physicalism would be false at our world [though 
contingently so, for it would be true at W(P)]. (p. 291) 
Recall the concept of 'omniscience simpliciter': 
For any x and for any proposition p, xis omniscient if and only if, 
if it is true that p then x knows that p. 
Recall also the concept of 'physical omniscience ' : 
For any x and for physical proposition p , x is physically omniscient 
if and only if, if it is true that p then x knows that p. 
Jackson ' s point in the above passage can be clearly presented by adopting 
these two concepts of omniscience. What Jackson essentially says is that 
the thrust of the knowledge argument, which could be illustrated by the 
Mary scenario, is the following--call it 'KA': 
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KA 
(12) If physicalism is true then physical omniscience 1s 
omniscience simpliciter. 
(13) Physical omniscience is not omniscience simpliciter. 
Therefore, 
(14) Physicalism is false. 
This formulation suggests that the core of the argument is reduced to the 
following simple question: Is physical omniscience omn1sc1ence 
simpliciter? If the answer to this question is negative, physicalism 
collapses; if it is affirmative, physicalism might be true. 
Recall that in Chapter 6 I reformulated Jackson's 'convenient and 
accurate way of displaying the argument' using the concepts of 
omniscience simpliciter and physical omniscience as follows; call the 
reformulation 'MARY': 
MARY 
(15) Mary (before her release) is physically omniscient. 
(16) Mary (before her release) is not omniscient simpliciter 
(because she learns something on her release). 
Therefore, 
(17) Physical omniscience is not omniscience simpliciter. 8 
Jackson thinks, as the paragraph quoted above suggests, that premiss (12) 
in KA is obviously true. And now we can see that Jackson uses MARY in 
order to establish the more controversial premiss (13) in KA. 
We can find the exact parallel structure in the argument from concept 
possession by reformulating the argument in the same manner. In order to 
1 
accomplish this aim a new formulation of divine omniscience is in order. 
In Part II of this work I assumed that divine omniscience is omniscience 
8 As I noted earlier, in this chapter, I omit the phrase 'about other people' for the sake of 
simplicity. 
169 
Chapter 7: Physical Omniscience and Jackson's Knowledge Argument (2) 
simpliciter, instantiated as one of God's necessary attributes. However, in 
this chapter, I adopt the following slightly different concept of divine 
omniscience: 
For any x and for any proposition p, the knowing of which is 
consistent with necessary divine attributes, xis divinely omniscient 
if and only if, if it is true that p then x knows that p. 
According to this formulation of divine omniscience, one 1s divinely 
omniscient if one knows all true propositions, the knowing of which is 
consistent with necessary divine omnipotence, necessary divine 
omnibenevolence and so on.9 Given that God is a perfect being there is no 
reason why He would deliberately fail to know what He can know. 
Therefore, God is divinely omniscient. Using the notion of divine 
omniscience, the thrust of the argument from concept possession can be 
reformulated as follows-call it 'ACP': 
ACP 
(18) If Judaeo-Christian theism is true then divine omniscience is 
omniscience simpliciter. 
(19) Divine omniscience is not omniscience simpliciter. 
Therefore, 
(20) Judaeo-Christian theism is false. 10 
This formulation suggests that the core of the argument is reduced to the 
following simple question: Is divine omniscience omniscience simpliciter? 
If the answer to this question is negative, Judaeo-Christian theism 
9 In this work I am not concerned with exactly what necessary divine attributes are. I also 
assume, for the sake of argument, that God can have all divine attributes , whatever they 
are, consistently. 
10 Notice that this is similar to the argument against God ' s omnipotence that I introduced 
in Chapter 5. 
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collapses; if it is affirmative, Judaeo-Christian theism might be true. 11 
Notice that ACP is structurally parallel to KA. 
Using the concepts of omniscience simpliciter and divine omniscience, 
a more specific scenario in the argument from concept possession is 
formulated as follows-call it 'GOD'. 
GOD 
(21) God is divinely omniscient. 
(22) God is not omniscient simpliciter (because He does not 
comprehend fully what fear is). 
Therefore, 
(23) Divine omniscience is not omniscience simpliciter. 
Proponents of the argument from concept possession think that premiss 
(18) in ACP is obviously true. And now we can see that they use GOD in 
order to establish the more controversial premiss (19) in ACP. 
At this point it is clear that ACP is structurally parallel to KA, and 
GOD is structurally parallel to MARY, and hence overall, the knowledge 
argument is structurally parallel to the argument from concept possession. 
Can we then undermine the knowledge argument by applying my 
objection to the argument from concept possession, just as I undermined in 
Chapter 5 Nagel's bat argument by applying my objection to Grim's 
argument from knowledge de se? Unfortunately, we cannot. For although 
the knowledge argument and the argument from concept possession are 
structurally parallel, as I have noted, there are various differences between 
these arguments. However, in what follows I argue that the comparison 
11 One might think that (18) is obviously false because God's omniscience cannot be as 
simple as omniscience simpliciter. I set this point aside in the main text because my main 
focus in this chapter is not to provide a rigorous formulation of divine omniscience, but to 
reveal a defect of the knowledge argument by comparing it with the argument from 
concept possession. What is important here is that proponents of the arguments from 
concept possession do think that ( 18) is true. 
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between the two arguments 1s helpful 1n revealing a defect of the 
know ledge argument. 
7.5 The Crucial Dissimilarity Between the Arguments 
Here is MARY again: 
MARY 
(15) Mary (before her release) is physically omniscient. 
(16) Mary (before her release) is not omniscient simpliciter 
(because she learns something on her release). 
Therefore, 
(17) Physical omniscience is not omniscience simpliciter. 
(17) is derived from (15) and (16). Since the argument is valid there is no 
reason to doubt (17) if (15) and (16) are both true. However, it is not 
entirely clear whether they are in fact true. 
(16) is based on our intuition that Mary comes to know something 
new upon her release from her black-and-white environment. Philosophers 
such as Dennett (1991) and Foss (1993) doubt our intuition here. 12 
According to them we judge mistakenly that physically omniscient Mary 
learns something new upon her release merely because the possession of 
complete physical knowledge is far beyond our ken. It is reasonable to 
doubt our intuition, they claim, especially when its consequence 1s as 
extraordinary as the denial of physicalism. Therefore, they conclude, (16) 
should be rejected. While this might be a reasonable physicalist objection 
to the knowledge argument I do not examine it in this chapter. For I argue 
that even if our intuition is reliable and even if it is true that Mary does 
come to know something new upon her release, there still is a good reason 
12 Since he announced in 1998b that he gave up the knowledge argument himself Jackson 
has also questioned our intuition. See Jackson (1998b), Jackson (2003), Jackson 
(forthcoming). 
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for most physicalists to reject the conclusion of the knowledge argument. 
In what follows I accept (16) for the sake of argument and focus on (15), 
which has been questioned by very few philosophers. 13 
For the purpose of developing a new objection to the knowledge 
argument it is helpful to formulate MARY in terms of sets. Let T be the set 
of all true propositions, P be the set of all true physical propositions, and 
M be the set of true propositions that Mary knows in a black-and-white 
room.
14 MARY then can be reformulated as follows-call it 'MARY*': 
MARY* 
(24) M=P. 
(25) Mis a proper subset of T. 
Therefore, 
(26) P is a proper subset of T. 
(26) contradicts physicalism because, according to Jackson, physicalism 
entails the following. 
(27) P=T. 
MARY* can be summarised as follows: Physicalism states that P is 
identical to T. However, the apparent fact that Mary discovers something 
new upon her release seems to show that there is at least one true 
proposition p such that p is a member of T but not M. Hence, Mis a proper 
subset of T. Since, according to Jackson, M is identical to P, p is not a 
13 Other philosophers who reject (15), in quite different ways from mine, include: Torin 
Alter (1998), Owen Flangan (1992), Terence Horgan (1984), Daniel Stoljar (2001). 
14 In Chapter 1 I introduced Patrick Grim's Cantorian argument, according to which there 
is no set of all true propositions. One might think that Grim's argument shows that there 
are no such things as T, P and M. I am not, however, concerned with his argument in this 
chapter for two reasons. First, it is highly controversial whether or not Grim' s argument is 
successful. Second, even if it is successful it is essentially irrelevant to our discussion 
here. For, we can always block his argument by limiting the scopes of T, P and M 
properly. 
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member of P either. That is, Pis also a proper subset of T. Therefore, it is 
false that Pis identical to T and hence physicalism is false. 
Analyse GOD in a similar fashion. Let T be the set of all true 
propositions, D be the set of all true propositions, the knowing of which is 
consistent with necessary divine attributes, and G be the set of all true 
propositions that God actually knows. GOD then can be reformulated as 
follows-call it 'GOD*' 
GOD* 
(28) G=D. 
(29) G is a proper subset of T. 
Therefore, 
(30) D is a proper subset of T. 
According to proponents of the argument from concept possession (30) 
contradicts Judaeo-Christian theism because Judaeo-Christian theism 
entails the following: 
(31) D=T 
GOD* can be summarised as follows: Judaeo-Christian theism states that 
D is identical to T. However, the apparent fact that God does not 
comprehend fully what fear is seems to show that there is at least one true 
proposition p such that pis a member of T but not G. Hence, G is a proper 
subset of T. Since G is identical to D, pis not a member of D either. That 
is, D is also a proper subset of T. Therefore, it is false that D is identical to 
T and hence J udaeo-Christian theism is false. 
Many theists have tried to show, as we saw in Chapter 3, that (29) is 
false. It is important to emphasise, however, that (28), viz., G=D, 1s 
uncontroversially true. (28) says that God knows everything that 1s 
consistent with His necessary attributes, which simply means that God 
knows everything that He can know. Again, given that God is a perfect 
being there is no reason why He should deliberately fail to know what He 
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can know. Hence, God's knowledge represents both G and D. In order to 
see this point, imagine that God has all the necessary di vine attributes but 
omniscience. 15 If we let God freely know all true propositions that he can 
know, then His know ledge will represent both G and D. 
However, unfortunately, the story is not so simple in the case of Mary. 
For (24), viz., M=P, which is analogous to (28), is far from obvious. This 
is the most important difference between the knowledge argument and the 
argument from concept possession. Mary is supposed to be physically 
omniscient. However, because of his dialectic, Jackson cannot simply 
release her and let her freely know as many true physical propositions as 
she can. Jackson has to confine her in a black-and-white room. Further, he 
has to design a vivid scenario in which Mary's knowledge is 
comprehensive enough to cover all true physical propositions yet not quite 
comprehensive enough to cover absolutely all true propositions. That is, 
Jackson has to place proper restrictions on Mary, so that she can gain 
(almost16) exactly minimal complete physical knowledge. If Jackson does 
not place proper restrictions, then he might fail to derive the falsity of 
physicalism. Suppose, for example, that Jackson's restrictions are so loose 
that Mary can know physical propositions as well as non-physical 
propositions, if there really are such things. Then, it is not clear whether 
Jackson is allowed to use the knowledge argument to derive the falsity of 
physicalism. For, we might no longer have the intuition that Mary 
discovers something new upon her release. Suppose, on the other hand, 
that Jackson's restrictions are so tight that Mary, before her release, can 
know fewer true physical propositions than there are to know. In this case, 
15 One might claim that God is necessarily omniscient, but this does not matter for the 
point that I make here. 
16 I added the word 'almost' because, as I noted in 7 .2, there are pieces of physical 
knowledge that are irrelevant to the cogency of the knowledge argument. 
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again, it is not clear whether Jackson is allowed to use the knowledge 
argument to derive the falsity of physicalism. For Mary's alleged 
discovery upon her release might be attributed to the true physical 
propositions that Mary's knowledge misses. In what follows, I argue that 
indeed Jackson's restrictions are too tight. In particular, I argue that there 
is a good reason to reject (24 ), that is, there is a good reason to think that 
Mary, in a black-and-white room, is not physically omniscient. 
7.6 Mary's Ignorance 
As I noted earlier, Jackson (1986) claims that Mary's knowledge in a 
black-and-white room covers 'all the physical facts about us and our 
environment, in a wide sense of 'physical' that includes everything in 
completed physics' (p. 291). How does Mary acquire such knowledge? 
Jackson describes her learning process as follows: 
Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, [and] is educated 
through black-and-white books and through lectures relayed on 
black-and white television. In this way she learns everything there 
is to know about the physical nature of the world. (p. 291) 
Now it is clear that the knowledge argument is based on the following 
assumption: 
(32) In principle, one can be physically omniscient by simply 
reading black-and-white books and watching black-and-white 
television. 
Is (32) a plausible assumption about physical omniscience? In order to 
motivate (32) Jackson (1982) writes, 'It can hardly be denied that it is in 
principle possible to obtain all this physical information from black and 
white television, otherwise the Open University would of necessity need to 
use color television' (p. 130). This reductio argument is not very 
persuas1 ve. 
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Jackson's description of Mary's learning process tells us at least two 
important facts. The one is that Mary learns monochromatically. The other 
is that Mary learns by reading textbooks and watching television. One 
might think that we can conclude from the first fact that Mary is not 
physically omniscient because in order to know certain physical facts 
about colour one has to have relevant colour experiences. For instance, one 
might say, in order for Mary to know what it is like to see red, an alleged 
physical fact about a specific phenomenal experience, Mary has to see a 
red object. However, this suggestion is untenable. As I noted in 7.3, this 
sort of empiricist thesis is subject to counter-examples. We can construct a 
possible situation in which one knows what it is like to see red without 
seeing a red object. 17 What is more important is the second fact, viz., Mary 
learns by simply reading textbooks and watching television. Surprisingly 
enough, most philosophers have overlooked this fact. Notice that even 
Jackson himself overlooks it and concerns only the first fact, viz., Mary 
learns monochromatically, when he justifies (32) by the above reductio 
argument. 
Mary learns physical facts by learning explanations of the structures, 
functions and dynamics of physical entities and properties from textbooks 
and television. Jackson (1986) describes this, again, by saying that Mary 
knows all the physical facts in 'physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, 
and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts consequent 
upon all this, including ... functional roles' (p. 291). In other words , Mary 
learns, by reading textbooks and watching television, all theoretically 
communicable physical facts that are based on a characterisation of 
physical entities and properties in terms of their contingent relationships to 
one another and to us. It is reasonable to think that Mary is physically 
17 I made a similar point with respect to concept empiricism in Chapter 4. 
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omniscient if we include only this much 1n the meaning of the term 
'physical'. 
However, it 1s dubious that Mary can acquire knowledge of 
'completed physics' 'in a wide sense of 'physical" (p. 291) by simply 
learning through textbooks and television. For there is more to know in the 
physical nature of the world than the facts about entities and properties that 
can be theoretically communicable. In order to defend this point I appeal 
to what Lewis (2001) calls 'Ramseyan humility'. It should be emphasised, 
however, that Lewis himself does not appeal to the humility in order to 
undermine the knowledge argument. As I noted in 7.1, he rejects the 
argument by claiming that it erroneously mixes up knowledge-how and 
knowledge-that (Lewis (1988)). 
Suppose that Mary becomes physically omniscient by learning all 
theoretically communicable physical facts through textbooks and 
television. This means that Mary knows, using Lewis's terminology, the 
'final theory' of this world, call it T, which covers a true and complete 
inventory of the physical properties, including fundamental properties that 
play an active role in the actual workings of nature. Fundamental 
properties are intrinsic properties on which other intrinsic properties 
supervene. Intrinsic properties are properties which ground the 
dispositions of physical entities, characterising the entities that stand in 
various relationships. So for example, if a vase is fragile, then there are 
intrinsic properties whose instantiation characterises the fragility of the 
vase. Or, to take another example, if a car is shiny, then there are intrinsic 
properties whose instantiation characterises the shininess of the car. 
As Lewis says, scientific theorising and the discovery of fundamental 
properties are always closely related. One good example 1s 
electromagnetism. In the nineteenth century, through the failure of their 
attempts to provide reductive explanations of properties of positive and 
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negative charge, scientists concluded that that these properties were very 
likely to be fundamental. Consequently, they formulated theories of the 
laws that govern the phenomena of electromagnetism on the basis of the 
understanding that they are fundamental properties. 
If we replace the terms that name fundamental properties, such as 
properties of positive and negative charge, in T with existentially 
quantified variables then we can get the Ramsey sentence of T in the 
following form: 'For some x1 ... for some Xn T(x1 ... Xn)'. The Ramsey 
sentence tells us that there is at least one realisation of T, which is, of 
course, the actual realisation. Now an interesting question is whether or 
not T is multiply realisable. That is, whether or not there is a possible 
world such that T is true in that world but in which the arrangement of 
fundamental properties is different from that in this world. Lewis answers 
this question positively. While there are various possible ways of showing 
this, the most straightforward and least controversial one is presented as 
follows. Permute two fundamental properties FI and F2 in T and hold 
everything else fixed. F2 will be found in exactly those places in space and 
time that correspond to the places where FI was found originally, and, vice 
versa, and the physical laws that governed FI originally will govern F2, 
and, vice versa. This permutation represents a realisation of T that is 
different from the actual realisation of T. In other words, the permutation 
shows that there is a possible world such that T is true in that world, yet 
the arrangement of FI and F2 in that world is different from the one in this 
world. Therefore, Tis multiply realisable. 
What is so significant about the fact that Tis multiply realisable? If T 
1s multiply realisable, then no possible observation can tell us which 
realisation is actual. Suppose that there are two possible realisations of T, 
RI and R2, and that there are two possible worlds, WI and W2 in which RI 
and R2 are realised, respectively. If Lewis is right, then no theory, not even 
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the final theory T, can tell us which world we are in; for whichever world 
we are in, the Ramsey sentence is true. In other words, even if Mary 
knows the final theory T she still does not know the ultimate reality of the 
physical nature of the world because she does not know how fundamental 
properties are actually arranged. 
So, if Lewis's Ramseyan humility is cogent, then Mary, who knows T 
and a characterisation of physical entities and properties in terms of their 
contingent relationships to one another and to us in a theoretically 
communicable way, does not know everything physical. 
Therefore, Jackson's assumption (32)-viz., In principle, one can be 
physically omniscient by simply reading black-and-white books and 
watching black-and-white television-is false and the knowledge 
argument fails. 
Now I discuss two possible objections to my argument. 
Objection 1: Mary's Ignorance is Irrelevant 
One might object that my argument fails to undermine the knowledge 
argument on the grounds that Mary's ignorance with respect to the 
fundamental properties is irrelevant to her discovery upon her release from 
her black-and-white environment. This objection is based on the fact that 
in order to undermine the know ledge argument by showing that Mary is 
not physically omniscient we have to demonstrate that Mary is ignorant in 
a relevant sense. Suppose, for example, that Mary does not know that the 
capital city of Australia is Canberra. This does not undermine the 
knowledge argument because this fact, which Mary happens to miss, is 
irrelevant to her discovery about colour upon her release. It does not 
matter to the cogency of the knowledge argument that Mary may miss 
such irrelevant facts as this. 
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This objection is not compelling because there is a good reason to 
think that Mary's ignorance that the Ramseyan humility reveals is relevant. 
Mary's ignorance concerns fundamental properties that ground 
dispositions and characterise other physical entities and properties. Given 
that a phenomenal experience of colour involves highly complex 
manipulations of physical entities and properties in the brain, it makes 
sense to think that her ignorance is at least indirectly related to her 
discovery about colour upon her release. It would be surprising if 
fundamental properties had nothing to do with it. Of course, given the 
speculative nature of my position, there is no obvious empirical evidence 
to show that, in fact, it is relevant. However, at the same time, there is no 
plausible reason to think that it is irrelevant either. It is reasonable to hold 
that Mary's discovery upon her release is explained away by the fact that 
she lacks the knowledge of fundamental properties. 
Objection 2: My Overall Reasoning is Incoherent 
One might claim that my objection to the knowledge argument 1s 
inconsistent with my objection to David J. Chalmers' position, which I 
discussed in the previous chapter. For, my objection to the knowledge 
argument appears to force me to endorse panprotopsychism, which is the 
very doctrine that Chalmers endorses. So, according to this objection, my 
overall reasoning is incoherent. Again, panprotopsychism is a form of 
dualism, according to which phenomenal properties are reducible to 
protophenomenal properties. In a recent paper (2002b) Chalmers argues to 
the effect that if we identify protophenomenal properties with 
fundamental/intrinsic properties then panprotopsychism is essentially the 
same as a version of physicalism, according to which the term 'physical' 
subsumes physical entities and properties, which causally impinge on us , 
as well as fundamental/intrinsic properties, which are categorical bases of 
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physical dispositions. It might be claimed that since this is a form of 
physicalism to which my objection to the knowledge argument leads, I 
cannot criticise Chalmers' position in the way I did in the previous chapter. 
I reject this objection on two grounds. First, I disagree with Chalmers 
that fundamental/intrinsic properties should be labelled 'protophenomenal'. 
Unlike Chalmers I do not find any reason to think that 
fundamental/intrinsic properties are non-physical or that there is anything 
ontologically unique about fundamental/intrinsic properties by virtue of 
their underlying phenomenal properties. Second, and more importantly, 
while Chalmers defends panprotopsychism by appealing to the knowledge 
argument, I do not defend any position on the mind-body problem by 
appealing to the know ledge argument. Indeed, as we have seen, I reject the 
knowledge argument. Hence, even if I had to endorse panprotopsychism I 
could still defend what I maintained in the previous chapter, namely, that 
Chalmers cannot subscribe to panprotopsychism if he rejects physicalism 
by appealing to the knowledge argument. 
7. 7 Knowing the Fundamental Features of Physical Entities and 
Properties 
One might wonder how we can know the fundamental features of physical 
entities and properties if it is impossible to know them in a theoretically 
communicable way. In order to seek a possible answer to this question, I 
once again borrow an idea from the philosophy of religion that I 
introduced in Chapter 4. 
I wrote in 4.4 that God's knowledge, or at least some part of it, could 
be intuitive. What I mean by intuition is, again, immediate intellectual 
insight that involves nothing, not even direct perception of an object. 
Given that the fundamental features of physical entities and properties are 
unknown in a theoretically communicable way we may hypothesise that 
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they are known only by intellectual intuition. That is, Mary can be 
physically omniscient only if she can intuit the fundamental features. As I 
stated in 4.4 the statement that some truths are known only by intuition 
does not entail empiricism, at least not versions of empiricism that I have 
rejected throughout this work. For, again, intuition is non-experiential. For 
instance, when one intuits that there could be infinitely many marbles one 
does not need to have an experience of seeing infinitely many marbles. 
Intuition is also non-inferential, non-perceptual and non-imaginative. I also 
assume that it is also propositional for the reasons that I explained in 4.4. 
It seems obvious that, we, human beings, including Mary, do not have 
any power, based on intellectual intuition, to grasp the fundamental 
features of physical entities and properties. However, it is reasonable to 
think that there are possible beings-perhaps God or highly intelligent 
aliens on other planets-who can intuit them accurately. Lewis (2001) 
discusses this possibility as follows: 
Indeed, might God have the supernatural power to become 
acquainted with all fundamental properties, qualia or not, and to 
identify each of them by acquaintance? And if Humility did not 
apply to God, would He then be able to tell us just which 
fundamental property it is that occupies any given role? 
If there were God, who knows what supernatural powers He 
might have. But no matter what knowledge He might gain by 
acquaintance with the fundamental properties, he could not share it 
with us. Since we cannot express any of the answer-propositions to 
the question which fundamental property occupies a given role-
not in such a way that we know which of the propositions we are 
expressing-God would have no way to communicate His 
knowledge to us. If He wanted to remedy our ignorance, His only 
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recourse would be to impart to us His own power to identify 
properties by acquaintance. 18 (p. 18) 
I take it that Lewis refers to an intellectual intuition when he speaks of 'the 
supernatural power to become acquainted with all fundamental 
properties ... '. As he says, even if God knows fundamental features of 
physical entities and properties by intuition He cannot share His 
knowledge of them with us. For, even the final theory T, the most 
comprehensive and most accurate characterisation of the physical nature of 
the world that can be communicable to us, does not capture the 
arrangements of fundamental properties. The only way that God can 
complete our physical knowledge is, as Lewis states, to give us an intuition 
that can capture the fundamental features accurately. 
What if, then, we assume that Mary is given such an intuition by God? 
I believe that, under this supposition, we are no longer in a position to state 
intuitively whether or not she discovers anything new upon her release 
from her black-and-white environment. For, even if Mary knows 
everything about fundamental features we, who are to judge intuitively 
whether or not Mary discovers anything new, are miserably ignorant about 
them. However, physicalists can reasonably claim, on a different ground, 
that Mary no longer discovers anything new upon her release. For, Mary, 
who now knows the fundamental features of physical entities and 
properties, seems to be physically omniscient and, as (12) says, if 
physicalism is true then physical omniscience is omniscience simpliciter. 
If she is omniscient simpliciter, surely she should not discover anything 
new upon her release. There is nothing left to be known for omniscient 
Mary. 
18 It is interesting to see that Lewis evokes the notion of power, in particular a kind of an 
epistemic power, here. As readers might recall, this notion has emerged in a number of 
places in this work. 
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7 .8 Conclusion 
I have tried to establish a new objection to the knowledge argument by 
comparing it with the argument from concept possession. By formulating 
these arguments in terms of omniscience I have argued that while the 
argument from concept possession does not rely on a controversial 
assumption about divine omniscience, the knowledge argument does rely 
on a controversial assumption about physical omniscience. In order to 
undermine that assumption I have argued, by appealing to Lewis's 
Ramseyan humility, that Mary cannot learn the non-relational fundamental 
features of physical entities and properties by reading books and watching 
television. I have also discussed a possible way for Mary to know the 
fundamental features by adopting the idea that I introduced in Chapter 4. 
As I noted in Chapter 6, a number of philosophers take it for granted 
that Mary is physically omniscient. 19 However, what I have demonstrated 
implies that they think too highly of her-she is not actually as 
knowledgeable as they think. 
19 See, for example, Chalmers (2002a), Chalmers (forthcoming), Loar (1997), William G. 
Lycan (2003), Philip Pettit (forthcoming), Tillmann Vierkant (2002). 
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